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Summary
My thesis explores the political economy of trade protection in India. The first essay
outlines the political economy of trade protection in India. My second essay asks: Has
Protection really been for Sale in India? To answer this question, I use a unique dataset
to explain the political economy of trade protection since liberalisation. The traditional
Grossman and Helpman (1992) (GH henceforth) model of Protection for Sale (PFS hence-
forth) is used with a new measure of political organization. I undertake cross-sectional
analysis for several years from 1990-2007 and use the pooled dataset. The third essay
outlines the modified PFS framework that introduces a new measure of lobbying effect-
iveness to analyse how heterogeneity in lobbying affects trade protection. The underlying
framework is based on the idea that government preferences or the market structure of the
industry can influence lobbying effectiveness. The empirical evidence provides estimates
on effectiveness and examines its determinants. The fourth essay explores: Is Protection
still for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness? I undertake an estimation of the modified PFS
model against the conventional results presented in my second essay. I examine if differ-
ences in lobbying effectiveness can explain the variation in tariff protection levels across
Indian manufacturing sectors and construct a direct measure of lobbying effectiveness for
Indian manufacturing. Finally, I include additional political factors of importance to Indian
trade policy. The fifth essay asks: Join Hands or Walk Alone? I examine the factors that
affect the choice of lobbying strategy of Indian manufacturing firms for trade policy and
consider the exclusive use of a single strategy, to lobby collectively (Join hands) and lobby
individually (Walk Alone), along with the possibility of a dual strategy i.e. a combination
of collective and individual lobbying using information from a primary survey across 146
firms. The results are new for India and reveal the overall preference of a dual lobbying
strategy.
iv
Acknowledgements
The journey of my thesis has been one of ups and downs; a concoction of awe and ques-
tioning of self-beliefs has characterized its life span of four years. Nonetheless, in hindsight
it is a sojourn that I will cherish forever. I am grateful to several individuals as without
their support I would not have reached this stage.
My greatest debts are to my supervisors Prof. L. Alan Winters and Ingo Borchert for
their sheer dedication as mentors. Alan has been a constant support; without his encour-
agement and methodological rigour this thesis would have remained a set of ideas. Ingo
has constantly challenged me to think more critically and deeply; I have learnt from him
not only discipline but commitment. I hope to continue and aspire towards the standards
that have been set for me by my supervisors.
I gratefully acknowledge financial support for my PhD from the Commonwealth Schol-
arship Commission in the United Kingdom. I am thankful to the Government of India for
having deemed worthy my candidature for this award. At the University of Sussex, I am
grateful to Andy McKay and Mike Barrow who provided me teaching opportunities. I also
thank Peter Holmes and Michael Gasiorek for opportunities working with Tradesift and
advice on my PhD proposal.
The Confederation of Indian Industry in New Delhi has been instrumental in its sup-
port for my survey and I am forever indebted to them. I am thankful to United Nations
Asia-Pacific Research and Training Network on Trade, in particular Mia Mikic for provid-
ing a platform to build and showcase my research, she has been a great role-model. I must
also thank Cosimo Beverelli for invaluable supervision at the WTO; I have learnt much
from him to aspire for. I also owe thanks to Rashmi Banga for providing opportunities
that supported the final stage of this PhD.
vI was fortunate to have the advice of great practitioners in my field who were not
only kind but encouraging. I cannot thank enough Prof. Kishore Gawande for patiently
responding to several queries over the years. I am grateful to Prof. Gene Grossman for
giving me initial feedback on my research idea. This list would be incomplete without
thanking my examiners Prof. Marcelo Olarreaga and Dr Dimitra Petropoulou who kindly
agreed to examine my thesis.
I would also like to thank everyone that provided me with support to persevere on this
path. My first mentor Prof. Pradip Biswas at Delhi University for believing in me at a
very early stage and providing my first break into research in New Delhi. Prabir De who
has not only been an inspiration but a very generous colleague and co-author who has
supported every data concern and query that I have put to him in the past four years.
Deputy Secretary Indira Murthy at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry who gave me
the opportunity to learn trade policy in practice. This list would be incomplete without
thanking Abhijit Das and Rajan Sudesh Ratna for their encouragement.
I must mention my dear friends at Sussex who have supported this endeavour and also
provided much needed diversion from depths of the thesis. Ani for his insightful comments;
Mattia-fellow Trade PhD, Matteo, Eva, Egidio, Hector, Pedro, Tsegay, Yashodhan, Cecilia
and Nihar for being great friends and colleagues. I also thank Javier Lopez whose work
inspired me even before arriving to Sussex; Edgar Cooke for being a great mentor. I deeply
thank all my close friends back in India who have supported me at all times.
I cannot thank enough Marco Carreras who has supported me through the final stages
of the PhD; Bottarga made the journey a very pleasant one.
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my family; my father who has provided me with the
means to reach where I am today and continues to be my primary problem-solver, my
mother who has enabled me to believe in myself with her unconditional love, and my sister
who is my moral support and now on the path of her own PhD.
vi
Contents
List of Tables xi
List of Figures xii
1 Introduction 1
2 Political Economy of Indian Trade Policy 9
3 Has Protection really been for Sale in India? 16
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2 Protection for Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3 Literature on Protection for Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.1 Selected estimations of PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3.2 Indian Protection for Sale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Empirical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.1 Functional Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4.2 Measurement Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.3 Endogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4.4 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5 Political Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.6 Data and Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6.1 Industry Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6.2 Trade and Tariffs Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.6.3 Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6.4 Political Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.7 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.7.1 PFS with Complete Political Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.7.2 Has Protection really been for Sale in India? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vii
3.7.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4 Trade Protection and Lobbying Effectiveness 56
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 Literature on PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.2.2 Heterogeneity in Lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.2.3 Government Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3.1 Government Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.2 Lobbying Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.2 Estimating Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4.3 Lobbying Effectiveness in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4.4 What determines Lobbying Effectiveness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5 Is Protection still for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness? 99
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.1 PFS and Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.3.2 Additional Political Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.1 Lobbying Effectiveness γai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.2 Predicted Lobbying Effectiveness γ̂bi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.3 Additional Political Factors Ei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5.1 PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5.2 PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness & Additional Political Factors . . . 128
5.6 Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
viii
6 Join Hands or Walk Alone? Evidence on Lobbying for Trade Policy in
India 136
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.2 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2.1 Survey Design and Sampling Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2.2 Stratified Sampling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.2.3 Randomization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
6.2.4 Potential and Target Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.2.5 Final Sample and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
6.3 Stylized Findings on Lobbying for Trade Policy in India . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.4 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.5.1 Lobbying Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.5.2 Lobbying Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
6.5.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.6 Conclusions and future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
7 Conclusion 175
7.1 Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.1.1 Protection has been for Sale in India from 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
7.1.2 Modified PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
7.1.3 Geographically concentrated firms are more effective in lobbying where
effectiveness declines with increase in product similarity . . . . . . . 176
7.1.4 Protection is for sale (only) for very effective sectors . . . . . . . . . 176
7.1.5 Competition effects clearly dominate any free-riding for Indian man-
ufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.1.6 Indian manufacturing firms join hands while walking alone to lobby
the government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.2 Limitations and Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
7.3 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Bibliography 178
A Appendix 186
A.1 Mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
A.1.1 Industry Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
ix
A.1.2 WBES and NIC Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
A.2 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
A.2.1 PFS Theoretical Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
A.2.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A.2.3 First Stage Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.2.4 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.2.5 Political Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
A.2.6 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.3 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.3.1 OLS Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.3.2 First Stage Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
A.3.3 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.4 Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
A.4.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
A.4.2 First Stage Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
A.4.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
A.4.4 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
A.5 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
A.5.1 Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
A.5.2 Additional Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
xList of Tables
3.1 Percentage of organized firms and 4-dgt sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2 Protection for Sale across the Years: OLS vs Exact Identification . . . . . . 43
3.3 Cross-Sectional Structural Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.4 Pooled Cross-Sections: OLS and IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.5 Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization IiWBES . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.6 Implied a, αL and Sum of Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Summary of Estimates: Models 1-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2 Modified PFS: IV Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3 Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4 Most Effective Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5 Least Effective Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6 Determinants of Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1 Lobbying Effectiveness and Additional Political Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.2 Determinants of Effectiveness in Lobbying using Membership . . . . . . . . 122
5.3 Lobbying Effectiveness and Predicted Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4 Protection for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.5 PFS with Additional Political Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.7 Structural Estimates from the PFS models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.1 Survey Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.2 Lobbying by Average Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.3 MFN by Lobbying Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.4 SC by Lobbying Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
6.5 Lobbying Effectiveness by Lobbying Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.6 Lobbying Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
xi
6.7 Lobbying Strategy: Baseline Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.8 Lobbying Strategy given trade policy outcomes, Model 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.9 Lobbying Strategy given trade policy outcomes, Model 2 . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.10 Selection Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.11 Lobbying Strategy given Trade Policy outcomes, Model 1 with Selection . . 171
6.12 Lobbying Strategy given Trade Policy outcomes, Model 2 with Selection . . 172
A.1 Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
A.2 Summary Statistics by Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
A.3 First Stage Estimates: IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
A.4 Pooled First Stage Estimates: IV1-IV4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
A.5 Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization IiWBES : First Stage . . . 205
A.6 Protection for Sale across the Years: OLS vs 2 IVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.7 Pooled Cross-Sections with Time Dummies: IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.8 Pooled Cross-Sections with Time Dummies: First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . 208
A.9 Thresholds to define Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A.10 Summary of Political Organization Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A.11 Summary Statistics by Organized and Unorganized Sectors: IiCadot . . . . . 209
A.12 PFS with various Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.13 Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization: IiCadot . . . . . . . . . . . 212
A.14 Comparison of Political Organization Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.15 Modified PFS, OLS Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
A.16 First Stage Estimates Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
A.17 Comparison with previous estimates on India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.18 WBES Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
A.19 Protection for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness: First Stage . . . . . . . . . 238
A.20 PFS with Additional Political Factors: First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
A.21 Model 1 and Model 2, Additional Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
A.22 Comparison of Effectiveness: Chapter 4 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
A.23 Sampling Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
A.24 ASI Data 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
A.25 Target vs Actual Distribution across Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
A.26 Lobbying Strategy: Preliminary Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
xii
List of Figures
2.1 MFN Applied Tariffs in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2 Pre-reform MFN tariff changes 1990-1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 MFN tariffs and tariff changes 1999-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 MFN tariffs and tariff changes 2001-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1 Output and Imports in Indian Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 Tariffs, Output and Imports in Indian Manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Relative weight on Welfare in India across the years . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 Kernel Density estimates for coefficients from OLS1 and IV1 . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Kernel Density estimates for coefficients from OLS3 and IV3 . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.1 Lobbying Effectiveness and Additional Political Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2 Traditional PFS versus PFS with γai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3 Lobbying Effectiveness and Predicted Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4 Sum of Coefficients versus Lobbying Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.1 Geographical Distribution of Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.2 Lobbying Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.3 Lobbying Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
A.1 Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
A.2 Count distribution of World Bank Enterprise Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Trade policy is important especially in its role of securing balanced outcomes across dis-
parate needs in the economy. Discerning trends in trade policy across countries has been a
topic of interest both in economics and politics. It is widely acknowledged that trade policy
is governed by complex set of interactions, one crucial aspect being government-industry
correspondence having a profound impact on the development and design of trade policy re-
form. To a large extent, such interactions ascertain if the underlying determinants of trade
policy are economically appropriate and feasible in addition to being politically acceptable.
The political economy literature in the context of trade policy has served the spe-
cific aim of explaining the factors that have shaped different outcomes. Examples include
Grossman and Helpman (1994), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1982), and Gawande et al.
(2015) among others. This literature has recognized differences in examining trade policy
for developed countries versus developing ones. However, I find only limited empirical
research to explain the forces that shape trade policy in developing countries. This thesis
seeks to contribute towards this gap in the literature by examining the case of India.
Trade theory prescribed free trade, yet in practice we observe protection. Political
circumstances and development realities often govern this trade policy choice. This links
back to the complex interplay of interactions shaping such outcomes. Political economy
of trade policy has endeavoured to offer insights on these choices. The analysis of trade
policy with a political economy dimension finds one established and popular framework
in the model of Protection for Sale (PFS henceforth) by Grossman and Helpman (1994)
(American Economic Review 84: 833–850, GH henceforth). PFS describes trade policy
outcomes as the result of interactions between the government and special-interest groups.
2The model has been traditionally estimated for the United States using a binary measure
of political organization that is identified using information from contributions data.
Estimating the PFS model for developing countries has limitations that include at
least the following. First, the absence of data on contributions (as available for the United
States) for developing countries makes it hard to appropriately identify the binary measure
of political organization. Second, the political economy of trade policy can differ signific-
antly in developing countries. This finds acknowledgement also in Gawande et al. (2015)
among others who argue that there exist factors specific to explaining the political economy
of trade policy in developing countries that are not incorporated in PFS.
The arguments presented raise an important question, how do economic and political
factors determine trade policy formulation in India? My thesis is devoted to seeking mean-
ingful answers. Government-industry interaction in developing countries can bring crucial
information to domestic trade policy formulation. I exploit variation in trade, tariffs and
political organization for the manufacturing sector to examine the link between trade pro-
tection and political economy factors. The thesis begins with Chapter 2 that discusses the
political economy of trade policy in India and its evolution since independence. Chapters
3-6 seek answers to the question posed above by examining a set of hypotheses and testing
them against the widely developed empirical evidence for the United States.
One key ingredient in my story is that the interaction between the government and
industry, termed as "Lobbying" in the political economy literature, is a complex process
in the absence of any quantifiable political contributions, and is compared to the political
economy of trade policy in the United States. I adopt a structural approach in my thesis
that follows the PFS environment. The empirical analysis undertaken is based on a simple
intuitive modification of this framework that is arguably suited to examining the model
for India taking into explicit account the cross-sectional variation in protection across the
years since liberalization.
In applying the PFS model to India, an issue of importance is to incorporate spe-
cific features from Indian policy making. This motivates one of the primary aims of the
Chapter 3 which is to examine the question "Has Protection really been for Sale
in India?". I estimate the standard model of PFS using a new and unique dataset that
3combines trade and industry data. To enable comparison with two existing studies on
India, I first estimate PFS using cross-sectional data. Using data for each of the nine years
1990, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, and 2007, I find that protection has been
for sale only for 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004. This goes in contradiction to Bown and Tovar
(2011), who find support for the model in 1990. There are at least two explanations for
this finding. First, the cross sector endogeneity in tariff changes prior to 1991 is very weak
(shown earlier) explained in part by the large public ownership of industries before the
reforms. Second, I examine the model using 4-digit industrial data, while I believe there
were changes at the product-level of 6-digit classifications used in Bown and Tovar (2011),
but are much less attributable to being politically organized and more to commitments to
protect its infant industries at an early stage of development.
The estimation of the PFS model depends on the crucial identification of a binary
political organization measure. The absence of political contributions data for several
other countries has prompted the use of various methods to identify political organization
to estimate the PFS with data. However, the literature remains divergent on the correct
method to construct this measure. In the PFS model, the organized groups put forth
political contributions that are valued by the government to finance election campaigns.
On the other hand, political organization in developing countries is often a means of com-
munication and information exchange between policy-makers and industry. It can also be
argued that political organization does not necessarily imply actual lobbying.
Political organization can arise for different purposes in different countries. For ex-
ample, Mitra et al. (2002) uses information on individual members of one Turkish associ-
ation to respective sectors and uses a cut-off to construct organization, while McCalman
(2004) identifies political organization using information on the operation of an independ-
ent advisory body known as the Tariff Board in Australia. Also, it is often assumed that
all sectors are politically organized as in Gawande et al. (2009). However, making the as-
sumption that all industries are organized eliminates the binary identification of differences
in achieving trade protection. At the same time, it is arguably a reasonable one as most
industries are organized where organization implies membership to associations. This is
evidenced in positive contributions across all industries in the United States and informa-
tion on membership for other countries. Finally, with a binary measure there is no way to
account for further differences in lobbying that can achieve more or less favourable influence
4for policy-making. Thereby, it can be contested that moving forward with the assumption
of full organization, the further step is to incorporate differences in lobbying and exam-
ine how this disperse lobbying component affects the influence on protection across sectors.
Next, Chapter 3 uses the pooled data across all years with a new measure of political
organization arguably more reflective for the case of trade policy in India as defined in
the framework of GH. This estimation is undertaken to study the period as a whole and
derive structural estimates as averages to explain the political economy of protection from
1990-2007. In India, membership to associations are often seen as a more legitimate means
of lobbying where associations have close ties to the government and are seen a means of
crucial information for policy. These associations include especially the apex bodies of CII
and FICCI that sponsor and participate in general policy debates as outlined in Kochanek
(1996). In this light, I construct a new binary indicator for political organization based
on data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) that identifies firms that are
members of associations and has not been used in estimating the PFS model before. I
begin by using this information to construct the binary indicator in the traditional model.
The WBES data was collected from 2000-2004 and can be argued as a more appropri-
ate measure for the decade of 2000. I restrict my pooled dataset for 2000 onwards and
find strong support for the argument that MFN applied trade protection was in fact for sale.
Empirical evidence on the PFS with pooled data suggests that applied MFN protection
has been for sale only from 1999-2004. However, as argued above, organization as in the
PFS model is only a discrete story which has limitations in capturing how differences in
actual lobbying affect the influence on trade policy. Also, political organization does not
necessarily imply actual lobbying. Thereby, the empirical evidence on the traditional PFS
motivates the need of a measure to incorporate differences in lobbying across sectors. I
believe that such a modification can add value to the GH hypothesis, reflecting actual
lobbying abilities across sectors that leads to the next chapter of the thesis.
What is new in Chapter 4 of my thesis is allowance for the fact that different kinds
of lobbying which are hitherto unexplained in the PFS model can vary in their effective-
ness of achieving favourable influence for policy-making. But why one should explore this
question requires further depth. A primary explanation follows from the basic premise
of PFS that is the fact that an interest group can influence the outcome of trade policy,
5however in practice it is observed that the level of trade protection obtained by groups
can vary immensely. These are not simply restricted to being politically organized versus
unorganized as in the traditional framework. This motivates the need to understand why
different interest groups have different impact on policy outcomes and therefore achieve
different effectiveness in their lobbying efforts when interacting with the government.
An understanding of the sources of such differences can allow me to offer insights into
the political economy conditions that generate higher effectiveness in Indian manufactur-
ing. Quantifying lobbying effectiveness in obtaining policy outcomes has been a challenging
task as discussed by de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) in a very useful review on the lit-
erature on lobbying. In this light, the PFS model provides a potentially clean structural
framework to examine lobbying effectiveness. Chapter 4 begins with the primary aim to
provide original estimates on lobbying effectiveness for the manufacturing sector in India.
I use a simple modification of the structural framework of the PFS to derive theoretically
consistent empirical measures of lobbying effectiveness. Asserting potential heterogeneity
in terms of differences in lobbying for a trade policy outcome across sectors, the natural
questions to ask are the following. First, how to introduce this into the theoretical frame-
work of the traditional PFS model? Second, what can generate these differences?
The differences in lobbying for trade policy influence are introduced using a measure
of lobbying effectiveness that varies across sectors where heterogeneity derives from the
idea that lobbies have different influence on the equilibrium policy. It has been implicitly
assumed in much of the literature on PFS that lobbies only differ in terms of organization
that misses on several dimensions of potential heterogeneity in actual lobbying. To analyse
the impact of lobbying effectiveness on trade protection, I build a framework that follows
the environment in GH and makes the assumption that there may be two alternate factors
that can influence effectiveness in lobbying. This includes the predisposition of the gov-
ernment to supply protection (owing arguably to a perception bias to certain lobby groups
that present their policy stance better) or the ability of a lobby to organize and make a
case for protection (Baldwin (1989); Pincus (1975)). This simple modification gives us the
framework of Modified PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness.
The chapter concludes by examining the question: "What determines Lobbying Ef-
fectiveness in the Indian manufacturing sector?". I use the estimates derived from the
6modified framework and examine these in terms of the sector ability to lobby given by the
geographical location, similar or differentiated goods produced in the sector, opportunity
to interact with the government among others. The evidence suggests that sectors with
geographically concentrated firms are more effective in lobbying and the effectiveness de-
clines with an increase in similarity of goods produced in the sector. Further, for sectors
where firms produce differentiated goods, lobbying effectiveness increases with an increase
in geographical spread. This suggests an overall competition effect that seems to dominate
any free-riding effects that will be examined further in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
Accounting for differences of lobbying effectiveness in the PFS model can explain the
variation of trade protection across sectors. The primary question of interest is now to
examine how the differences in political economy factors explain the variation in trade
protection data across Indian manufacturing sectors. I attempt to construct a direct meas-
ure of lobbying effectiveness for the modified PFS framework developed in Chapter 3. As
stated earlier, the industry dealings with the Indian government for trade policy are of-
ten facilitated by associations in turn accompanied by rising government responsiveness in
industry association meetings. This information was used to construct a binary indicator
in Chapter 2 to estimate the traditional PFS model. The modified PFS model allows to
construct measures based on the information on firms that are members of industry asso-
ciations in each sector as proxy measure of lobbying effectiveness.
Using this in Chapter 5, I ask "Is Protection still for Sale with Lobbying Ef-
fectiveness?". The aim of this chapter is to examine if the traditional PFS model holds
with heterogeneity in lobbying effectiveness. The motivation for this chapter derives from
examining the estimates of the modified PFS framework with that of the traditional model.
I find that for the PFS model with lobbying effectiveness, protection is for sale but only
for those sectors that are very effective in lobbying the government.
In the traditional PFS, the government maximizes industry contributions and utilit-
arian social welfare and there is no scope for additional factors. However, there exist other
political factors that can influence government maximization that include employment in
marginal constituencies and other forms of representation. I control for additional factors
to account for any other political economy factors particular to Indian trade policy that
may be transferred to the government. This evidence further re-instates that for lower
7measures of additional political economy factors (in addition to lower values of effective-
ness), the PFS relationship between trade protection and inverse import penetration is
found reversed. Therefore, protection is not for sale for sectors with lower lobbying effect-
iveness and lower additional factors that influence protection.
Finally, the reason for writing Chapter 6 titled "Join Hands or Walk Alone?" is
to complement the structural analysis in this thesis with original information on the ac-
tual trade policy process in India. I examine the choice of lobbying strategy that includes
collective lobbying (Join Hands) by a group of firms or individual lobbying (Walk Alone)
by a single firm. Milner and Mukherjee (2011) suggest that trade policies in India before
1991 were often held hostage to the interests of few big business houses. The IMF support
to India in 1991 came conditional on an adjustment program of structural reforms that
included a reduction in the level and dispersion of tariffs. This was followed by the elim-
ination of licensing and introduction of competition that potentially reduced the pay-offs
to individual lobbying. I therefore argue that it is likely that individual lobbying prior to
the reforms were more effective as sectors were dealing with specific concerns. Post 1997,
there started evolving a duality in industry dealings with the government that consisted
of organized industry associations in addition to individual lobbying.
However, there exists an informal mechanism of government-industry interaction for
trade policy such that the earlier literature has argued that the exact role of these inter-
actions is not well defined. In this light, an understanding of various lobbying strategies
can motivate a clear mechanism for both industry associations and firms to interact with
the government. Overall, I find that Indian manufacturing firms join hands while walking
alone to lobby the government such that this constitutes a dual strategy. I find that the
likelihood of lobbying collectively is higher in sectors characterized by low concentration
(in relation to chapter 3 these are expected to be less effective) that suggests competition
effects clearly dominate any free-riding for Indian manufacturing firms and re-instate the
findings on lobbying effectiveness earlier in Chapter 3. The unique finding is the preference
of a dual strategy over the use of each exclusive single strategy by Indian firms.
The thesis concludes by outlining the results of examining the political economy of
Indian trade policy. I highlight the unique contributions that this thesis set out to make.
This includes explaining Indian trade protection in a new framework, estimating unique
8measures of lobbying effectiveness that derive from the preceding relationship and finally
studying lobbying strategies that is a first for India. Policy implications are brought to the
spotlight with the aspiration of reaching out to stakeholders. Finally, I identify avenues
for further research that emerge from the analysis.
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Political Economy of Indian Trade
Policy
The political economy of Indian trade policy is interesting on account of a unique insti-
tutional framework. My own experience of working at the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry (MOCI) in India led me to explore the mechanisms of this structure that seemed
dynamic yet not very well-defined in the past (Yadav (2008); Saha (2013)). Trade policies
in India have been the subject of strong political economy arguments. The interaction
between the manufacturing industry and the government has been a topic of wide debate
with a seemingly likely impact on India’s stance in multilateral forums.
Until economic liberalization in the 1990s, domestic interaction for trade policy was
only at the margin. By 2000, the policy scenario was transformed such that domestic pro-
ducer interests could effectively determine negotiating positions by communicating with the
apex organization of MOCI overseeing Indian trade policy as outlined in Narlikar (2006).
The increased engagement of India in international negotiations stimulated overlaps across
its fragmented ministries and sectors that further demanded greater domestic interactions
and meetings for mediation of differences across sectors.
Bodies such as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian
Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) became very active during the decade of
2000s. That associations sought to combine the interests of domestic business with the
imperatives of economic liberalization faced by India is asserted in Baru (2009). Govern-
ment response to domestic business concerns grew as industry was also actively involved
in multilateral negotiations at the WTO; in turn government participated in business as-
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sociation meetings at home to inform its multilateral agenda.
Another reason why it is interesting to examine political economy of Indian trade policy
owes to historically one of the highest trade barriers in the world. Figure 2.1 shows the
average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs (at the 4-digit of National Industrial Clas-
sification)1 for the manufacturing sector stood at a high of 85 per cent in 1990. Post the
IMF mandate in 1991, these tariffs reduced to 44 per cent by 1996. I find that the stand-
ard deviation of tariffs dropped by half during the same period but remained quite high
between 32-36 per cent. The nature of these changes in applied MFN protection across
1990-2007 (observed below) present the case of these tariffs as a potentially interesting
question to examine the extent to which political economy factors can be used to under-
stand the determinants of this specific trade policy in India. This enables an investigation
of whether these tariffs align closely with the well-known predictions of existing political
economy models.
Figure 2.1: MFN Applied Tariffs in India
Figure 2.1 shows the Mean and Standard Deviation (S.D.) for the MFN Applied Tariffs in India from
1990-2007.
India has always aligned to the importance of international trading systems while hav-
ing a degree of independence in its trade policy formulation. This stance is often linked to
the domestic set-up that has constantly expressed the specific needs of developing countries.
How this domestic political economy of trade policy evolved since liberalization deserves
attention. Figure 2.2 outlines the linear relationship between the pre-reform MFN applied
1The following figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are based on my own calculations using data at 4-digit of
NIC, following a similar analysis in Topalova (2007).
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tariff levels and the tariff changes in the period immediately after liberalization from 1991-
1996 for the manufacturing sectors. This uniformity is evidence that the tariff changes in
this period were in fact exogenous. After 1997, the sectors were characterized by uneven
levels of liberalization, explained in part by domestic interests fearful of market-oriented
reforms as found in Topalova (2007). This suggests trade protection may have been used
selectively after 1997 to meet certain objectives such as protection of less efficient indus-
tries or to meet other political economy objectives. In fact, I find a non-linear relationship
between the immediate post-reform tariff levels in 1999 and tariff changes across from 1999
to 2001 in Figure 2.3 and a similar picture for the tariff changes for 2001-2007 in Figure
2.4. This is evidence of the endogeneity in tariff protection assigned across manufacturing
sectors in India that warrants an understanding of the political economy changes over the
entire period of 1990-2007.
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Figure 2.2: Pre-reform MFN tariff changes 1990-1996
Figure 2.2 shows a linear relationship between Pre-Reform MFN tariff and tariff changes from 1990-1996.
Figure 2.3: MFN tariffs and tariff changes 1999-2001
Figure 2.3 shows a non-linear relationship between 1999 MFN tariffs and tariff changes from 1999-2001.
Figure 2.4: MFN tariffs and tariff changes 2001-2007
Figure 2.4 shows further non-linear relationship for 2001 MFN and tariff changes from 2001-2007.
Kochanek (1996) outlines the post-independence economy of India subject to heavy
government regulation weighted towards the dominance of the public sector. Indian policy-
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makers followed import-substitution industrialization as the chosen model of development
with extensive regulatory controls as asserted in Sinha (2007). High levels of trade protec-
tion were in place to protect infant industries considered vital to the country’s economic
growth. Milner and Mukherjee (2011) suggest that trade policies in India before 1991 were
often held hostage to the interests of few big business houses that were able to influence
the content of trade policies. This was the era of central planning when the state retained
autonomy of agenda. I therefore argue that it is likely that individual lobbying during that
time was more effective than any kind of collective effort as these businesses were lobbying
for their specific concerns. Industries only occasionally reacted to policy decisions and re-
sorted to lobbying the government directly for specific benefits. This is also evidenced by
findings in the literature and in interviews with the policy-makers that all point to a nar-
row group of large business houses that constituted the most influential groups sharing a
close relationship with the state. Yadav (2008) terms it as an opaque and unrepresentative
system where access only in few hands with money or strong political connections. It can
be said that the policy regime in place during this period was not conducive to collective
action and there were no associations lobbying for policy influence. Policy seemed skewed
to favour those who contributed to the political party in power as stated in Piramal (1996).
The IMF support to India in the face of an external payment crisis of 1991 came con-
ditional on an adjustment program of structural reforms. Chopra (1995) outlines that
for trade policy this included a reduction in the level and dispersion of tariffs, removal
of quantitative restrictions on imported inputs and capital goods for export production.
As a result import and export restrictions were eased and tariffs were drastically reduced
such that the data on average Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs suggests a decline from
approximately 85 percent in 1990 to 44 percent by 1996 across the National Industrial
Classification (NIC) 4-digit manufacturing industries. This was in accordance with the
guidelines outlined in the report of the Tax Reform Commission constituted in 1991. Also,
as alluded to in the introduction, the standard deviation of tariffs dropped by half during
the same period but remained quite high between 32-36 per cent. A linear relationship
was observed in Figure 2.2 between the pre-reform tariff levels and the tariff changes in the
period immediately after liberalization from 1991-1996 which is known to be an exogenous
shock.
Milner and Mukherjee (2011) outline the interaction between the government and in-
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dustry immediately after the 1991 reforms. Confronted with the need to raise funds to
finance the ruling party’s campaign for the 1994 state elections, the incumbent govern-
ment turned to large industrial houses for financial support as argued in Kochanek (1996).
The business groups in turn formed an organization called the Bombay Club consisting of
a group of prominent Indian industries to voice their concerns against trade reforms that
sought their reversal and demanded more protection for their industries from the surge in
import competition as outlined in Kochanek (1996) and Kochanek and Hardgrave (2006).
This seems to have marked the beginning of a transformation in collective influence of
business from individual business to associations.
The elimination of licensing and introduction of competition accompanied by an emer-
ging pattern of coalition governments could have potentially reduced the pay-offs to indi-
vidual lobbying. At this stage there started evolving a duality in business and industry
dealings with the government that consisted of organised industry associations in addition
to direct individual lobbying. Also, Indian business began to look at market opportunit-
ies abroad including overseas investment as highlighted by Baru (2009). India continued
on the path of further trade liberalization in the post reforms era. However, after 1997
tariff movements were not as uniform. Topalova (2007) shows that Indian sectors were
characterized by uneven levels of liberalization owing partly to domestic interests fearful
of market-oriented reforms. This suggests trade protection measures may have been used
selectively such as to protect less efficient industries during 1999-2001. This is evidence
of the endogeneity in tariff protection assigned across manufacturing sectors in India that
warrants an understanding of the political economy changes over the entire period. In fact,
I found a non-linear relationship between the immediate post-reform tariff levels in 1997
and the tariff changes across the manufacturing sector from 1999 to 2001 in Figure 2.3. A
similar picture was also observed for the tariff changes in 2001-2007 in Figure 2.4.
Further, there is an emphasis to understand the extent to which these changes in tariffs
reflected the lobbying power of the industry. Sinha (2007) outlines the policy scenario dur-
ing this time when the power and status of the nodal Ministry of Commerce and Industry
(MOCI) was enhanced and new institutions of trade policy compliance were created with
radically reformed policy processes and policy–expert networks. This strengthened the cre-
ation of new policy practices such that the number of officials devoted exclusively to trade
policy in the MOCI increased significantly. Following this, Baru (2009) outlines that the
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Council on Trade and Industry was also created for partnership between the government
and business in this period.
My own experience of working at the MOCI suggests the importance that the WTO
and its trade policy review seems to have played in the transformation that fostered
policy–expert networks.The trade policy review created increased opportunities of trade
and industry consultations within the domestic trade policy set-up. In light of this, do-
mestic trade policy witnessed several changes to adhere to rules in Geneva which received
participation from industry at home and their representation abroad.
The increased engagement of India in international negotiations stimulated overlaps
across its fragmented ministries and sectors that further demanded greater interactions
and meetings for mediation of differences. This was the time when bodies such as the CII
and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) became very
active. Baru (2009) outlines that these bodies started representing industry views on com-
promise formulas between sectors that would combine the interests of domestic business
with the imperatives of economic liberalization. Government response to business concerns
grew as industry was actively involved in WTO negotiations. In turn government parti-
cipated in business association meetings. CII and FICCI organized such regular meetings
with government officials to discuss policy and other matters. Individual lobbying became
more of informal personal access as it seems likely that it had lost steam with trade and
industry associations gaining influence in interaction with the government. These bodies
emerged as industry-led and industry-managed organizations consisting of several members
drawn from both public and private firms in India. The CII became actively involved in
projecting Indian interests abroad and in pursuing diplomacy both at home and abroad as
asserted in Baru (2009). Other sector-level associations also rose during this period such
as the Confederation of Indian Textile Industry(CITI), Council for Leather Exports among
others2.
2A further step would be to delineate association lobbying in terms of national associations and the
sector-level ones. This is not dealt with in this Chapter as there is no available information and the scale
of the survey did not allow me to cover this. I therefore consider the overall decision of association vs
individual lobbying.
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Chapter 3
Has Protection really been for Sale
in India?
3.1 Introduction
The Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) (GH henceforth)
has been traditionally estimated for the United States. However, the political economy of
trade policy can differ significantly in developing countries. Lobbying for trade policy in
India for instance rose in importance in the last two decades with a unique institutional
framework. The objective of this chapter is to put forth new empirical evidence on the
standard GH hypothesis as the first step to motivate potential modifications of the model
reflecting actual trade policy set-up for the Indian case in the following chapters.
The PFS model is a popular approach to endogenous trade policy. The model provides
micro foundations to the behaviour of organized lobby groups and the government to derive
the level of endogenous protection. It explains the differences in protection across sectors
with the inverse import-penetration ratio, the import elasticities and whether or not the
industry is politically organized1. The distribution of firms within the sector does not
matter for the determination of trade policy in the traditional PFS setting. Protection is
derived as positively related to inverse import penetration for politically organized sectors
and negatively related for the unorganized ones. Equilibrium tariffs are based on the joint
maximization of welfare for the government and special interest groups.
1The level of ‘industry’ and ‘sector’ is used alternatively in the PFS to imply the same unit of analysis
that is the sector such that the decision to lobby and how much to contribute is made at this level.
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The model assumes binary sectoral political organization where groups are either un-
organized or fully organized to lobby for protection. Import-competing producers have
an incentive to organize politically to lobby the government for tariffs on imports. The
owners of specific factors in each sector thereby organize to form interest groups to lobby
the government. In the model, such lobby groups put forth political contributions that are
valued by the government to finance election campaigns etc. The government in turn cares
both about social welfare and the contributions and seeks to maximize their weighted sum.
The lobby groups seek to maximize private returns in terms of their producer rents, and
their labour incomes, surplus and redistributed revenues as consumers.
The GH hypothesis has been examined by a number of studies that include Goldberg
and Maggi (1997) (GM henceforth) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) (GB hence-
forth) for the United States. Estimates for other countries include Mitra et al. (2002) for
Turkey; McCalman (2004) for Australia; Belloc (2007) for the EU; and Bown and Tovar
(2011) and Cadot et al. (2007) for India. This empirical literature has focussed on checking
the predictions of the model and estimating its structural parameters, as a strict test of the
PFS model would require a well-specified alternative hypothesis to explain trade protection
as argued in GM. Further, the absence of data on political contributions or lobbying for
developing countries such as India makes it hard to appropriately identify political organ-
ization when estimating the model for such countries.
In this chapter, I discuss the traditional model of PFS and use it to provide an inter-
pretation of the political economy forces that have driven the Indian experience of trade
liberalization. The analysis attempts to deal with various empirical issues outlined in the
existing literature on PFS and provides new evidence for India using data from 1990 to
2007. The estimation does not significantly detach from the original theoretical model. In
applying the model to India, I attempt to incorporate specific features from Indian policy
making. A unique dataset that combines trade, industry and lobbying information is com-
piled for analysis. A new empirical measure of political organization is constructed which is
based on the lobbying behaviour of firms in each sector within the set-up of the traditional
model. The empirical strategy attempts to overcome the weaknesses of previous empirical
tests using better political organization indicators. The estimation is undertaken particu-
larly for the manufacturing sector as the changes in political economy of trade protection
have undergone interesting transformation in previous years.
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The predictions of the model also depend on the nature of protective instrument ana-
lysed2 as argued in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000). An important question dealt with
in this chapter is to what extent the PFS model can be used to understand the determin-
ants of the specific trade policy of MFN applied tariffs. This enables an investigation of
the specific question of whether the particular trade policy aligns the tariffs closely with
the assumptions of PFS. Also, as observed in Figure 2.1, the MFN applied tariffs have
undergone several changes in the period under study until the late 2000s.
The structural estimates of the model include weight on welfare in the government’s
objective function relative to the weight on political contributions and the fraction of pop-
ulation that owns specific factors. There are issues in interpreting the weight on welfare as
several previous studies such as GB find large values for this parameter. The large values
of the weight on welfare documented in literature seem associated to large estimates of the
other parameter that is the fraction of population who are owners of specific factors. This
seems to be a contradiction, as if a large fraction of the voting population is organized when
the weight on welfare is much larger than one, there is doubt whether the government that
places such a huge weight on welfare is then exposed to the political pressures from lobby
groups (Mitra et al. (2002)). The structural estimates obtained from the estimation of the
PFS model in this Chapter are argued as being reasonable with the trade policy setting
in India. This provides evidence to the fact that the government cares both about social
welfare and producer interests reflected in lobbying interests in India.
Previous estimates on the PFS for India are found in Bown and Tovar (2011) and in
Cadot et al. (2014) and Cadot et al. (2007) that undertake estimations for India for se-
lect years that are 1990, 1997 and 2000. In this chapter, I examine the PFS for various
years from 1990-2007 as a means of comparison with the two existing studies. Further, I
attempt to use the pooled dataset that spans the entire period. One potential advantage
of the pooled data for the PFS set-up is the use of time fixed effects that can capture the
effect of political economy factors controlling for unobserved effects across the years. This
could be on lines of changes in political parties that can potentially alter the government
preferences for social welfare versus producer interests. I estimate the PFS model with
time fixed effects to control for any such effects.
2Tariffs and quantitative restrictions can produce different predictions
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In the PFS set-up, trade flows and import penetration are determined as in the specific-
factors model. Import penetration can however be correlated with the error term because
of endogeneity with respect to the tariff (GM, GB). This is solved using instrumental vari-
ables correlated with import penetration but not correlated with the error. I use variables
similar to the import equation in Trefler (1993), where the import-penetration ratio is a
function of factor shares in each sector that include the measures of capital and labour. I
attempt to analyse the estimation of PFS with a new set of instruments examining their
excludability. I present estimates using the method of Limited Information Maximum Like-
lihood (LIML)3.
The first aim of this chapter is to discuss the interpretation and derivation of the tra-
ditional model and examine the empirical issues in estimation by putting forth relevant
data concerns. The selected literature on the PFS and its extensions are also laid out for
the scope of the theses. Second, I examine the model using a new dataset for India, where
consistency is determined by examining if the signs of the coefficients are in line with the
predictions of the model. If the consistency check is satisfied, the structural parameters
can be calculated using the coefficients. Third, the attempt is to deal with the absence of
data on political contributions and lobbying for India. I construct a new indicator for polit-
ical organization in India based on data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES)
which has not been used in estimating the PFS model before. The indicator is based on
lobbying behaviour of firms in each sector within the framework of the traditional model.
Finally, I undertake a structural interpretation of the political economy factors of trade
liberalization in India along the lines of changes in government preferences across time
based on the findings of the model. The parameter values can then be used to explain the
tariff liberalization process that was undertaken in India.
What are the unique contributions of this Chapter? To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first attempt estimating the PFS model using a dataset that combines trade,
industrial data across a time period of 1990-2007 with lobbying information for the Indian
manufacturing sector. The two papers that have estimated the PFS model for India, have
restricted their analysis for only select years. Second, I construct a new indicator of polit-
3These were compared with the Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) method. However LIML is know to
give better estimates with potentially weak instruments. This will be argued in the following sections and
I will discuss the results using this method.
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ical organization in India based on firm lobbying in each sector within the letup of the
traditional model. Finally, I offer a structural interpretation of political economy of Indian
trade liberalization for several years.
The main findings of this chapter are the following. First, using the cross-sectional
data for each year, PFS hypothesis finds strong support for MFN tariff protection in India
for the select years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004. Second, I find support for the GH find-
ings using the entire pooled dataset that includes trade protection across nine years since
liberalization. Third, I no longer find the GH findings in terms of the traditional set-up
when I control for time or sector fixed effects. Finally, I present a more realistic structural
interpretation of the political economy of Indian trade policy that gives evidence on the
political economy of trade protection such that the Indian government seems to attach
importance both to social welfare and producer concerns.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the PFS
model briefly focusing on specific interpretations. Section 3 includes a discussion of selec-
ted literature on estimating PFS with empirical data and select theoretical extensions of
PFS that are relevant to the scope of my thesis. Section 4 presents details on two papers
that have undertaken estimations of PFS for India. The empirical issues in estimation of
the PFS are discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 focuses on identification of political
organization in the model in detail. Section 7 outlines the data followed by the empirical
evidence in Section 8 using the cross-section and pooled data for India. Finally, Section 9
concludes the chapter setting the ground for following chapters.
3.2 Protection for Sale
The PFS is a specific factors model in a multi-sector framework. Individuals have identical
preferences and differ in their specific factor endowments. The interaction between the
government and lobbying groups takes the form of a menu auction. It is a two stage
non-cooperative game. In the first stage, each lobby can present the government with a
contribution schedule. In the second stage, the government sets trade policy. The details
of the PFS model are attached in Appendix A.2.1
In PFS, the government weighs each dollar of contributions equally such the govern-
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ment objective is a weighted sum of the contributions Ci from the set of organized sectors
i ∈ L and the aggregate welfare W as shown below.
G =
∑
i∈L
Ci + aW (3.1)
The political equilibrium is a two-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, each lob-
bying group presents the government with a contribution schedule and in the second stage
the government chooses the policy to maximize its objective function. The equilibrium set
of contribution schedules is a policy vector that maximizes the objective function of the
government. In this game, the contribution schedule is set so that the marginal change in
the gross welfare of the lobby for a small change in policy equals the effect of the policy
change in contribution i.e. each lobby makes locally truthful contributions that reflects
true preferences of the lobby.
In the original PFS model, GH assume the interaction between the government and
lobby groups takes the form of a menu auction as outlined in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986). A sub game-perfect Nash equilibrium of the trade-policy game is outlined. The
interaction between lobby groups and the government has the structure of a menu-auction
problem following which the equilibrium is characterized as a joint maximization of welfare
net of lobbying cost. GH use Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to define a truthful contri-
bution function 4 Bernheim and Whinston (1986) state that the equilibria supported by
truthful strategies are the only stable and coalition-proof strategy. Coalition-proof means
non-binding communication among players that implies an equilibrium such that players
bear no cost from playing truthful strategies5.
Re-writing the traditional GH equation (A.15 in Appendix A.2.1) gives the following
estimable form, where the ratio of output to imports Xi/Mi equals zi6:
4GH argue that this contribution schedule reflects the true preferences of the lobby. However, I argue
that this approach from Bernheim and Whinston (1986) describes individual behaviour in menu auctions.
The GH is however an application of the cumulative group behaviour of individuals. Therefore, the notion
of truthfulness in this game may be questionable.
5Goldberg and Maggi (1997) proposed a Nash bargaining game as the simplified mechanism that they
argue gives the same trade policy outcome such that at the Nash bargaining solution, trade policies are
selected to maximize the joint surplus of both groups. Therefore, the first-order condition for the GH
approach and that of GM are shown to be the same. However, to the best of my knowledge, the proof
showing the equivalence of the two approaches is not available.
6I replace j with i which is only a notation for the empirical estimation.
22
ti
1 + ti
=
(
Ii − αL
a+ αL
)
zi
ei
(3.2)
Here ti is the ad-valorem tariff in equilibrium, Ii is an indicator variable that equals 1
if sector i is organized, the parameter αL > 0 is the fraction of the population organized
into any lobby and the parameter a is the weight that the government places on aggregate
welfare relative to political contributions. Finally zi is the inverse import penetration ratio
that equals the ratio of output to imports, and ei is the import demand elasticity.
From equation (3.2), I observe that for organized sectors the term 1−αLa+αL is positive
where Ii = 1. Sectors that are politically organized are thereby granted positive rates of
protection. The level of protection is positively related to the ratio of domestic outputs
to imports for such organized sectors. −αLa+αL is negative for unorganized sectors such that
those sectors that are not organized face negative rates of protection. This implies that
protection is negatively related to the ratio of domestic outputs to imports for the unor-
ganized sectors.
GM outlined the free trade equilibrium in this set-up. The PFS model will predict free
trade as the equilibrium outcome if all industries are organized such that Ii is one for all
sectors and the entire population owns specific factors implies αL is also one. This gives
the ad-valorem tariff as zero implies the free trade outcome. As discussed earlier values
of a above one show that the government favours welfare of the population very highly
compared to the contributions, while values below one show evidence of favour to lobby
groups. The model also predicts that protection for organized industries increases with the
relative weight the government attaches to political contributions relative to welfare and
falls with the fraction of voters that belong to an organized lobby group.
3.3 Literature on Protection for Sale
The GH hypothesis has been tested considering different countries and using various econo-
metric techniques. This section discusses selected literature on the PFS model in detail to
outline the theoretical and empirical issues that are dealt with in this thesis. In particular,
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I take up the first empirical investigations of the PFS by GM and GB. The two papers
that estimate the PFS with India are also discussed in detail.
3.3.1 Selected estimations of PFS
The earliest study to test the predictions of the GH hypothesis was GM. Their paper
considers the following form of the government objective function shown below where β
captures the weight on welfare. In this case, a the relative weight on welfare in the PFS
model is now replaced by β1−β .
G = βW + (1− β)
n∑
i∈L
Ci (3.3)
GM deviates from the GH menu auction and assume a Nash bargaining solution such that
trade policies maximize the joint surplus of the government and the lobby groups. Their
maximization yields the equation shown below.
ti
1 + ti
=
Ii − αL
β
1−β + αL
zi
ei
+ ui (3.4)
The econometric estimation takes the elasticity to the left hand side and an error term is
added7:
ti
1 + ti
ei = γ
Xi
Mi
+ δIi
Xi
Mi
+ vi (3.5)
Where,
γ =
−αL
β
(1−β) + αL
δ =
1
β
(1−β) + αL
Using maximum likelihood on data aggregated up to the 3-digit SIC level, GM use cov-
erage ratios of non-tariff barriers to find the pattern of protection as broadly consistent
with the predictions of the GH hypothesis. The import demand elasticities are from Shiells
(1991). Political contributions are at the 3-digit of the Standard Industrial Classification
7Conceptualised as a composite of variables potentially affecting protection and the error in the meas-
urement of the dependent variable.
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(SIC) and a threshold level of 100, 000, 000 USD is used to assign the political-organization
dummy. This threshold was chosen on account of a natural break in the data around that
point. To investigate the model predictions, GM used two set of criteria. First, if the signs
of coefficients in the equation above were as predicted by theory. Second, the structural
parameters were derived to check the admissible range between 0 and 1. GM also did
additional robustness checks by adding more variables in the estimation to test for better
fit.
The results show the signs and t-statistics of the coefficients are consistent with the
predictions of PFS. The structural estimates include the weight on welfare β found to be
0.986, 0.984 and 0.981 that are many times larger than that of the contributions while
fraction of the population represented by a lobby αL is found to be 0.883, 0.858 and 0.840
respectively. These are significantly different from zero and also fall in the admissible
range even without any restrictions on the empirical specification by GM. Thereby, GM
concludes that United States was relatively open to trade even when non-tariff barriers
were accounted for. The observed low protection levels can be explained by the large es-
timated weight on welfare and the lesser importance of political contributions.
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)(GB henceforth) also tested the predictions of
GH for the United States. A modified PFS model is set-up including new variables on
intermediate goods: an average tariff on intermediate goods in an industry and the av-
erage Non-Tariff barrier (NTB) coverage of intermediate goods. The dead weight loss
(DWL) from protection is also analysed where the greater the DWL, the greater is polit-
ical spending. GB considers the case in which members of lobbies are a small fraction
of the population where actions of any lobby do not affect other lobbies. This simplifies
the menu auction into a set of independent principal-agent relationships where each lobby
compensates according to the DWL times the weight on welfare for the corresponding
amount of protection. Lobbying competition is measured by the bargaining strength of
downstream users and upstream producers.
The intermediate input is assumed to be produced under constant returns to scale and
used by some or all industries. Now there are two parameters αL and αX , the fraction of
population organized into final good (L) and intermediate goods (X) lobbies respectively.
The government attaches a weight a to welfare relative to both contributions. Protection
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in an industry is an increasing function of the tariff on intermediate input tx. A system
of equations is estimated by GB that include the protection equation, the first stage for
import penetration and the effects of the DWL on lobbying spending. The two-stage least-
squares estimator proposed by ? is employed.
The empirical evidence strongly confirms the main prediction that in politically or-
ganized industries protection varies directly with z and inversely with e. The measure of
weight on welfare in the government’s objective is however quite large and similar to GM
that suggests welfare considerations figure prominently than political contributions. The
fraction of population represented by a lobby group is reported as one. The overall predic-
tion is the rate of protection on intermediates positively influences the rate of protection
for the final good. On the whole, GB concludes that the U.S. pattern of protection is
influenced by lobbying such that protection is for sale.
Mitra et al. (2002) investigate the predictions of the PFS model for Turkey using various
protection instruments: nominal protection rates, effective rates of protection and NTB
coverage ratios. The period under investigation is four different years from 1983 to 1990.
Lobbying is mapped to one of the most important Turkish industrialist organizations (the
Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association or the TUSIAD). The identification is
then validated using statistical discriminant and probit estimation techniques. The findings
augment support to the fundamental predictions of PFS, they find that politically organ-
ized industries receive higher protection than unorganized ones. Tariff rates are decreasing
in the import-penetration ratio and the absolute value of the import-demand elasticity for
organized industries, while they are increasing for unorganized sectors.
McCalman (2004) estimated the PFS model for Australia using ad-valorem tariff on
final goods, domestic output and imports for the two periods 1968/69 and 1991/92. Follow-
ing GM, he also moved the elasticities to the left of the equation to control for measurement
error. He endogenizes political organization and uses 2-stage least squares (2-sls) to deal
with endogeneity in political organization and import penetration ratio. The results find
signs of statistically significant coefficients confirming the GH hypothesis. The proportion
of population represented by lobbies is 0.88 in 1968/69 increases to 0.96 in 1991/92 and is
similar to the finding in GM.
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Imai et al. (2009) estimate a modified version of the PFS model where it does not
require industries to be classified as organized or unorganized. They use instrumental vari-
ables quantile regression presenting results that question the findings of the PFS model.
They argue that using a binary identification of organization can lead to misclassification
of industries that lead to inconsistent estimates of the PFS model. Their findings challenge
the traditional GH hypothesis and suggests the need to address the empirical inconsisten-
cies in estimating the PFS.
Mitra (1999) extended the PFS model by adding a new stage where interest groups
decide whether or not to incur the costs of getting organized. An industry being organized
is a consequence of several aspects in an industry. The level of protection in turn depends
on industry characteristics and other political and economic factors. He begins with the
second stage in PFS and solves the model by backward induction. In the second stage, the
government sets trade policy to maximize a weighted sum of political contributions and
overall social welfare. The first stage includes the decision of creating a lobby. Here he
concludes that the equilibrium ad-valorem tariff for an organized sector is no longer always
positively related to the government’s weight on political contributions. Also, larger groups
benefit less than the smaller groups from organizing.
3.3.2 Indian Protection for Sale
To the best of my knowledge there are two papers that have estimated the PFS model
with Indian data for specific years: Cadot et al. (2014) and Cadot et al. (2007) for 1997
and Bown and Tovar (2011) for 1990 and 2000-2002 averages.
Cadot et al. (2007) were the first that applied the PFS to estimate determinants of
Indian import protection. They present results for the GH hypothesis at the 4-digit In-
ternational Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 2 for 81 sectors using tariffs
for 1997. Their results are qualitatively consistent with the PFS predictions. The empir-
ical estimation presents a method to identify jointly the driving forces behind the observed
patterns of trade protection and which sectors find it profitable to organize for trade policy
influence.
They identify the politically organized industries using trade and production data in
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a multi-stage iterative procedure based on a grid-search procedure to generate a variable
that can define the cut-off between the organized and unorganized sectors. The first stage
consists of a standard GH equation without distinguishing between organized and unor-
ganized sectors to obtain the endogenous tariffs as functions of import penetration rates.
The first stage residuals are used to rank industries where sectors with high residuals are
assumed to be organized. A cut-off value is set based on this ranking and the magnitude
of the residuals is taken to indicate how successful each lobby was in obtaining protection.
This cut-off value is used to determine political organization Ii. The cut-off value that
yields the absolute minimum of the residual sum of squares is chosen to give a binary sec-
toral political organization vector. The political organization measures are then introduced
into a stochastic unconstrained version of the estimating equation and the coefficients are
re-estimated. The procedure is iterated until the system minimizes the residual sum of
squares.
The structural estimates are then used to derive estimates of lobbying contributions.
The weight put by the Indian government on contributions is a third (a = 3.09) of social
welfare is much lower than that estimated later by Bown and Tovar (2011) and the iden-
tified organized sectors are also very low at αL = 0.12.
Bown and Tovar (2011) later used the PFS model to estimate structural determinants
on India’s import protection. Pre-reform tariff data from 1990 is found broadly consistent
with the GH hypothesis. Immediately post liberalization, the cross-product variation in
import tariffs no longer supports the findings of the model. This is explained by India’s
1991–1992 IMF arrangement which is known to be an exogenous shock to its tariff policy.
The estimates using the post-reform average cross-product variation in import protection
from 2000–2002 restores the significant determinants of the PFS model.
The unit of observation is an imported product at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS)
level in 1990 or averaged for 2000–2002. Indian applied ad-valorem tariff data is used.
The sum of the applied tariff and an anti-dumping ad-valorem equivalent is also employed
as an alternative. Their combined results indicate that tariffs moved away from the GH
equilibrium with the 1991 reform. However, after 1997 it seems that the overall level of
protection was back to a new post-reform political–economy equilibrium consistent with
the PFS model.
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Several papers use coverage ratios for non-tariff barriers to measure protection in the
PFS model. However, the PFS model strictly interpreted should be estimated with tariffs
data. Bown and Tovar (2011) estimate the following equation, where the dependent vari-
able τ is defined as the applied tariff only or the tariff plus an anti-dumping measure:
τi,t = β0 + β1Ii
zi
i
+ β2
zi
i
(3.6)
The paper finds the estimates from 1990 to be consistent with the GH hypothesis such
that organized sectors receive more tariff protection than unorganized ones. The estim-
ated weight of welfare a = 833 was found very high and the fraction of organized lobby
at αL = 0.28. Their estimates on immediate post-1990s were found inconsistent with the
model predictions8. For 2000 − 2002, the significance of the estimates using post-reform
tariffs and additional Anti Dumping (AD) ad-valorem equivalent were restored. However,
the estimates of a = 537 and 397 were again very high (though lower than 1990), while
αL = 0.98 was much higher than 1990.
3.4 Empirical Issues
This section presents a discussion of various empirical issues on estimating PFS in the
existing literature.
3.4.1 Functional Form
A number of empirical studies (Baldwin (1989), Trefler (1993)) found a positive relation-
ship between import-penetration ratios and the level of protection. The logic being that
industries with high import-penetration reflect higher comparative disadvantage such that
these industries tend to lobby harder than others for trade protection. The GH model pre-
dicts a different relationship between equilibrium protection and the import penetration
ratio (in GH, it is the ratio of the domestic output to imports which is the inverse import
penetration) for organized sectors vs. unorganized ones. For the former, the relationship
is positive (hence negative between protection and import penetration, as noted above),
and for the latter, it is the reverse.
8On lines of India’s 1991-92 IMF arrangement interpreted as an exogenous shock to its tariff policy.
29
GM argues that protection levels being inversely related to import penetration is con-
trary to the traditional view of trade protection. The estimating equations employed in
earlier literature introduced import-penetration and political-organization variables ad-
ditively on the right-hand side. Estimating the protection equation without interacting
import penetration with political organization would be expected to document a positive
relation between import penetration and trade protection.
Another puzzle when taking the PFS model to data is that most industries classified
as unorganized receive positive levels of trade protection from the government9. The lack
of negative levels of protection cannot be taken as a refutation of the PFS model. It may
simply be evidence for extraneous factors that can potentially influence the equilibrium
level of trade protection. Empirically, this is typically dealt by introducing a constant term
as in GB, while an additive error term is introduced in GM who describe the error as a
composite of variables potentially affecting protection left out of the theoretical model.
But the main estimations in GM do not include a constant term which confirms to the
strict structural set-up of PFS. The trade protection equation is however derived by the
maximization of the joint welfare function of the lobbies, the government and additional
terms that imply deviations from welfare-maximizing behaviour. In this light, GM suggest
that political factors can be introduced into the model only by adding them into the welfare
functions. This argument holds importance in Chapter 4 where I introduce heterogeneity
in lobbying by introducing changes into the welfare function of the government.
The predictions of PFS also depend on the nature of protective instrument analysed
such that tariffs and quantitative restrictions can produce different predictions (Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (2000)). The nature of changes in applied MFN protection in India across
1990-2007 present the case of these tariffs as a potentially interesting question to examine
the extent to which the PFS model can be used to understand the determinants of this
specific trade policy in India. This enables an investigation of whether these tariffs align
closely with the assumptions of the PFS model. Further, Cadot et al. (2014) argue that
estimating the PFS for India is not subject to the same critique of the model as using
United States data, shown by estimates in Kee et al. (2008) where non-tariff barriers ar-
9Often discussed in the empirical literature such as in GM and GB, one of the basic predictions is
that unorganized industries should receive import subsidies and export taxes. However, in reality, such
instruments are rarely observed.
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guably explain as high as 75 per cent of trade restrictiveness in the United States, but less
than 20 per cent in India.
3.4.2 Measurement Error
The trade price elasticity ei that enters the PFS model is an estimate and could thereby
suffer potential measurement errors. One strategy to deal with this has been to move
the elasticity on the left-hand side as in GM and McCalman (2004) . GB and Mitra et al.
(2002) use instrumental variables estimation for the elasticities keeping it on the right-hand
side. To deal with the possible measurement error in this thesis, I follow the strategy in
GM and move the ei estimates to the left-hand side. However, it must be noted that the
dependent variable is an estimated variable where the estimated elasticities are multiplied
by the ad-valorem MFN tariffs. This presents a potential problem of heteroskedasticity as
also pointed out by GM such that I perform tests for heteroskedasticity in my estimations.
3.4.3 Endogeneity
The logic of endogeneity here points to a high level of imports as a cause of protection
when protection is in turn directed to reduce imports. As argued by Trefler (1993), this can
disguise the relationship between protection and imports. The import penetration ratio
is thereby endogenously determined in the PFS model as tariff levels can in turn have an
effect on import penetration ratios. The method of estimation used in various empirical
papers on PFS have attempted to deal with this endogeneity.
GM used a reduced form equation for the inverse penetration ratio using maximum
likelihood in their estimation of the PFS. GB, McCalman (2004), Gawande and Hoekman
(2006) used instrumental variables (2-SLS). These methods helped deal with the endo-
geneity in import penetration ratio. I instrument for import penetration using variables
motivated in the PFS literature presented in the following sections.
Gawande and Li (2009) discuss the problem of weak instruments in the 2-SLS estim-
ation of the PFS. They show that if the correlation of the instrumental variables with
the endogenous variable is weak then the parameter remains invalid. Thereby instrument
diagnosis needs to be included with F-tests to validate the results. The method of LIML
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is presented as the more reliable method than the 2-SLS with weak instruments for PFS.
3.4.4 Organization
The estimation of the PFS model depends on the identification of the binary political or-
ganization measure Ii. This is an exogenous identification in the PFS model. There are
several methods that have been used to determine this measure for various countries. For
the United States, the construction of this measure has relied mainly on what are called
political action committee (PAC) contributions. Such data on contributions for lobbying
is well documented. However, the absence of such contributions data for several other
countries has prompted the use of various methods to identify organization. In the case
of India for instance, Cadot et al. (2007) used an iterative procedure to identify 17 out
of their 81 ISIC Revision 2 sectors as organized10. I attempt to use new data to identify
politically organized manufacturing sectors in India.
3.5 Political Organization
The PFS model classifies every sector as either fully organized or completely unorganized.
The politically organized sectors are inferred by looking at the level of political contribu-
tions for the United States such that if the contribution is positive, the sector should be
organized. Empirical papers on PFS have used various methodologies to determine this
indicator.
A widely used method is information on political action committee (PAC) contributions
to proxy for the existence of a lobby. However, GM and GB that use PAC contributions
differ in their classification of sectors for the United States. In GM an absolute cut-off
for the contributions data made by firms is selected such that those above the cut-off are
considered organized. It can be seen that the sectoral contribution levels are all positive
for the 3-digit SIC sectors. However, it has been argued that not all contributions are
made to influence trade policy. This is put forth as a basis for the chosen threshold level at
100, 000, 000 USD. GB on the other hand regress the contributions on bilateral import pen-
etration interacted with 20 two-digit dummies that cover the total sample of 242 four-digit
SIC industries, where the organized industries are identified based on positive coefficients.
10This method is discussed in detail in the following section.
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All four-digit SIC codes within the two-digit code get the same level of binary sectoral
political organization.
Mitra et al. (2002) map individual members of a Turkish association to respective sec-
tors and use a cut-off to classify 12 of the 37 sectors as organized. The paper considers a
democratic versus an autocratic political regime. The political organization variable was
constructed in two steps. First, the membership data for the Turkish association was used
to determine the organized sectors. Second, discriminant analysis methods and probit re-
gressions were used to statistically validate the choice in the first step.
McCalman (2004) identified political organization using information on Australian
trade policy institutions namely the operation of an independent advisory body known
as the Tariff Board. After 1960, tariffs emerged as the major protective instrument such
that industries were able to initiate inquiries to have tariffs revised. The analysis is under-
taken for seven industry classes (groups) for Australia. If an industry was able to initiate a
request for tariff revision to the Australian Tariff Board and a report was prepared between
1960 and 1969, it was defined as politically organized. The number of politically organized
classes was aggregated and divided by the number of total classes within each group.
Bohara et al. (2004) estimated the PFS for Mercosur using various methods to construct
political organization. It is assumed that industries with total imports above the sample
mean are politically organized. Four other methods were also analysed to statistically
validate the binary partitioning of organized and unorganized sectors. First, all industries
were assumed organized. Second, industries with total imports from the world exceed-
ing the 85th percentile were considered politically organized. Third, the industries with
total imports exceeding the 90th percentile were considered politically organized. Finally, a
combination of a mean cut-off on imports and a 25th percentile cut-off on output was used.
Another method used is to assume that all sectors are politically organized to the same
degree is also used in the literature. Looking at equation (3.2) and assigning the value 1
for political organization gives the following equation.
ti
1 + ti
=
1− αL
a+ αL
zi
ei
(3.7)
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This equilibrium tariff is also referred to as the cooperative lobbying outcome in Gawande
et al. (2012), and it is argued as evidence of perfect cooperation between sector-specific
capital owners in their lobbying behaviour. It is important to note here that assuming
all industries are organized is different from any assumption on the fraction of population
represented by organized lobby groups (αL). Given political organization of sectors there
can still be a substantial proportion of the population that are not sector owners and hence
are politically unorganized and are absent from αL. Mitra et al. (2002) argue that using
an empirical specification tied more tightly to the theoretical model and classifying all sec-
tors as politically organized can produce more sensible estimated parameter combinations.
According to the PFS model, all organized sectors obtain positive protection while the
unorganized ones are given negative protection. However, all sectors in United States and
the Turkish datasets have positive or at least non-negative protection. Further, given the
positive amounts of political contributions for the United States observed for all sectors
there seems a strong possibility that all are politically organized.
Gawande et al. (2009) also assumes all sectors are politically organized at the aggrega-
tion level of 3-digit ISIC industries. They argue that this is true of manufacturing sectors
in most advanced countries where political action committees and industry associations
lobby their governments and also for similar industry coalitions prevalent in developing
countries. Further, as the analysis is at the aggregated level of twenty-eight ISIC at three-
digit level industries, the assumption is stated as being empirically reasonable. Using this
assumption, PFS is estimated to compare the welfare-mindedness of the government across
fifty-four countries.
Belloc (2007) tests the PFS for the European Union as one entity. She identifies the sec-
tors that are organized as lobbies with regard to trade policy. The Civil Society Dialogue-
External Trade (European Commission DG-Trade) is used as a means of constructing the
political organization indicator. This body holds regular meetings on external trade mat-
ters between the European Commissioner for Trade, senior Commission officials and trade
negotiators. She incorporates a feature of the EU institutional arena where lobbying is
mainly at the early stages of the policy formation by information provision to and ne-
gotiations with the European Commission. Using this information the organizations are
coded according to the ISIC Rev. 2 system at the 3-digit level. If, in a given sector, there
are at least five European-wide organizations registered in the Civil Society Dialogue Ex-
34
ternal Trade, political organization is set equal to 1, and zero otherwise. A concordance
is used from ISIC Rev. 2 corresponding to 6-digit HS as the estimation uses data at this
level. Political organization is thereby more aggregated than the trade variables. This is
justified on grounds of advantages from lobbying by organizing at the industry level and
more variation in protection across industries rather than within them. The identification
is validated using a discriminant function analysis, cluster analysis and probit estimation
techniques.
Bown and Tovar (2011) and Cadot et al. (2007) construct indicators on political organ-
ization for India. Bown and Tovar (2011) used data about organizations from World Guide
to trade associations for 199511, where an industry is organized if it lists membership to
at least five organizations. Cadot et al. (2007) identify the politically organized industries
using trade and production data in a multi-stage iterative procedure. The identified or-
ganized sectors are only 17 out of 81. They estimate the mean equilibrium contributions
using the PFS equations at 33 million USD per sector. When I examined the identified
17 sectors, it seems to have missed out on several very important sectors that are active
in lobbying. This may partly owe to the fact that the data refers to 1997 which was still
early in the era of organization and lobbying in India.
Political organization can be determined by other factors besides political contributions.
Imai et al. (2009) state that a particular threshold of campaign contribution to distinguish
between politically organized and unorganized industries as in GM is inconsistent and res-
ults in misclassification of political organization of an industry. PAC contributions can
understate or overstate trade-related influence activities and this can affect the cut off
between organized and unorganized ones. They argue that on reclassifying the politically
organized industries, one would obtain parameter estimates which no longer support the
PFS hypothesis. To show this, artificial data is generated from a simple equilibrium model
of trade where the political organization is purely random and government imposes a quota
on politically organized industries uniformly such that there was no protection for sale ef-
fect. Estimating the simulated model, the coefficients were found consistent with the PFS
model. It is assumed that there are 100 industries and each industry has 64 sub-industries.
Each sub-industry is politically organized with a probability allowing for some variation in
11There are limitations to this information that may not reflect accurately the actual membership or
lobbying behaviour of the domestic trade policy in India. I was unable to obtain the mentioned data and
check the validity of this information.
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the political organization probability across industries. They replicate GB and GM using
simulated data from the model above. It is shown that the PFS results can come from a
model where quotas can be obtained and these could be either binding or non-binding but
the imposition depends on organization: politically organized sectors get them, others do
not. Furthermore, import penetration and equilibrium campaign contributions are shown
negatively correlated in GM, which is exactly the opposite of the relationship assumed by
GB that classify industries as politically organized when the import penetration and the
PAC contributions per value added are positively correlated.
In this chapter I use new data to identify political organization in the PFS model.
This data is on membership to trade associations from the WBES of 2005. As a means
of comparison, I also take the political organization indicators from Cadot et al. (2007),
obtained from the authors.
3.6 Data and Mapping
To estimate the PFS model I needed data on imports and output to calculate the import
penetration ratio, data on MFN tariffs, industry characteristics and information on polit-
ical organization. The dataset in this chapter spans from 1990–2007 with gaps. The time
frame is a total of nine years: 1990, 1992, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006, 2007. The
main data is summarized in Appendix A.2.2.
3.6.1 Industry Data
The industry data for India is taken from the All India Survey of Industries (ASI) com-
piled by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) at the National Industrial Classifica-
tion (NIC). The NIC underwent several revisions from 1990 − 2007. For the scope of the
selected time period for my thesis, I deal with four revisions of the NIC namely: NIC-1987,
NIC-1998, NIC-2001 and NIC-2004. In 1998, 4-digit of ISIC Revision 3 was folded into
NIC-1998 and these 4-digits were extended up to 5-digits based on national needs for NIC.
After release of the ISIC Rev. 3.1 in 2002, NIC-1998 was updated keeping consistent with
ISIC Rev 3.1 and the updated version, namely NIC-2004 was adopted. I map all revisions
to NIC-1998. An important point to note here is that there exists a perfect one-to-one
correspondence between NIC-1998 and the ISIC Revision 3 of All Economic Activities of
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the United Nations at the 4-digit level. This helped achieve correspondence between the
tariffs and industry data.
The ASI data covers only the registered sectors. It consists of compiled time series data
on industry characteristics from 1998-99 to 2007-08 generated from the detailed results of
ASI for the corresponding year. The tables are by 2-digit, 3-digit and 4-digit industry
division for each State/UT. All data for the years 1999-2000 and 2001-2007 consisted of
127 manufacturing sectors each at the four-digit classification of the NIC. For 1990-1996
there are 98 manufacturing sectors. The differences in the number of observations across
the changes in classifications owe to the revisions across the years. The data had to be
mapped across these to NIC-1998 for comparability across the years. Finally, the 98 sec-
tors were selected for all the estimations to compare the results (Details on Mappings in
Appendix A.1.1).
3.6.2 Trade and Tariffs Data
The tariffs and imports data are from WITS TRAINS and WTO IDB. These contain tariff
data from 1990-2011 with gaps in the years. This database contains comprehensive inform-
ation on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied and bound tariffs at the standard codes of
the Harmonized System (HS) and ISIC for all WTO Members. This information on tariffs
and trade is compiled at the 4-digit level of NIC. Both output and imports are measured
at domestic prices shown in Figure 3.1 below. Since 1990s, the increase in average output
across the 4-digit sectors is clearly higher than that of the average imports in the same
period.
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Figure 3.1: Output and Imports in Indian Manufacturing
Figure 3.1 shows the average output and average imports for the Indian Manufacturing sector based on
the 98 sectors of the 4-digit of NIC/ISIC Rev. 3
3.6.3 Elasticities
Elasticities are from Kee et al. (2008). They provide a systematic estimation of import de-
mand elasticities at a much disaggregated level for various countries. It uses a semi-flexible
translog GDP function approach to formally derive import demands and their elasticities
which are estimated with data on prices and endowments.
3.6.4 Political Organization
Identification of political organization has for long been an issue in the empirical literature
on PFS. This study constructs a new measure of political organization for India using data
from WBES. Additionally, I take the organization indicators from Cadot et al. (2007) who
identify the politically organized industries using trade and production data in a multi-
stage iterative procedure12
Using information from the WBES, I construct a new measure of Political Organization
(IWBES) for Indian manufacturing sectors. This is based on the share of firms that are
members of associations in each 4-digit sector. The number of sectors varying in terms of
this share (from <0.20 upto 1) is shown in Table 3.1 below. Based on the shares of firms
as members of associations, I created four quantiles for the shares taking the percentiles of
0.74, 0.82, 0.85 and 0.89 (LM I- LM IV) as different thresholds to construct the political
12They identify 17 out of 81 industries as organized at ISIC Revision 2. This is mapped to the 4-digit
level of NIC in my study that corresponds to 4-digit of ISIC Revision 3. I identify 47 out of the 98
manufacturing industries as politically organized when I use their classification.
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organization indicator. I found the threshold of 0.75 gives the most variation to identify
differences by organized and unorganized sectors. I find that with the other thresholds
higher than the share of 0.75 do not fit the model. I use this threshold as the cut-off meas-
ure for the political organization indicator in my estimations13. Finally, the WBES data is
based on information collected over the period of 2000-2004, such that this is potentially
good reflection of organization for the decade of 2000s.
Table 3.1: Percentage of organized firms and 4-dgt sectors
% of Firms No. of Sectors
Members at 4-dgt
<0.20 1
0.20-0.30 0
0.30-0.40 0
0.40-0.50 8
0.50-0.60 0
0.60-0.70 10
0.70-0.80 16
0.80-0.90 44
0.90-1 19
Total 98
Note: Table 3.1 shows the various brackets of shares of firms that are members of associations in each
sector (<0.20-1) with the corresponding number of sectors in each bracket. Note that the highest number
of 44 sectors fall in the bracket of 80-90 per cent firms as members of associations.
3.7 Methodology
Tying the empirical work in this chapter closely to the theory, I estimate equation (3.2),
by adding an error term such that the equation can be re-written as:
ti
1 + ti
= (
Ii − αL
a+ αL
)
zi
ei
+ ui (3.8)
13This will be discussed in detail in section 3.7.3 on robustness. The PFS model was estimated with each
threshold. 0.75 was then selected as the cut-off owing to greater variation in the organization indicator
such that the data fits the PFS model.
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Where i represent 4-digit NIC/ISIC Rev. 3 industries. In my sample, I have 98 manu-
facturing industries at this level. The dependent variable is the applied ad-valorem Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff protection. The average MFN tariffs across the sectors are
shown in Figure 3.2 showing a noticeable decline. Also, the maximum MFN tariff has
declined from a peak of more than 300 per cent to around 150 per cent.
To deal with the measurement error in the estimates of import demand elasticities,
following once again the empirical approach of GM, I take the elasticities to the left hand
side14 :
ti
1 + ti
ei = (
Ii − αL
a+ αL
)zi + i (3.9)
Figure 3.2: Tariffs, Output and Imports in Indian Manufacturing
Figure 3.2 shows the Average Tariffs, Maximum Tariffs and the Ratio of Average Output to Average
Imports for the Indian Manufacturing sector based on 98 sectors at the 4-digit of the NIC/ISIC Rev. 3.
The maximum tariffs are observed for the sector 1551 defined as the Distilling, rectifying and blending of
spirits. This sector is dropped for robustness checks for the baseline regressions.
As discussed earlier, Trefler (1993) showed that tariff levels have an effect on import
penetration ratios. This suggests that the inverse of import penetration must be treated as
endogenous as it enters the PFS equation. The determination of import penetration in this
thesis is on lines of the specific factors model as also in GM. Thereby, z is an endogenous
regressor which means that z and the error term are correlated and a random shock to
14Taking the elasticities to the left hand side gives the errors as say  that is ui
ei
. The measurement
errors for the elasticities are now arguably in the error term.
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the dependent variable also affects the regressor. To solve this issue, I specify a first stage
model for the endogenous regressor as shown below.
zi = δY + i (3.10)
The exogeneity assumption is that the set of instrumental variables Y is uncorrelated with
the error term. For the instrumental variables estimator to be consistent, the instruments
must satisfy the following two conditions15. First, the instruments must be exogenous
such that the variable should impact the dependant variable (tariff protection) only in its
effect on the endogenous explanatory variable (inverse import penetration). The J-test
for over identifying restrictions can however be undertaken to check if all instruments are
exogenous. Second, excludability implies that the instruments influence the inverse import
penetration rates and do not have any direct effect on the MFN tariffs or any effect through
omitted variables. It is also important to rule out any reverse effect of the MFN tariffs on
the instrumental variables. Finally, the instruments must be correlated with the inverse
import penetration that implies it must be relevant. The relevance condition can be tested
by computing the t-statistics in the first stage regression and testing for joint significance
of instrumental variables.
Exogenous variables motivated in the literature are used to instrument for the inverse
import penetration in this chapter. This follows the import equation of Trefler (1993) where
the import-penetration is a function of factor shares in each sector namely the measures
of the amounts of capital and labour. Here, I discuss the instrumental variables that are
used in the following estimation. First, I use inventories as a measure of physical cap-
ital. Second, labour-intensive sectors that are exposed to higher imports can potentially
receive relatively higher trade protection. It is thereby expected that there is a comparat-
ive advantage for India in terms of unskilled workers measured by the number of workers
in production. I use the number of production workers as a measure of labour intensity
across sectors to instrument for inverse import penetration. Historically, India exports
both labour-intensive and capital-intensive goods but imports less labour-intensive ones.
Based on the presumption that India is labour abundant with capital being relatively
scarce in India, one would expect the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) coefficients to be
15Wooldridge (2010) for details.
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biased upwards compared to Instrumental Variables (IV) estimates. However, the de-
pendent variable in my model may suffer from measurement error owing to the estimated
elasticties16. This could create an attenuation bias that leads to an opposite downward
bias of the OLS coefficients. In this case, the IV estimator can potentially correct for both
problems. Given that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the measurement
error, the IV procedure corrects for both endogeneity and attenuation bias. Depending on
the extent of each bias, it is quite conceivable for IV estimates to increase/decrease once
the attenuation bias is removed.
Gawande and Li (2009) highlight the weak instruments (WIs) problem in the empirical
testing of PFS. On the whole, for estimators to possess a low bias, the instruments must
be strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor. The strength of the instruments can
be diagnosed using the F-Statistics on excluded instruments compared with the Stock and
Yogo (2005) critical values to check for the extent of bias. The Limited Information Max-
imum Likelihood (LIML) estimator is suggested as better suited to exact inference with
WIs. LIML has better small sample properties than 2SLS with weak instruments. To in-
vestigate the quality of instruments, I check the F-statistic from the first-stage regressions
on the IVs and present the LIML estimations17. The Pagan and Hall test for heterogeneity
is undertaken for the instrumental variables and the fitted values of the dependent variable.
I find that the null of homoskedasticity is rejected such that I use robust standard errors
in my estimations.
3.7.1 PFS with Complete Political Organization
First, I begin by estimating the PFS model with the assumption that Ii = 1∀i, i.e. all
industries are organized18
ti
1 + ti
ei = (
1− αL
a+ αL
)zi + i (3.11)
Note that I do not include a constant term in my estimations. I drop the constant
16We take the elasticities to the left-hand side to deal with errors in these estimates. But the left hand
variable is now an estimate that suggests potential measurement errors in coefficients.
17I did the 2SLS estimates and compared the results with the LIML estimations. The chapter will focus
on LIML estimations as the preferred method for small samples and potentially weak instruments.
18This follows Gawande et al. (2015) at the 4-digit.
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following GM such that I seek to explain trade protection strictly within the PFS frame-
work19. For consistency with the GH hypothesis, the expected sign on ( 1−αLa+αL ) > 0. The
underlying implication is that if domestic output is larger, specific-factor owners have more
to gain from an increase in the domestic price, while (for a given import-demand elasti-
city) the economy has less to lose from protection if the volume of imports is lower. If the
coefficient is also significant, it is seen as evidence on support of the GH hypothesis.
Re-writing equation (3.11) above, I get the following specification termed as Model 1.
I estimate this using the cross-section data across the years, where ρ is defined in terms
of the underlying parameters a and αL. I check the expected sign and significance for the
coefficient ρ > 0:
ti
1 + ti
ei = ρzi + ui (3.12)
ρ =
1− αL
a+ αL
I begin by testing the PFS model using MFN applied tariffs in 1990, the year prior to
India’s trade policy reform and follow by testing the findings for each of the years following
immediately after the reform20.
Table 3.2 presents the results from estimating Model 1 in equation (3.12) using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and those for exact identification with IV using Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood (LIML)21. The first stage estimates are attached in Table A.3 of Ap-
pendix A.2.3. The F-statistic on the excluded instruments are quite small in all cases such
that I present the LIML results22. The IV results from exact identification are used to
interpret the findings of the model23. The F-statistics are more than 10 for the years of
19The inclusion of constant term can be understood as explaining the following. First, as in Ederington
and Minier (2008) explains this as deviations from welfare-maximizing behaviour. Second, as in Gawande
et al. (2012) it reflects the fact that industries may have non-zero trade barriers in practice even when the
right-hand side variables are zero.
20I check the OLS with the IV specification using a Durbin Wu Hausman (DWH) which is an augmented
regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) to confirm the endogeneity in inverse import
penetrationn. This is undertaken by including the residuals of the endogenous variable as a function of all
the exogenous variables in a regression of the original model. I get a small p-value that indicates that OLS
is not consistent and supports the use of the instrumental variables.
21Table A.6 in Appendix A.2.4 presents the results for Model 1 using OLS and those for over-identification
with IV using LIML.
22I estimated the model using 2SLS, and chose LIML as giving better results with weak instruments.
23I also examine with other sets of instruments such as the combination of workers and inventories,
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2000 and 2001 where the model finds strong support.
Table 3.2: Protection for Sale across the Years: OLS vs Exact Identification
(I) (II) (III)
1990 1992 1996
Model OLS IV1 OLS IV1 OLS IV1
X/M 0.004*** 0.021 0.002 0.009 0.003 0.025
(0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.011)
N 94 94 96 96 98 98
(IV) (V) (VI)
1999 2000 2001
Model OLS IV1 OLS IV1 OLS IV1
X/M 0.010** 0.049** 0.007** 0.022** 0.018** 0.032**
(0.003) (0.017) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011)
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
(VII) (VIII) (IX)
2004 2006 2007
Model OLS IV1 OLS IV1 OLS IV1
X/M 0.016** 0.070** 0.004* 0.010 0.004** 0.010
(0.004) (0.027) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006)
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table 3.2 shows the results for PFS assuming all industries are organized. Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood is used that is shown to provide better estimates with weak instruments. I find
strong support in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
I find only weak support for the GH hypothesis with the Indian MFN tariffs in 1990.
This is shown in column (I) of Table 3.2. The coefficient has the correct sign in all cases.
however I discuss the ones with exact identification as they provide a better fit. The results for over-
identification are attached in Table A.6 of Appendix A.2.4. The criteria for preference was the first stage
F-statistic. It can be argued that with a small cross-section, the exact identification case with LIML
provides better estimates.
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However, I find strong significance only for the years 1999-2004, while it is insignificant
for the years 1990, 1992, 1996, 2006 and 2007. This is opposed to findings in Bown and
Tovar (2011) discussed above that find strong evidence for the GH findings using tariffs
for 1990 at the 6-digit of the HS. The empirical evidence that I consider in this thesis also
includes the years 1992 and 1996 in addition to 1990. Tariff reductions under the reforms
in India were mostly undertaken between 1991 and 1996. It is observed that for 1992 and
1996 again the coefficient has the expected sign but is insignificant in columns (II) and
(III) in Table 3.2. Thereby, the GH findings find support for the Indian manufacturing
MFN tariffs for only a few years.
The lack of support PFS in 1990 can be explained in terms of cross-sectional differences
in MFN trade protection changes. This is argued based on the fact that policy-makers were
not very selective in setting tariffs such that the cross-sectional variations in changes of
protection were not really based on economic and political factors. Prior to liberalization
in India, most manufacturing industries were publicly owned such that it can be asser-
ted that political economy factors may not have played an eminent role in setting trade
protection. Further, there is a linear relationship between the pre-reform tariff levels in
1990 and the decline in tariffs across the manufacturing sector from 1990 to 1996 such that
the movements in tariffs were strikingly uniform until 1997 (Figure 2.2 in the introduction).
The results for 1999 however confirm to the findings for PFS observed in column (IV). I
also check the model for the selected years from 2000 onwards in columns (V)-(IX). Bown
and Tovar (2011) shows that the GH hypothesis holds for tariffs plus an anti-dumping
(AD) equivalent for averages in 2000-2002. However, here I observe that the GH findings
hold even with the ad-valorem MFN tariff protection in each of the years 2000, 2001 and
also 2004. The coefficients are significant in columns (V) - (VII). Again in 2006 and 2007,
it is observed in columns (VIII) and (IX) that the coefficients are not significant. This is
explained on lines of a similar argument as above of cross-sectional differences being less
pronounced for MFN tariffs after 2004.
On the whole, the results are evidence of the political economy influences on India’s
import tariff protection over the selected years. The PFS model finds support for the years
1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004 in my period of investigation since liberalisation. This can be
explained by the fact that cross-sectional variations in changes of protection were based
45
on economic and political factors before 1991. This was followed by the exogenous reform
in 1991 such that MFN tariffs reductions were undertaken until 1997. The GH hypothesis
no longer holds for the MFN tariffs for the years after 2004 as most cross-sectoral changes
were already undertaken. Indian trade policy was now looking more to the increased use
of other barriers in combination with MFN tariffs that still reflected political economy
objectives but to a lesser extent.
To provide a structural interpretation of Indian MFN trade protection for the years
where the GH hypothesis holds, I use the results from exact identification (IV1) in Table
3.2 (assuming all industries are organized) to estimate the structural parameter a across
the years where the coefficients are of correct sign and are significance. Additionally, as-
sume 24 αL = 0 as a means of empirical ease, such that the estimated coefficients are 25
1
a . I find the estimate for government weight on welfare for each year shown in Figure 3.3
below. The estimates suggest that government weight on welfare was 20 times the weight
on contributions for 199926. This weight rose to 45 times in 2000 before declining again
to less than 15 times by 2004. These estimates on a are significant and much lower than
those observed in Bown and Tovar (2011).
Figure 3.3: Relative weight on Welfare in India across the years
Figure 3.3 shows the weight attached to welfare relative to contributions of Indian manufacturing sector.
24This assumption implies that the share of the population that are organized specific factor owners is
negligible.
25This follows Gawande et al. (2015) among others.
26These are comparable to estimates for India for the cross-country model for 1988–2000 in Gawande
et al. (2015).
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Table 3.3: Cross-Sectional Structural Estimates
Years 1999 2000 2001 2004
1/a 0.049** 0.022** 0.032** 0.065**
Implied a 20.410** 44.584** 31.654** 14.212**
S.E. 7.156 15.8 11.453 5.424
Note: Table 3.3 shows the structural estimates 1
a
and Implied a based on coefficients from Table 3.2
assuming all industries are organized, across the years where the coefficients are of correct sign and are
significant. Additionally, assume αL = 0 as a means of empirical ease, such that the estimated coefficients
are a 1
a
. I find strong support in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2004.
aThis follows Gawande et al. (2015) among others.
Now, re-writing equation (3.12) above including the time dimension, I get the following
equation that can be estimated using the pooled dataset for all years.
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + it (3.13)
The results are presented in Table 3.4 by pooling the data across 1990−2007 where column
(I) presents the results with OLS, column (II) outlines the results when the model is over-
identified and columns (III)-(VI) presents results with alternate IV strategies outlined in
the corresponding first stage estimates in A.4. I use various combinations of the lagged
value of workers, lagged values of inventories and the square of workers to further alle-
viate endogeneity concerns in the pooled dataset, where IV3 using the lagged values of
inventories and workers squared gives the best fit in terms of the F-statistic (12.46). The
coefficients are statistically significant and of expected sign27. I check the t-statistics on
the instrumental variables to examine if they are significantly different from zero with signs
supporting the identification story. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic on the excluded
instruments is more than 10 for IV strategies in columns (III) and (IV) (10 is desirable as
in Stock and Yogo (2005))28.
27The 2-SLS results are slightly lower than LIML estimates.
28There may be a potential weak instrument problem when IV is biased towards OLS and the bias
is worse when there are many over-identifying restrictions (many instruments compared to endogenous
regressors as in my case). I attempt to deal with this problem of weak instruments in my estimations
using the LIML. I also attempted to use other instrumental variables such as the theoretically consistent
Gross Fixed Capital and semi-skilled workers and additionally profits and the lag of import penetration
as an exogenous source of identification in my specification. However, these emerged weak instruments for
inverse import penetration and were also found insignificant.
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Table 3.4: Pooled Cross-Sections: OLS and IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) )
Model OLS IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
X/M 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
N 876 876 876 876 876
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table 3.4 shows the results from Limited Information Maximum Likelihood for the pooled dataset.
The results are presented for IV strategies I-V presented in Table A.4 of Appendix A.3.2.
The estimates from the pooled data can be biased and inconsistent due to correlation
of regressors with the error terms in other periods. This is based on the logic that there
are unobserved characteristics that are common to all sectors of Indian manufacturing but
vary across time, one example being changes in governments since 1990 to 2007. I use time
fixed effects and include dummies for all years that allows the intercept to have a different
value in each period. Both the dependent variable and X/M varies across time and across
sectors29:
tit
1 + tit
ei = (
1− αL
a+ αL
)zit + λt (3.14)
The results are presented in Table A.7 of Appendix A.2.4. On comparing with results
from the specification without any fixed effects, it is observed that the coefficient sizes
are much lower. Controlling for differences in lobbying for the sectors that vary across
time also changes the structural interpretation of the model estimates, as I capture the
political economy factors controlling for unobserved effects over the years. This may in-
clude changes in governments and are correlated with the explanatory variables. However,
including such time fixed effects changes the interpretation of standard PFS and requires
a different approach that will be taken up in the empirical section of Chapter 4. Next, I
estimate the PFS model where I include the political organization indicators to examine
the political economy of Indian trade protection.
29Note if there was any variable that varies only across time will be collinear with the dummy variables
and its effect cannot be estimated
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3.7.2 Has Protection really been for Sale in India?
Now, re-writing equation (3.9), I get the estimable equation:
ti
1 + ti
ei = ρzi + β(Iizi) + ui (3.15)
ρ =
−αL
a+ αL
β =
1
a+ αL
When the time dimension t is included in this model, the specification can be written as
shown below for Model 2:
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + βIizit (3.16)
I employ a new approach to identify political organization across the manufacturing
sectors in India. Interest groups often organize themselves into producer or trade asso-
ciations that lobby the government for industry-level tariffs. Trade associations such as
the CII and FICCI in India provide a common lobbying organization that can handle the
concerns of industry in a more effective manner than if the firms/industries lobbied them-
selves. This is arguably on lines of cooperative lobbying as in Gawande et al. (2012), if
these industries achieve full organization. Political organization in the PFS model across
sectors can be identified using such information on membership to these associations. Data
on such membership is available at the firm-level from the WBES. At the industry-level,
this survey identifies 24 sectors30.
Lobby membership is thereby identified at the firm level, using the response from the
following question of the WBES: "Is your firm a member of a producer or trade associ-
ation?". A positive answer is coded 1, while the value of 0 is assigned to a negative answer.
30Of these we drop two sectors with respect to the scope of the manufacturing sector sample such that
it now consists of a total of 22 sectors. These sectors can be matched with the selected sample of 98
industries in this thesis at the 4-digit NIC using product descriptions. Each NIC sector is matched to one
sector from the Enterprise survey (Attached in Appendix A.1.2).
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To reach identification of political organization at the level of 4-digit ISIC, I first aggregate
the membership of the firms in each sector. This is defined as the share of member firms
for each of the 22 sectors as shown in Table 3.1. The percentage of organized firms that
are members of these associations is observed to be quite high in each sector. I use this
data to construct the political organization indicator. Four different thresholds were set
in terms of the quantiles for the percentage organized firms across sectors. This is to set
a threshold to identify political organization across the ISIC 4-digit sectors. Using this
threshold, each industry is identified as organized or unorganized. I constructed four in-
dicators named Lobby Membership (LM) defined as LM I, LM II, LM III and LM IV based
on the thresholds of 0.75, 0.82, 0.84 and 0.89 from quantile values respectively shown in
Table A.9 of Appenidx A.2.5. I estimate the PFS model based on these measures of LM
across industries, shown in Table A.12 in Appendix A.2.5. The results for thresholds above
0.75 differ in terms of signs on coefficients and in terms of significance. On the whole, this
confirms to the argument in Imai et al. (2009) that on reclassifying politically organized
industries, the estimates may no longer support the GH hypothesis. I select the threshold
of 0.75 to construct the political organization indicator for the following analysis31.
Now, I estimate the PFS with political organization. Both the dependent variable and
X/M varies across time and sectors, but political organization varies only across sectors.
The following quantitative implications are now testable. First, ρ, the coefficient on X/M
for unorganized sectors is negative ( −αLa+αL < 0). Second, β, the coefficient on X/M for
organized sectors is positive ( 1a+αL > 0). Second, the sum of the coefficients is positive
Ii−αL
a+αL
> 0. If these quantitative findings are confirmed, the GH hypothesis finds support.
If the GH hypothesis is found to hold, then the structural estimates can be derived. This
includes the weight on government welfare a and also the fraction of population organized
as lobbies αL. I check if these are within the expected values of 0 and 1 and are statistically
significantly different from 0.
The results are outlined in Table 3.5 where I estimate the baseline in column (I) using
the pooled dataset from 1990-2007. I use the IV strategy from Table 3.4 (IV3 was argued
31To statistically validate this identification I use probit estimation. The political organization dummy
is the dependent variable and the right-side variables include the import penetration ratio and the import
demand elasticity. This validation follows Mitra et al. (2002) where all the variables on the RHS include the
import-related variables only. The variables are jointly significant and have the expected signs (negative
for both the import demand elasticity and import penetration. I now predict the probability of being
politically organized using the mean values of the predictors at 0.76. This is used to construct an ex post
classification by categorizing a sector as organized if the predicted probability of being organized using the
estimated probit regression) is 0.76 or higher. The average percentage error is around 11 per cent.
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as the preferred strategy). Simple robustness checks are in columns (II)-(IV), where (II)
shows the results dropping the maximum tariff, (III) shows the results for the data with a
restricted sample for the years 2000 onwards. I also check this specification including time
dummies32 such that (IV) shows the results with time dummies.
The GH hypothesis finds strong support such that the basic quantitative findings are
confirmed where ρ is negative and significant at −0.131 and β is positive and significant at
0.158, and the sum of the coefficients is also found positive and statistically significantly
different from zero. The first stage estimates for each estimation is outlined in Table
A.5 of Appendix A.3.2 where the F-statistics are greater than 10 for the models IV1-IV3,
introducing time dummies seems to take away from the explanatory power of the model.
32It can be argued that when I include political organization in the PFS and estimate with the pooled
data, controlling for unobserved characteristics that vary across time will also wipe out any sector specific
characteristics that need to be captured to explain the cross-sectional endogeneity in trade protection
across periods.
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Table 3.5: Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization IiWBES
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Pooled Drop Restricted Pooled with
Outlier Sample Time Dummies
Baseline Robustness Robustness Robustness
X/M -0.131** -0.091** -0.210** 0.006**
(0.053) (0.042) (0.099) (0.003)
X/M ∗ IiWBES 0.158*** 0.114*** 0.252*** 0.005*
(0.053) (0.041) (0.097) (0.003)
yr1 3.119*
(1.738)
yr2 1.141
(1.698)
yr3 2.697***
(1.045)
yr4 3.291***
(0.679)
yr5 3.102***
(0.722)
yr6 3.463***
(0.624)
yr7 3.389***
(0.592)
yr8 1.860***
(0.648)
yr9 1.778**
(0.691)
N 876 867 490 876
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: (I) shows the results for the pooled data, (II) shows the results dropping the maximum tariff, (III)
shows the results for the data for years 2000 onwards, finally (IV) shows the results with time dummies.
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The robustness checks in (II)-(IV) suggest that the GH hypothesis is robust to the
outlier observation. Further, I restrict the sample for 2000 onwards, I find the coefficients
are higher when I restrict the time-period of my estimation and the corresponding Shea
R-squares are the highest for the corresponding fit of the first stage estimates. It is import-
ant to note that the political organization indicator uses the information from the WBES
that collected information from 2000 onwards such that these are arguably more reflective
of the political economy set-up in that period.
Finding support for the PFS model using the pooled dataset with the new political or-
ganization indicator warrants a comparison with previous political organization indicators
available for India. I under take this comparison with the political organization indicator
from Cadot et al. (2007) that was available33. A simple comparison (attached in Table
A.14 in Appendix A.2.6) reveals that 63 out of 98 industries are politically organized for
my set of industries using this indicator, lets call it ICadot34. This is significantly higher
than the 47 industries identified in the paper by Cadot et al. (2007).
In addition, I estimate the PFS on my dataset using the measures ICadot, the results
are attached in Table A.2.5 in Appendix A.13. I find that the GH hypothesis does not find
support when I use the ICadot indicator with my pooled dataset. There are two potential
explanations for this. First, their estimations are based on data from 1997 and it can be
argued that the organization measure reflects the period for 1995-1997 when industries
were not very organized. Second, when I map their measures from ISIC Revision 2 to
NIC/ISIC Revision 3 at the 4-digit, I find that there is not enough variation in the organ-
ization measure.
I estimate the structural parameters a and αL using the results in Table 3.5 for the
pooled cross-section. Finding strong support for the restricted sample, I use data for 2000
onwards such that the results can be interpreted as averages for the decade of 2000. The
estimated coefficients ρ and β can be used to calculate the parameters such that αL = ρβ
and a = 1+ρ1+ρ+β . Table 3.6 shows that the relative weight on welfare with respect to in-
dustry interactions (political contributions in terms of the PFS model) for the government
33This data was kindly provided by Marcelo Olarreaga and Jean-Marie Grether.
34The results are attached in Table A.13 in Appendix as a means of comparison only. I believe that
the Cadot et al. (2007) measures are reflective of the year 1997 only, also the year of estimation in their
sample. This measure misses out on crucial information that shows actual organization of manufacturing
industries in India for the years 1999 onwards as more industries started interacting with the government.
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in India was 0.758 for the period of 2000 onwards35. This means that the government
weighs industry interactions along with welfare when formulating trade policy. The es-
timate of αL is approximately 0.832 that implies a very high proportion of specific factor
owners are organized as members of associations in India.
The structural estimates suggest that there is a high proportion of sector specific owners
that are organized. The next step is in the direction of examining potential heterogeneity
in terms of actual lobbying behaviour across sectors. In fact, if it is the case that at the
industry-level most of the population engaged in the manufacturing sectors are politically
organized, the variation would thereby be expected in terms of the lobby behaviour. These
estimates therefore imply that even though the government cares about social welfare, it
is still open to industry opinion and corresponding producer welfare also owing to the fact
that a large fraction of the population are specific factor owners who can organize to lobby
the government.
Table 3.6: Implied a, αL and Sum of Coefficients
Structural Parameters Estimates
(Data 2000 onwards)
a 0.758*** (0.094)
αL 0.832*** (0.078)
Sum of Coefficients 0.042*** (0.009)
Note: Table 3.6 shows the structural parameters. The estimated coefficients ρ and β are used to calculate
the parameters such that αL = − ρβ and a = 1+ρ1+ρ+β , where ρ=-0.210 and β=0.252.
3.7.3 Robustness
In this section, I examine the robustness of my findings. This was achieved using the
following methods that are discussed briefly.
Taking into account the nature of the estimated dependent variable used in my model
(trade protection interacted with the estimated import demand elasticities), I undertake
two robustness checks. First, I use weighted least squares using the inverse standard errors
35Note the interpretation of this estimate is now different from that discussed in Table 3.3 as I also
consider political organization
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of the elasticity estimates from Kee et al. (2008). I use the inverse standard errors of
the import demand elasticities to weight my estimates. Second, I bootstrap the standard
errors for the dependent variable in my instrumental variable estimations. In both cases,
the qualitative findings of the model were found unchanged.
To examine robustness of the main findings in this chapter, I also considered altern-
ate definitions of my political organization dummy constructed using the WBES data. I
created four quantiles for the shares of firms that are members of associations, taking the
percentiles of 0.74, 0.82, 0.85 and 0.89 (LM I-LM IV) as different thresholds to construct the
political organization indicator. The threshold of 0.75 gives the most variation to identify
differences by organized and unorganized sectors. The results are attached in Table A.12
in Appendix A.2.5. I find that the signs of coefficients fail to support the primary findings
above with higher thresholds to identify organization, while I also lose in terms of signi-
ficance of the coefficients. This owes to the fact that organization measures constructed
with the higher alternate thresholds did not give enough variation to identify the effect of
being organized. Therefore, I select the organization measure with the preferred threshold
of 0.75 for the share of firms as organized in every sector in the sections above.
3.8 Conclusion
The chapter provides evidence on the traditional PFS model using a unique dataset for
India. It is observed, that across the selected time period of study, the GH hypothesis
holds for only few years. In this light, Has Protection really been for Sale in India?. The
answer to this question is that protection has been for sale in India since 1999 with increase
in political organization in the decade of 2000s.
First, assuming full organization in Indian manufacturing, I find that for applied MFN
tariff protection, the GH hypothesis holds only for 1999, 2000 and 2001. The findings for
1990 are in contradiction to Bown and Tovar (2011) which can be explained in terms of the
cross-sectional differences in protection were less explained by political economy factors as
most sectors had high public ownership before the reforms. The results also differ for 2000-
2002 averages such that it can be argued that the GH hypothesis holds even in explaining
MFN protection without Anti-dumping equivalents for 2000 and 2001. I find only weak
support for the PFS model in early 1990s and post 2004.
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Second, political organization is identified using the WBES data for India. The PFS
model with the new measure of political organization for the Indian manufacturing indus-
tries explains the observed pattern of MFN tariff protection. I find very strong evidence
for the model using the data from 2000 onwards. However, organization as in the PFS
model is a discrete story which has limitations in capturing actual lobbying or variations
in lobbying strategies. Organization alone does not imply that a firm or industry will
necessarily lobby the government.
On the whole, the empirical evidence on the original PFS presented here motivates a
continuous measure to reflect heterogeneity in lobbying across sectors. Political organiz-
ation is thereby useful as a discrete story but lobbying in terms of a continuous measure
can add value to the GH hypothesis reflecting actual lobbying abilities across sectors. This
argument is motivation for the next chapter of the thesis where I explore a simple modi-
fication of PFS to include differences in lobbying across sectors.
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Chapter 4
Trade Protection and Lobbying
Effectiveness
4.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of differences in effectiveness to lobby across industries
for trade policy. I introduce a new measure of lobbying termed henceforth as Lobbying
Effectiveness into the Grossman and Helpman (1994) (American Economic Review 84:
833–850, GH henceforth) model of Protection for Sale (PFS henceforth) to analyse how
heterogeneity in lobbying effectiveness affects the trade protection outcome. The under-
lying theoretical framework is based on the idea that government preferences and/or the
market structure of the industry leads to differences in the effectiveness in lobbying. Ad-
ditionally, I examine the political economy determinants of lobbying effectiveness in the
context of Indian trade policy.
In the PFS model, the ability to lobby is specified in terms of political organization
across industries and is given exogenously. The distinction is dichotomous such that the
classification is into those industries that are fully organized and those that are unor-
ganized. The effect of lobbying on the equilibrium policy thereby derives from only an
identification of being politically organized or not. This effect is homogeneous such that
all fully organized industries exhibit the same relationship between import penetration and
trade protection, while the unorganized industries show the opposite relationship. There
exist no differences in this effect across the set of organized or unorganized industries. Any
differences in intra-industry free rider problems are also assumed away such that those
industries that overcome the free rider problem are organized while others are not.
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The exogenous and dichotomous distinction of political organization is known to suffer
from limitations when taken to empirical data often discussed in the literature on PFS1.
First, political contributions have been used to assign the exogenous political-organization
dummies. These contributions are actually endogenous and there exist differences across
sectors in the contribution offers forwarded to the government. Second, there exist unob-
served factors that can discriminate in lobbying ability across industries. The assumption
of all industries being politically organized or not however does not account for any such
differences in lobbying. I find that there is only limited direct evidence on this issue within
the PFS literature.
In this chapter, I introduce a new measure of Lobbying Effectiveness to replace the
exogenous political organization variable in the traditional PFS model to capture differ-
ences in lobbying across sectors. The ability of interest groups to organize politically and
cooperate for lobbying can have an obvious effect on the trade policy outcome. Asserting
potential heterogeneity in lobbying for a trade policy outcome across sectors, I explore the
question of what can generate these differences and how to introduce this into the theor-
etical framework of the traditional PFS model. The measures of lobbying effectiveness are
then derived from the data such that heterogeneity is based on the idea that not all sectors
have the same influence on the equilibrium policy.
In the literature, most industries are found to make some amount of political contri-
butions. In this light, it has often been assumed that all industries are fully organized as
in Gawande and Magee (2012). This assumption seems to make the binary measure of the
PFS model somewhat redundant. However, I argue that while it is plausible that all indus-
tries make some amount of contributions, there are varying degrees of lobbying that affects
the amount of contributions or information that can be supplied to the government across
sectors. Gawande and Magee (2012) allow for another class of partially-organized indus-
tries. This additional classification creates three categories of political organization but it
does not fully account for differences in lobbying across all sectors. Endogenizing the bin-
ary measure of political organization, Mitra (1999) showed that industry groups organize
according to some dominant kind of heterogeneity that addresses the demand side com-
ponent of protection but again identifies the binary measure of organization across sectors.
1In Goldberg and Maggi (1997) and Imai et al. (2009) among others.
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However, not much has been said about the effectiveness of lobbying within the PFS model.
Understanding and quantifying the effectiveness of lobbying in obtaining policy out-
comes has been a challenging task. de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) in a very useful
review of the literature on lobbying discuss the econometric identification issues that make
it problematic to ascertain causal mechanisms for lobbying effectiveness on trade policy2.
In this light, the PFS model provides a potentially clean structural framework to examine
lobbying effectiveness. However, the implicit assumption that lobbies only differ in terms
of being organized or unorganized misses on several dimensions of potential heterogeneity
in actual lobbying.
To provide theoretical motivation for pursuing this line of reasoning, I explore two dif-
ferent approaches within the traditional PFS setting. On the supply side of protection,
there can be potential bias from the government to a particular lobby3. This is based on
government preferences such that the weight the government puts on different sectors is
not the same (not all dollar contributions are equal when coming from different sectors).
On the demand side of sectors lobbying for protection, the iceberg cost component4 is
introduced on lines of differences in market structure that can lead to lobbying advantages
or disadvantages. These may include inherent resource advantages across sectors say in
terms of geographical location that can enable easier and more effective lobbying by certain
groups than others. It may also be determined by factors such as the sum of exporter and
importer lobbying interests in each sector or foreign ownership versus domestic lobbying
in a given industry.
Following the theoretical motivation, this chapter provides empirical estimates on lob-
bying effectiveness using a panel dataset for India from 1999-2007. I estimate varying
degrees of lobbying effectiveness across sectors5. To further explore the demand side of
2This includes a significant omitted variable problem as not all political instruments for influence can
be observed such as ability to lobby. The omitted variables correlated with the included terms can result
in biased parameter estimates and incorrect causal inference.
3I find such biases have found various explanations in the existing literature. For example, Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007) relate this to the ability of expanding and contracting industries to appropriate the
benefits of lobbying such that government policy is likely to pick losers. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) use
the notion of identity bias to account for a potential reluctance of governments to adopt changes in policies.
Often the government can be committed to protect its infant industries in earlier stages of development.
4It is based on paying the cost of lobbying with a portion of the lobbying resources.
5The main aim of this chapter is to use the variation in the dataset to estimate the theoretical measure
of lobbying effectiveness based on the political economy framework of modified PFS. Note that I examine
the predictions of the modified PFS framework in terms of the expected signs of the coefficients in Chapter
5.
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protection, I ask the question of what determines lobbying effectiveness in terms of po-
tential resource advantages across sectors. I use the same dataset as in Chapter 3 of my
thesis. The main aim of the empirical exercise here is to obtain estimates on lobbying
effectiveness for India and to examine the determinants of these measures to explain the
differences across sectors.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant literature
to motivate this study followed by Section 3 where I outline the theoretical framework.
Section 4 will present the empirical evidence. Finally, Section 6 will conclude the chapter.
4.2 Literature
The effectiveness of interest groups in lobbying the government to obtain policy outcomes
has been of much interest in the area of international trade. This literature has recognized
that policy outcomes are influenced by lobbying activities of groups in pursuit of their own
interests to secure trade protection. Issues with empirical data availability and economet-
ric identification make the causal mechanisms for lobbying effectiveness on trade policy
hard to discern. This section presents the literature that has dealt with political organiz-
ation and lobbying in GH and discusses possible sources of heterogeneity in lobbying that
emerges from the existing literature.
Political organization in the PFS model gives the exogenous structure of lobby groups
where some industries are organized while others are not. It gives the exogenous parti-
tion of interest groups where the producers in organized sectors can influence the policy
outcome. However, this indicator does not account for potential heterogeneity in actual
lobbying across industries. Political organization of the interest groups to form a lobby
is assumed to have an impact on the policy outcome. Government preferences are given
such that a dollar of the underlying political contributions by an organized lobby has the
same effect irrespective of identity. However, in practice political organization differs from
actual lobbying wherein organized groups may engage in lobbying or may choose to not
lobby at all. The identification of sectors as being organized and unorganized in the model
does not reflect this actual variation in lobbying that suggests an endogenous selection of
interest groups.
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4.2.1 Literature on PFS
Determining the status of being politically organized is complex and there exist several
approaches un the literature. Gawande and Magee (2012) assert that identification of
political organization in PFS using a binary measure is problematic. This owes to the fact
that every industry has positive campaign contributions in the datasets for United States
that are commonly used. Using a modified version of the PFS model, their paper allows
for what are termed as partially-organized industries. The binary organization variable is
dropped and every industry is assumed to be partially organized defined as the ability of
an industry to overcome the free-rider problem. This tackles the empirical issue of classi-
fying industries as either fully organized or completely unorganized to an extent. However,
one equilibrium tariff is the cooperative lobbying outcome based on perfect cooperation
between sector-specific capital owners by assuming the political organization indicator as
equal to 1. The other equilibrium outcome is classified as the non-cooperative outcome
where there is greater free-riding. This identification is quite useful but may not fully
capture differences in the ability to lobby across industries.
A threshold level of contributions is often used below which industries are assumed
to be unorganized as in Goldberg and Maggi (1997) (GM henceforth). Further, they ar-
gue that the menu auction set-up in PFS yields the same equilibrium output as the joint
maximization in a Nash bargaining game. Using this reasoning, the equilibrium in the
GM paper is obtained through the maximization of the joint welfare of the lobbies and
the government with respect to the tariff. A connected question concerns if the truthful
Nash equilibrium in GH and the joint maximization of GM lead to the same estimable
specification to study the effect of organization on the protection outcome. In the PFS
model, the equilibrium policy for the government and lobby groups is pinned down using
the common agency framework of Bernheim and Whinston (1986). It is demonstrated
that playing truthful strategies is the best-response for lobby groups and this set always
contains a truthful strategy. Also, this equilibrium is coalition proof, such that this being
the only one that is stable against non-binding communication among the players.
Preliminary regressions have also been used to divide industries into organized and
unorganized, as in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000)6. The reduced-form equation in-
cluded a set of traditional political-economy regressors that include concentration indices,
6The methodology is discussed at length in Chapter 3
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minimum efficient scale, unionisation, and geographical concentration termed as natural in-
struments for contributions and organization dummies, estimated using OLS regressions to
examine correlations. The organization variable is assigned the value 1 for those industries
where the relationship between campaign spending and trade flows is positive. The finding
is that all else held constant, on average tariffs are higher in industries represented by
organized lobbies. Going further, I find that there is also literature that proves otherwise,
such as Imai et al. (2009) who have argued that using such an identification of organiz-
ation can lead to misclassification of industries as politically organized and unorganized
that will give inconsistent estimates of the PFS model. They do a quantile regression of
the protection measure on the inverse import penetration ratio divided by the import de-
mand elasticities and show that the results do not provide any evidence to favour the model.
Mitra (1999) uses industry characteristics to determine whether a sector is organized
or not in the PFS, such that industry groups organize according to the dominant kind of
heterogeneity across sectors. He endogenized the binary indicator for political organiza-
tion in the PFS model specifying a reduced form equation using industry characteristics
to determine whether an industry is organized or not such that political organization is
according to a dominant kind of heterogeneity across sectors. This includes high capital
stock levels, low levels of geographical dispersion, and fewer members, while the groups
with the opposite characteristics will remain unorganized in equilibrium. The question
that is answered in the above analysis is how the organized lobbies come into existence.
Owners of specific factors decide whether to incur the fixed cost of forming a lobby. Organ-
ization depends on the condition that the benefit to form a lobby is greater than the cost
of organizing. In this approach, it can be argued that the sectors are black boxes where
actual lobbying by firms does not play any role. In fact it is an implicit assumption that
firms are all identical and coordinate to reach the organization outcome.
There is even limited evidence to account for varying lobbying ability in the PFS model
for India. As outlined in Chapter 3, in Cadot et al. (2014) and Cadot et al. (2007), sectors
are endogenously partitioned into organized versus unorganized using an iterative proced-
ure where the first stage estimates a standard GH equation with all sectors as unorganized.
This is used to determine the endogenous tariffs as a function of import penetration rates.
The first stage residuals are then used to rank the industries, those with higher residuals
being more likely to be organized than others and a cut-off value is used. In Bown and
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Tovar (2011), the binary organization measure is determined using data on organizations
listed in the World Guide to Trade Associations in 19957.
Therefore, the existing literature asserts various ways to deal with identifying political
organization, a dominant method being industries as fully organized. Moving beyond the
binary identification, I aim to analyse the steps following organization where firms in an
industry actually lobby the government for trade policy influence and there are differences
in their effectiveness to lobby across sectors.
4.2.2 Heterogeneity in Lobbying
Heterogeneity in lobbying effectiveness has been suggested in the previous literature. Hill-
man et al. (2001) has explored the possibility of an ex-ante decision to invest in lobbying
activity. He shows that the industry equilibrium is influenced by lobbying technology,
establishing that an index of concentration is related to effectiveness of collective action
of the industry. Further, Hillman (1989) has argued that heterogeneity among firms in
terms of a fixed stock of resources and distribution of market shares plays a major role in
political allocations of firms to influence endogenous economic policies.
Long and Soubeyran (1996) provides theoretical support for the idea that degree of het-
erogeneity within a pressure group is an important determinant of the group’s influence.
In their paper, heterogeneity is defined in terms of differences in unit costs of production.
In the cooperative lobbying case, an increase in heterogeneity will lead to an increase in
total lobbying expenditures if in equilibrium the elasticity of demand curve is negative.
In the non-cooperative lobbying case, an increased tariff tends to benefit large firms relat-
ive to small firms, and the bias is more pronounced if the variance of the unit costs is higher.
Bombardini (2008) builds a model with heterogeneous firms in the presence of a fixed
cost of channelling political contributions. A continuous measure of organization is de-
veloped where the equilibrium share of total output is the continuous measure that char-
acterizes firms. However, it builds on the PFS assumption that some industries perfectly
overcome the free rider problem and therefore organize, other industries are unorganized.
The focus of her paper is to examine how differences in firm size affects the propensity
7This is an international directory of trade associations.
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to lobby. However, the empirical evidence still includes the binary sectoral political or-
ganization variable. The government is assumed to place equal weights on welfare and
contributions where the estimates for the weight on welfare are found extremely high.
Interpreting the measure a has in fact met with several problems in the literature with
often implausibly large estimates. In Mitra et al. (2002), they argue that plausible (i.e.
low) estimates of the policy maker weight on social welfare a are obtained if the fraction of
population represented by an industry lobby is close to 90 percent. If the lobby groups and
the population in a given country have comparable influence on policy-makers, then this
measure should be approximately 1. Providing further support in this direction, Chapter
3 of my thesis provides estimates for India that are close to 1. Following this, the empirical
analysis in this Chapter will assume a = 1 to estimate the variable of interest in this case
being measures on lobbying.
4.2.3 Government Welfare
Assuming differences across sectors in terms of government preference would imply differ-
ent weights on different components. Additional weights for political strength have also
been included in government preferences in the literature following different reasoning than
in this thesis. In Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2000), the government objective is taken as
the sum of the consumer surplus, the producer surplus weighted by a different factor (in-
terpreted as the valuation of rent to specific factor owners relative to consumer surplus),
the rents from importers weighted by another factor (interpreted as capturing political
strength of importers) and the tariff revenue also assigned a different weight. The weight
attached to producer rents is of interest to my work, however there is no empirical evidence
on this measure as the model is not estimated with data.
Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2011) postulate a political economy model of public
standards where the government objective function is a sum of the contributions of produ-
cers with a factor attached (interpreted as lobbying strength of producers), contributions
of the consumers (also assumed to be organized into interest groups) with another factor
(interpreted as lobbying strength of consumers) and welfare. In their paper, the govern-
ment preferences are altered to reflect differences between groups of producers, consumers
or importers assigning additional weights for lobbying strengths. However, again there is
no empirical evidence and the exposition does not address heterogeneity across different
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producer lobby groups.
On lines of the above, different weights are also adopted more recently in Gawande
et al. (2015) to examine cross-country heterogeneity in government preferences. Their pa-
per develops a broad theoretical framework that derives predictions on three determinants:
consumer welfare, producer interests, and tariff revenue. They obtain quantitative estim-
ates of underlying parameters describing the relative weights that government places on
the three factors. A high degree of cross-country heterogeneity is observed in the estimates
of the absolute weights placed by governments. Their results suggest that developing coun-
tries with weak tax systems have higher valuation for tariff revenue, while more developed
countries value producer interests the most. Finally, they find that very few countries hold
consumer welfare dear. An understanding of these weights hold importance for the under-
lying determinants of trade policy reform especially for developing countries to formulate
policy prescriptions. In this light, this chapter attempts to provide evidence on government
valuation of lobbying that can differ by industries providing empirical evidence for India.
4.3 The Model
To analyse the impact of effectiveness in lobbying on trade protection, I consider a modi-
fication of the standard PFS model. The framework follows the environment in PFS by
making the assumption that there can be two factors that influence effectiveness in lobby-
ing. This includes the predisposition of the government to supply protection8 or the ability
of sectors to organise and make a case for protection (Baldwin (1989); Pincus (1975)). In
my model, I will demonstrate that lobbying effectiveness can be explained by either of
these two factors. First, it can be explained by being observationally equivalent to differ-
ent weights associated by the government to political contributions coming from different
lobby groups. The government weighs different sectors differently (not all dollar contribu-
tions are equal when coming from different sectors) explained by the idea that there may
be some perception bias from the government to certain lobby groups that present their
policy stance better. Second, it can arise from differences in the ability of groups to lobby
in a given sector that in turn depend on a sum of various factors that include geographical
location, similar or differentiated goods produced in the sector, the opportunity to interact
8In GH, this is explained in terms of the relative weight of contributions and aggregate welfare
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with the government9 among others.
In the PFS model, the government sets trade policy that is independent of any differ-
ences across the lobbies. The lobby groups are the principals and the government is the
agent. The menu auction induces lobbies to design a contribution schedule that reflects
truthfully the effect of the trade policy on their welfare driven by import competition. The
equilibrium trade policy is pinned down using the truthful equilibrium of Bernheim and
Whinston (1986). The truthful contribution schedules induce the government to behave
as if it were maximizing a social-welfare function that weights different members of society
differently, with those sectors represented by a lobby group receiving a weight of (1 + a)
and those not so represented receiving the smaller weight of a. However, I argue that
the approach in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) essentially describes individual behaviour
in menu auctions, while the GH is an application of the cumulative group behaviour of
individuals that constitute the lobby groups. While, individuals play truthful strategic
games, the cumulative behaviour of such individuals will not always translate to satisfy
truthful revelations in terms of contributions made by a group of such individuals. So far
to the best of MY knowledge, none of the existing empirical tests of the GH suggest any
alternatives to the truthful Nash equilibria concept.
Heterogeneity in this chapter is based on the idea that not all lobbies have the same
influence on the equilibrium policy. I make the assumption that industries engage in Co-
operative Lobbying10 that is conducted by interest groups to maximize the welfare of the
entire group. There exists no private incentive to lobby the government in this scenario as
the underlying fixed costs of lobbying are greater than any gain from lobbying privately. I
consider that all industries are organized11 and engage in some form of cooperative lobby-
ing alone. Following political organization, these industries decide to lobby when they are
able to overcome the free rider-problem to different degrees which can make them more or
less effective in lobbying.
In terms of government preferences, given the offers of lobby groups, the government
can maximize its welfare by choosing a set of trade policy. The contribution schedule will
allow the government to know the contribution level associated to a particular policy such
9Other underlying factors can include exporter versus importer interests, foreign ownership vis-a-vis
domestic lobby groups etc.
10This term is used by Gawande and Magee (2012).
11This can be related to the case of all industries being fully organized in traditional PFS.
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that the government has varying preferences across sectors. Therefore, there can exist a
bias wherein the government may value lobbying by one sector more than another. An-
other motivation to explain differences in lobbying is the ability to lobby such that the
heterogeneity is in the method to put forth the dollars of contribution to the government.
This derives from potential differences in market structure of industries that can imply in-
herent resource advantages for the ability to lobby. Both cases are examined in detail below.
4.3.1 Government Preferences
An important element of success in securing protection depends on the predisposition of
the government to supply protection as in Baldwin (1989). This section considers the ef-
fectiveness of lobbying in terms of government preferences across sectors. One assumption
of the PFS model consists that the government weighs lobby groups equally in terms of
the dollars of contributions made by them. This means that government is not concerned
about the identities of the lobby groups as any dollar of contribution is of the same value.
However, it is expected that government preferences for contributions will differ across
sectors when interest groups can send a signal regarding some information they possess
and the policy makers observe the signal before setting the trade policies. Following this,
I can assume the weight the government puts on lobbying by different sectors is not the
same12 (not all dollar contributions are equal when coming from different sectors). The
weight the government puts on contributions from different sectors is used to define the
measure of lobbying effectiveness in this section.
To develop the empirical specification, I treat lobbying effectiveness to depend on the
predisposition of the government to supply protection. The government objective function
is characterized as a sum of the contributions of producer lobby groups weighted by γi that
represents their lobbying effectiveness and the aggregate voter welfare weighted by a that
represents the weight attached by the government to welfare:
Governments maximize their objective G in terms of industry contributions Ci and
(anonymous) utilitarian social welfare W :
12In terms of truthful revelation where a change in contributions equals change in welfare, this would
imply that the government prefers benefits for some sectors more than others.
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G = aW +
n∑
i=1
γiCi (4.1)
I assume a = 1 for estimating γi later. In this set-up, each sector i receive a different weight
given by (a + γi). This approach differs from previous literature as I define lobbying ef-
fectiveness in terms of government valuation of lobby contributions, accounting for various
degrees of lobbying. γi is the lobbying effectiveness that translates into a high valuation
of the political contribution in government’s preferences.
Substituting for W defined in terms wages at 1, the returns to specific factor pii, tariff
revenue from a specific import tariff ti with imports given asMi = di−yi and the consumer
surplus si, and Ci in the government objective, where Ci =Wi −Bi as in GH, gives:
G = a
[
1 +
n∑
i=1
pii +
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)
]
+
n∑
i=1
γi
pii + αi
1 + n∑
j=1
(tjMj + sj)
−Bi

(4.2)
Expanding gives:
G = a+ a
n∑
i=1
pii + a
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si) +
n∑
i=1
γi
pii + αi + αi n∑
j=1
(tjMj + sj)−Bi

= a+
n∑
i=1
apii + a
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si) +
n∑
i=1
γipii +
n∑
i=1
γiαi +
n∑
i=1
γiαi
n∑
j=1
(tjMj + sj)−
n∑
i=1
γiBi
I can bring
∑n
j=1 (tjMj + sj) to the front of
∑n
i=1 γiαi, hence:
G = a+
n∑
i=1
apii+a
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)+
n∑
i=1
γipii+
n∑
i=1
γiαi+
 n∑
j=1
(tjMj + sj)
 n∑
i=1
γiαi−
n∑
i=1
γiBi
Replacing j with i in
(∑n
j=1 (tjMj + sj)
)
has no impact since it is just a label and is
isolated by a bracket, so:
G = a+
n∑
i=1
apii+a
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)+
n∑
i=1
γipii+
n∑
i=1
γiαi+
(
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)
)
n∑
i=1
γiαi−
n∑
i=1
γiBi
Clustering terms gives:
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G = a+
∑
i
(a+ γi)pii +
(
a+
n∑
i=1
γiαi
)(
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)
)
+
n∑
i=1
γi (αi −Bi)
Replacing i with j in (a+
∑n
i=1 γiαi) again has no impact since it is just a label and
is isolated by a bracket, so:
G = a+
n∑
i=1
(a+ γi)pii +
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
( n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)
)
+
n∑
i=1
γi (αi −Bi) (4.3)
Differentiating (4.3) with respect to ti (equivalent to differentiating w.r.t. pi), gives13
∂G
∂ti
= (a+ γi)Xi +
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
(tiM ′i +Mi − di) = 0 (4.4)
Substituting and solving for ti gives:
ti = −
(
γi −
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
)
Xi
M ′i
(4.5)
Hence, following Chapter 3, I can re-write this in terms of the import demand elasticity
ei and assuming the import penetration ratio XiMi equals zi:
ti
1 + ti
=
γi −
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
zi
ei
(4.6)
Now, interpreting (4.6), the term
∑n
j=1 γjαj is the sum of lobbying effectiveness times
the fraction of sector-specific capital owners across all j sectors. Let γjαj = γ understood
as the mean lobbying effectiveness for all sectors. Therefore,
γi−
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
is the weighted
deviation of the lobbying effectiveness measure for each sector γi from the mean effect-
iveness for all sectors γ. I can now test the hypothesis that the effect of inverse import
penetration on the trade protection outcome can be explained significantly by deviations
from mean lobbying effectiveness across sectors.
13Note that the derivative of total consumer surplus si with respect to trade protection is minus the level
of consumption di, that for producer surplus pii is the level of domestic production Xi, and the derivative
of revenue tiMi equals the level of importsMi plus the level of the tariff times the change in imports tiM
′
i .
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In the GH, opposite relationships were hypothesized for organized versus unorganized
sectors. Note that my model differs from the straightforward interpretation in traditional
GH. There is now a disperse component in the overall relationship between inverse import
penetration and trade protection explained by lobbying effectiveness. I test the following
hypothesis for very effective versus ineffective sectors:
Hypothesis: For the most effective sectors i.e. higher the deviation in lobbying effect-
iveness of a given sector from the mean effectiveness γi − γ>0, a higher inverse of import
penetration will translate to higher trade protection such that
γi−
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
> 0. For the
least effective/ineffective sectors i.e. lower the deviation in lobbying effectiveness from
mean effectivenessγi − γ<0, a higher import penetration will translate to lower trade pro-
tection, such that
γi−
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
< 0.
Further, for (4.6):
• If γi = 1 for all i, then the equation collapses to traditional GH:
ti
1 + ti
=
1−∑nj=1 αj
a+
∑n
j=1 αj
zi
i
=
1− αL
a+ αL
zi
i
(4.7)
If it were the case that additionally αL = 1, I get the standard free trade outcome.
• If γi = γ for all i, then:
ti
1 + ti
=
γ − γ∑nj=1 αj
a+ γ
∑n
j=1 αj
zi
i
=
γ − γαL
a+ γαL
zi
i
=
1− αL
a
γ + αL
zi
i
(4.8)
If γ < 1, then:
1− αL
a
γ + αL
zi
i
<
1− αL
a+ αL
zi
i
(4.9)
If γ > 1, then:
1− αL
a
γ + αL
zi
i
<
1− αL
a+ αL
zi
i
(4.10)
So tariff is lower than in GH if contributions have a lower weight (γ < 1) and tariff is
higher if contributions have a higher weight (γ > 1). This is equivalent to changing
the weightings on W and
∑n
i=1Ci in the GH Government objective function.
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4.3.2 Lobbying Costs
I examine an alternate approach to the government preferences in this section. In the
locally truthful framework of PFS, around the equilibrium a change in welfare W equals
the change in contribution, C with respect to the policy. This is the PFS game in which
lobbies determine the policy level that maximizes their welfare. Now, to include hetero-
geneity in terms of the lobbying costs, I can assume that each firm maximizes its profit
with respect to the contribution schedule itself and not to the policy. This is again based
on the reasoning that not all lobbies have the same influence on the equilibrium policy but
I explain this in terms of costs to lobby.
In PFS, the lobbies commit to a contribution contingent on which the government se-
lects policy. This section appeals to the money-buys-access idea as in Ansolabehere et al.
(2003) such that I assume the lobby groups commit to organizing campaigns for the gov-
ernment that involves a certain lobbying expense. This expense is no longer contingent on
the future policy chosen by the government. It is now the means to obtain access to the
government. Based on this idea, the dollars of contributions raised by the interest groups
involves a dissipation of resources on the way by means of paying for campaigns etc. such
that only a part of those dollars actually reach the government and achieves influence for
the policy.
In this context, I can define the actual cost to lobby the government that is incurred at
two points. The lobby cost to raise the offerings is a fixed cost across the sectors. However,
access costs can be defined in terms of lobbying effectiveness such that the access cost is
γi times the actual lobby cost. This implies that lobbying effectiveness determines what
part of offerings actually reach the government. A less effective lobby pays a higher access
cost to lobby while a more effective lobby group pays a lower cost to access. I can now
define the total lobby cost faced by an interest group in terms of the actual cost to lobby
comprising the cost to raise the offerings and an access cost to forward the offerings.
In PFS, each organized interest group offers a contribution schedule to the government
allowing it to know the contribution level associated to a particular policy. The contribu-
tion schedule is also assumed to be locally differentiable. The PFS assumption of truthful
strategy by lobby groups implies that competition between the lobbies is choice of a scalar
amount that remains with the lobbies. If I assume that lobbies have to bear an access cost
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in the second stage, now in addition to the scalar amount, the lobbies vary in their effect-
iveness to put forth the dollars of contribution to the government. An additional stage
can be included into the PFS framework. In the first stage, the interest groups decide to
organize. This decision is based on a fixed cost component. All sectors that meet this cost
organize into lobbies and raise dollars of contributions to organize campaign support. In
the second stage, the lobbies meet the access costs and make the final offers in the form of
contribution schedules. Finally, the government sets trade policy.
The access cost say ζi is assumed to be a dissipation of resources on lines of Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011) for each sector. The government does not consider this cost incurred
by lobby groups and weighs each dollar of contributions equally. However, once the access
costs are incurred, let the contributions that actually reach the government are 1−ζi raised
by lobby groups where lobbying effectiveness is γi = 1 − ζi. I can define the government
objective as a weighted sum of the contributions and aggregate welfare below:
G = aW +
n∑
i=1
(1− γi)Ci (4.11)
This means that the dollars of contributions raised by lobby groups is Ci. However, the
access costs incurred by each lobby finally determines the amount that effectively reaches
the government. Defined in terms of costs, an effective lobby group would incur only a
small access cost and would have a higher γi. A not so effective lobby would have to incur
a very high access cost and have lower γi. This is lobby effectiveness as it determines the
effective dollars of contributions to reach the government. The government is concerned
about the total amount of contributions it receives from each sector.
If I substitute for W and Ci in the government objective and follow the same maxim-
ization as above, I arrive at a similar specification as in equation 4.6. This owes to the
fact that both the changes in terms of government preferences and market structure of
lobbying are introduced into the government objective function14.
Altering the contributions technology itself is in violation of the truthful criteria. An
14Therefore, note that the two representations of the model lead to the same estimable equation and are
expressed as being isomorphic. This is true for the case where say for every dollar raised the state acts as
if it received the γ cents, so while the contributions are in fact one dollar, the trade policy decisions are
as if less were contributed. However, there may be an alternative interpretation where lobbies fail to raise
enough or where there are costs (more or less) for trade advocacy, then there will be a real resource cost
somewhere in the economy (or higher profits for free-riding firms.
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important underlying question is therefore if the truthful relationship between contribu-
tions by lobby groups and the level of protection continues to hold. This can potentially
account for why some lobbies achieve a more influential relationship with policy-makers
than others15
4.4 Methodology
This section will outline the data used and the empirical analysis in this chapter.
4.4.1 Data
The estimation of Equation 4.6 requires data on imports, elasticity of import demand and
tariff preferences by the 4-digit NIC/ISIC Revision 3 Industry for India. The dataset is the
same used in Chapter 3 of the thesis from All India Survey of Industries (ASI) and covers
the years from 1990 to 2007 with gaps. The issues related to the data will be discussed at
length in the following sections.
4.4.2 Estimating Lobbying Effectiveness
This section presents the empirical framework to examine heterogeneity in lobbying effect-
iveness across industries and its impact on trade policy outcomes. The empirical approach
consists of two steps, first to estimate lobbying effectiveness measures, second to examine
the determinants of these measures.
First, I obtain the estimates on effectiveness of lobbying that will vary across the sec-
tors. Using the theoretical model motivated above, introducing heterogeneity within the
15The truthful contributions criteria implies that the contribution schedule is set so that the marginal
change in the lobby’s gross welfare for a small change in policy equals the effect of the policy change
in contribution i.e. each lobby makes locally truthful contributions that reflects true preferences of the
lobby. I have explored altering the contributions technology to introduce costs of lobbying that violates
this assumption, I argue that the original Bernheim and Whinston (1986) essentially describes individual
behaviour in menu auctions, while the GH is an application of the cumulative group behaviour of individu-
als constituting the lobby groups. Individuals play coalition-proof (non-binding communication among
players) truthful strategic games, but the cumulative behaviour of such individuals may not always trans-
late to satisfy truthful revelations in terms of contributions made by a group of such individuals. Another
line of reasoning is on lines of miscalculations on parts of lobbies when stating their contributions which
again links to truthful contributions. Goldberg and Maggi (1997) argues that their joint maximization
is equivalent to the truthful Nash equilibrium concept, however I found no mathematical proof for this.
Further, the existing theoretical advances do not suggest any alternatives to the truthful revelations.
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traditional PFS model enables an empirical estimation of the effectiveness measures con-
sistent with the underlying model of PFS. To obtain the estimates on effectiveness from
equation (4.6), the first econometric issue is the measurement error in the estimates of
import demand elasticities. To deal with this, I take the elasticities to the left hand side
(as in Chapter 3). Time-variation is introduced such that the stochastic version of the
equation can now be written as:
tit
1 + tit
ei = (
γi −
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
)zit + uit (4.12)
I assumed that a = 1 (earlier in this Chapter), the mean lobbying effectiveness is given
by
∑n
j=1 γjαj = γ. So, the term
γi−
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
can be written as γi−γ1+γ . The estimates of β
measure deviation from the mean effectiveness. β will be normalized 16 into a unit interval
(0, 1). Now, if the fraction of specific factor owners is negligible such that
∑
j=1 αj = 0,
then the estimated β collapse to direct measures of lobbying effectiveness.
Therefore, in this approach I am interested to obtain the estimates on lobbying ef-
fectiveness γi. To estimate this equation, I need a panel dataset as β varies by sector i.
The estimates of β by sector can be obtained by the interaction of a sector dummy with
the inverse of the import penetration for each sector. This generates interaction terms for
every sector that gives the variation to obtain the estimates of lobbying effectiveness that
vary across sectors. I estimate four different specifications to enable comparison across the
models and ascertain the best fit of the data:
Model 1 is estimated as:
tit
1 + tit
ei = β1izit + uit (4.13)
Here, the parameter β1i can be estimated across the sectors using variation of the interac-
tion of zit with the sector dummies for each sector where β1i is defined as:
β1i =
γi −
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
(4.14)
16coef − r(min))/(r(max)− r(min))
74
It estimates the effect of inverse import penetration on trade protection across the sectors.
This relationship given by the coefficient β1 which varies by the sectors i.
The type of sector can significantly affect the ability to lobby such that different sec-
tors may show different propensities to lobby for protection. In this context some sec-
tors maybe more effective than others for lobbying the policy-makers. If certain factors
associated to lobbying propensity are time invariant, say owing to some comparative ad-
vantage/disadvantage, sector fixed effects provide a means for controlling for such omitted
variable bias with time-invariant values. The fixed effects capture political economy factors
that do not vary substantially across years. This could involve the ability to lobby the
government for trade protection where some industries may easily organize and lobby for
protection. To the extent that few industries may systematically receive more protection is
also captured by these fixed effects. However, note that the sector fixed effects also remove
the cross-sectional variation used in the estimation of traditional PFS. Model 2 includes
the sector fixed effects and is written as:
tit
1 + tit
ei = β0i + β1izit + uit (4.15)
Here, β0i are sector dummies that is included in addition to β1i, both vary by sector i.
Model 2 allows the effect of inverse import penetration on trade protection to be identified
off the variation across years. This relationship is given by the coefficient β1 controlling for
any unobserved effects across the sectors that are correlated with the explanatory variable.
The estimates from the pooled data can also be biased and inconsistent due to correla-
tion of regressors with the error terms in other periods. Unobserved effects over the years
can include changes in governments for instance that are correlated with the explanatory
variables. To address this, year fixed effects can be employed to capture any pattern that
the sectors exhibit as a group over the years. To control for this, I now introduce time fixed
effects into the earlier specification and estimateModel 3 that includes time dummies and
is written as:
tit
1 + tit
ei = β0t + β1i(zitDi) + uit (4.16)
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Here, β0t are the time fixed effects. The parameters β0t is included in addition to β1i .
The effect of inverse import penetration on trade protection differs across sectors. This
relationship is now given by the coefficient β1 which is identified off the variation across
the sectors controlling for any unobserved effects across the years that maybe correlated
with the explanatory variable.
Finally, Model 4 includes sector and time dummies and is written as:
tit
1 + tit
ei = β0i + β1i(zitDi) + β0t + uit (4.17)
Here, β0t are the time fixed effects. The parameters β0i and β0t are included in addition
to β1 . The relationship between inverse import penetration and trade protection is now
given by the coefficient β1 which is identified off the variation across the sectors controlling
for any unobserved heterogeneity across the sectors and years that maybe correlated with
the explanatory variable. However, note that this estimation places huge demands on the
dataset.
The identifying assumption for the political economy parameter (lobbying effectiveness)
in my model is time-invariance. This may be a problem for developing countries as often
there are several changes in the political economy across years. But following Gawande
et al. (2015), who adopt a similar logic focussing on lobbying effectiveness estimates as an
average across their period of study, I present the effectiveness estimates for 1990-2007.
This is a good starting point for India as it underwent major economic and trade reforms
during the period under study. The aim of the empirical analysis is thereby to obtain lob-
bying effectiveness estimates as the average parameters during the entire period controlling
for any unobserved effects over the years of study (examples include change in governments
and so on) that can be correlated with the explanatory variables. This in turn allows us
to use the variation in trade protection and inverse import penetration over the period to
identify lobbying effectiveness across the sectors. Fitting with my objective, Model 3 is
thereby the baseline that is compared with the other models that are estimated without
any fixed effects, with sector fixed effects and including both sector and time fixed effects.
Another econometric issue in the estimation is that import penetration is determined
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endogenously with trade protection. The endogenous variable here enters as an interac-
tion with the sector fixed effects. I will use an instrumental variables approach on lines
of Chapter 3 using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML). The instrumental
variables include the lag of inventories and workers and the interaction of the instrument
lag of workers with the sector dummies. The IV strategy is different for each model on
account of the sector or time dummies that gives exact identification in IV2 and IV4. Table
4.1 presents a summary of the estimated coefficients for all the Models using IV and the
over-identification tests in the relevant case. The Anderson-Rubin Statistics tests the joint
significance of the endogenous regressor in the main equation such that over-identifying
restrictions can be argued as valid in IV1 and IV3; in both Models the null cannot be re-
jected. The corresponding IV results are outlined in Table 4.2, the corresponding product
descriptions can be read from Table A.14 of Appendix A.2.6 in Chapter 3. The estimated
coefficients reflect the individual correlation of the dependent variable with the inverse
import penetration across sectors. All else equal, this examines the relationship between
trade protection and the penetration of imports in Indian manufacturing. A negative and
significant coefficient suggests a higher inverse import penetration is associated with lower
MFN trade protection while a positive sign is evidence for the opposite relationship to
hold. Each model is examined in terms of the first stage results of the IV and compared
in terms of the IV and corresponding OLS estimates to examine the extent to which the
IV corrects for the bias in the OLS. The OLS results are outlined for Models 1-4 in Table
A.15 in Appendix A.3.1.
In examining the estimated coefficients across columns (I)-(IV), my interest was to ob-
tain estimates on lobbying effectiveness that in the model are given as γi. In the baseline
results in column (3), the coefficient estimates explains one sector receiving higher pro-
tection vis-a-vis another controlling for changes across time. The first stage estimates for
the models are attached in Table A.16 of Appendix A.3.2 which presents the First stage
F-Statistics and the Shea Partial R-Squares for all the interactions across the 98 sectors.
The F-test shows better fit for Models IV1 and IV3 where it is more than 10 for most sec-
tors, while the F-statistic is lower than 10 for several sectors in IV2 and IV4 that include
the sector fixed effects. LIML is used as the better estimation method with any problem
of weak instruments in small samples (as in Chapter 3), however I use the criteria of the
F-test to select the preferred model.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Estimates: Models 1-4
Variable IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Summary
Obs 98 98 98 98
Mean 0.311 -0.382 -0.371 0.127
Std. Dev. 0.448 6.539 0.784 1.878
Min -0.011 -56.971 -4.899 -5.897
Max 2.301 21.981 0.618 15.207
Instrumental Variables
IV lag workers, lag workers, lag workers, lag workers,
lag inventories lag inventories lag inventories lag inventories
Interactions lag workers*Di lag workers*Di lag workers*Di lag workers*Di
Sector Dummies No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes
Overidentification
Sargan Statistic 5.74 Exact 1.856 Exact
p-value 0.219 Identification 0.603 Identification
Descriptives
Significant Coefficients 34 0 31 0
Positive Coefficients 96 69 28 60
Note: Table 4.1 shows the first stage results for each Model IV1-IV4 for the endogenous variable.
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Table 4.2: Modified PFS: IV Estimates
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
NIC 1511 1.28100* -0.06205 0.03465 0.22075
(0.711) (1.710) (0.604) (1.735)
NIC 1512 0.01793* 0.00070 -0.00339 -0.00021
(0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
NIC 1513 0.01446** 0.00183 0.00367 0.00123
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
NIC 1514 0.40268*** 0.03911 0.11210 0.04748
(0.136) (0.334) (0.129) (0.268)
NIC 1520 0.03413*** 0.03975 0.01526* 0.01893
(0.009) (0.108) (0.008) (0.117)
NIC 1531 0.01870*** -0.00003 0.00986** 0.00152
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011)
NIC 1532 0.06347*** 0.01476 0.01607 0.01556
(0.024) (0.073) (0.021) (0.070)
NIC 1533 0.00813 0.00119 -0.06804** -0.01243
(0.040) (0.064) (0.035) (0.066)
NIC 1541 0.00043 0.00013 -0.00781** -0.00129
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
NIC 1542 0.00230*** -0.00029 0.00103* -0.00043
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
NIC 1543 0.04211 0.00611 -0.01410 0.00252
(0.032) (0.045) (0.027) (0.037)
NIC 1544 0.04096 -0.02341 -0.01072 -0.00762
(0.025) (0.094) (0.023) (0.100)
NIC 1551 0.49764*** 0.13711 0.45106*** 0.11882
(0.022) (0.139) (0.021) (0.120)
NIC 1552 0.22015*** -0.05672 0.17072*** -0.05442
(0.024) (0.124) (0.022) (0.100)
NIC 1553 0.00431** 0.00016 0.00047 -0.00045
79
Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
NIC 1554 0.00334 0.00029 -0.00155 0.00021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
NIC 1600 0.02016*** -0.00083 0.01703*** -0.00100
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006)
NIC 1711 0.14148*** 0.13535 0.03260 0.11727
(0.052) (0.202) (0.049) (0.219)
NIC 1721 0.10731 0.06867 -0.00253 0.05373
(0.079) (0.093) (0.059) (0.090)
NIC 1722 0.13149** 0.01874 0.03264 0.01539
(0.059) (0.029) (0.044) (0.026)
NIC 1723 0.09719 0.24966 -0.01148 0.18317
(0.059) (0.489) (0.051) (0.441)
NIC 1729 1.82261 21.98081 -0.22942 15.20661
(1.152) (36.617) (0.974) (35.582)
NIC 1730 0.12692*** 1.10218 0.04495 0.87030
(0.045) (1.290) (0.041) (1.174)
NIC 1810 0.01090** 0.00393 0.00749** 0.00273
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
NIC 1820 0.20153 -0.25010 -0.04156 -0.20049
(0.173) (0.369) (0.138) (0.299)
NIC 1911 0.13582 -0.02572 -0.55774* 0.17670
(0.325) (3.173) (0.311) (2.327)
NIC 1912 0.07037 0.03222 -0.06786 0.01097
(0.072) (0.109) (0.062) (0.118)
NIC 1920 0.05937 0.06478 -0.04127 0.03230
(0.050) (0.185) (0.045) (0.170)
NIC 2010 0.84837*** -7.08433 0.33233 -5.89724
(0.234) (7.597) (0.235) (8.736)
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Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
NIC 2021 0.19127** -0.39366 0.00752 -0.15172
(0.087) (1.467) (0.082) (1.013)
NIC 2022 0.02861*** 0.00691 0.01468** 0.00489
(0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009)
NIC 2023 0.10933*** 0.12267 0.05485** 0.11018
(0.026) (0.188) (0.024) (0.136)
NIC 2029 0.49974*** 0.07934 0.10633 -0.01251
(0.184) (0.655) (0.175) (0.460)
NIC 2101 0.43978 12.59152 -0.48515 5.00262
(0.438) (81.197) (0.415) (61.784)
NIC 2102 0.04010 -0.09653 -0.01382 -0.06217
(0.028) (0.190) (0.025) (0.203)
NIC 2109 0.21149 0.46846 -0.44885 0.02130
(0.354) (2.220) (0.307) (2.267)
NIC 2212 -0.00003 0.00000 -0.01409** 0.00335
(0.007) (0.019) (0.006) (0.017)
NIC 2219 0.57991 0.48306 -2.37177* -0.50440
(1.401) (13.213) (1.341) (9.060)
NIC 2221 0.00377 0.00562 -0.00960 -0.00520
(0.006) (0.045) (0.006) (0.039)
NIC 2222 0.09899 0.06097 -0.36030* -0.03566
(0.228) (0.776) (0.208) (0.589)
NIC 2310 0.07179 -0.02097 -0.42340* -0.35507
(0.298) (2.782) (0.254) (2.583)
NIC 2320 -0.01147 -0.01836 -0.20857** 0.01994
(0.130) (0.242) (0.103) (0.227)
NIC 2411 0.53260 1.80816 -2.16366* -2.74697
(1.279) (30.876) (1.200) (30.782)
NIC 2412 0.12324 -0.92435 -0.48868* 1.24826
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Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
(0.288) (18.961) (0.273) (13.871)
NIC 2413 0.10296 -0.22685 -0.72402* 0.30281
(0.401) (3.640) (0.371) (3.760)
NIC 2422 0.03446 0.01251 -0.10422* 0.01653
(0.065) (0.208) (0.062) (0.165)
NIC 2423 0.06604 1.04867 -0.26789* -1.23460
(0.165) (11.722) (0.151) (12.046)
NIC 2424 0.04458 0.05724 -0.11580 0.00328
(0.078) (0.365) (0.072) (0.338)
NIC 2429 0.24728 -0.70967 -0.84300* 1.29132
(0.513) (18.231) (0.487) (17.765)
NIC 2430 0.43249* -2.64842 -0.06195 -0.51529
(0.234) (46.389) (0.221) (17.937)
NIC 2511 0.00539 0.00522 -0.03222* -0.01084
(0.018) (0.101) (0.017) (0.104)
NIC 2519 0.08421 0.16293 -0.49775* -0.23138
(0.283) (2.027) (0.261) (2.112)
NIC 2520 0.08703 0.10324 -0.15774 0.00277
(0.123) (0.515) (0.111) (0.552)
NIC 2610 0.77928** 0.49720 0.11215 0.99869
(0.324) (4.044) (0.304) (3.618)
NIC 2691 0.15571 0.27024 -0.06358 0.19327
(0.103) (1.344) (0.097) (0.924)
NIC 2692 0.36850** 0.36478 0.06705 0.32570
(0.160) (0.665) (0.144) (0.530)
NIC 2694 0.00740*** 0.00343 0.00575*** 0.00297
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
NIC 2695 0.02360** 0.00724 -0.00088 0.00509
(0.010) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
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Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
NIC 2696 0.00847 0.00300 -0.00177 0.00185
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
NIC 2699 0.20486* 0.15284 -0.05918 0.10815
(0.122) (0.437) (0.121) (0.472)
NIC 2710 0.25000* 0.19709 -0.07982 0.11071
(0.145) (1.351) (0.145) (0.965)
NIC 2720 2.30107 1.26729 -1.08151 0.66861
(1.548) (3.006) (1.475) (3.109)
NIC 2811 0.12931*** 0.50815 0.04698 0.40107
(0.041) (0.754) (0.038) (0.521)
NIC 2812 0.05729** 0.02115 0.00521 0.02209
(0.024) (0.078) (0.023) (0.068)
NIC 2813 0.15790 -0.15858 -0.27987 0.07340
(0.216) (1.543) (0.201) (1.094)
NIC 2893 0.09893 -0.00824 -0.40725* 0.11026
(0.237) (1.204) (0.227) (0.930)
NIC 2899 0.55133 -1.41123 -0.25073 -0.88918
(0.511) (3.196) (0.415) (3.175)
NIC 2912 1.32276 6.16343 -0.48968 3.33211
(0.886) (16.217) (0.816) (15.948)
NIC 2919 0.14191 0.05483 -0.13320 0.03859
(0.133) (0.281) (0.130) (0.276)
NIC 2921 0.02499 0.01464 -0.01796 0.00387
(0.020) (0.074) (0.019) (0.055)
NIC 2922 1.73735 1.61463 -2.06251 1.20606
(1.770) (6.353) (1.744) (6.448)
NIC 2924 0.67472 -3.42895 -1.00013 1.01518
(0.792) (51.059) (0.753) (38.268)
NIC 2925 0.65600 0.66451 -1.54121 0.31128
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Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
(1.021) (19.087) (0.979) (14.135)
NIC 2930 0.12611** 0.04809 -0.00456 0.05409
(0.061) (0.211) (0.058) (0.166)
NIC 3000 0.48626 0.08102 -1.78995* -0.08159
(1.111) (2.661) (1.066) (2.394)
NIC 3110 0.20389 0.10782 -0.45735 -0.18345
(0.315) (1.635) (0.292) (1.485)
NIC 3130 0.07197 0.03702 -0.15255 -0.06870
(0.127) (0.812) (0.120) (0.788)
NIC 3140 0.11929 0.03736 -0.25762 -0.00661
(0.186) (0.275) (0.166) (0.285)
NIC 3150 0.26195 0.13409 -0.10145 0.03725
(0.183) (0.535) (0.162) (0.504)
NIC 3190 1.01819 -2.01219 -0.84484 -1.21429
(1.076) (5.135) (0.904) (5.316)
NIC 3210 0.35429 -1.09934 -1.98821* -0.23674
(1.294) (5.429) (1.114) (5.569)
NIC 3220 0.06935 0.01071 -0.19233 0.04756
(0.134) (0.373) (0.122) (0.285)
NIC 3230 0.21134 0.10587 -0.42968 -0.56871
(0.315) (6.231) (0.286) (5.817)
NIC 3311 1.51585 -11.63940 -2.71078 -0.83967
(2.141) (58.431) (1.933) (55.052)
NIC 3320 0.87293 -56.97120 -2.19333 -3.86902
(1.570) (306.879) (1.394) (237.271)
NIC 3330 0.32375 0.22553 -0.25087 0.16215
(0.268) (1.069) (0.260) (0.962)
NIC 3410 0.83882*** -2.00261 0.61762*** -1.77377
(0.115) (1.326) (0.103) (1.235)
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Modified PFS: IV Estimates (cont.)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (IV1) Model 2 (IV2) Model 3 (IV3) Model 4 (IV4)
Baseline
NIC 3511 1.12389 -0.33013 -2.02978 0.53256
(1.522) (6.986) (1.429) (5.487)
NIC 3520 0.14069 0.12718 -0.26663 -0.00943
(0.215) (1.247) (0.207) (1.335)
NIC 3530 1.37176 0.57359 -4.89945* 0.35758
(2.993) (10.415) (2.903) (9.064)
NIC 3591 0.01331*** 0.01438 0.00439 0.06038
(0.005) (0.215) (0.004) (0.177)
NIC 3592 0.12566*** 0.09745 0.04142 0.10299
(0.039) (0.190) (0.038) (0.159)
NIC 3599 0.00259 -0.00054 -0.00102 -0.00127
(0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
NIC 3610 0.05932 0.01952 -0.02498 0.01296
(0.042) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040)
NIC 3691 0.27740 0.13832 -0.41410 0.05516
(0.344) (0.481) (0.323) (0.472)
NIC 3692 0.25853 0.08971 -0.54856 -0.02426
(0.379) (0.627) (0.378) (0.752)
NIC 3693 0.18826 1.59730 -0.54021 -0.10808
(0.409) (8.844) (0.345) (9.121)
NIC 3694 0.34491 -2.02034 -0.28777 -1.13888
(0.334) (5.293) (0.292) (5.874)
Sector FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 876 876 876 876
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table shows the coefficients from the estimation with the models.
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Column (I) of Table 4.2 shows the coefficient estimates obtained from Model 1 with
the pooled dataset. This identifies the coefficient β1i that serves as the benchmark for the
competing models. Comparison of the OLS results (OLS1) and the IV (IV1) is presented
in Figure 4.1. There are arguably endogeneity issues and an attenuation bias working in
opposite directions in the OLS estimations. First, an upward bias on account of endo-
geneity in estimating the relationship between trade protection and the ratio of output to
imports. Second, there may also be a downward bias on account of measurement error in
the dependent variable that includes the estimated import demand elasticities. This was
discussed in Chapter 3, such that if the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with any
measurement error, the IV procedure corrects for both bias. On account of the bias being
in opposite directions however, I expect the IV estimates may be higher or lower than the
OLS estimates depending on the correction across sectors.
Column (II) outlines the results for Model 2 that includes the sector fixed effects in the
estimation. Including the sector fixed effects wipes out the cross-sector variation tradition-
ally used in the PFS. This reveals the expected change in trade protection associated with
a one unit of within-sector change in import penetration, all else equal. Next, the results
for the baseline Model 3 are outlined in column (III). Comparison of the OLS (OLS3) and
(IV3) reveals that in this Model, the IV estimates are a clear correction over the OLS bias.
The distribution of the coefficient estimates (with time fixed effects) that are identified off
the cross-sector variation are shown in Figure 4.2. Note that there is a clear left shift in
the distribution for IV3 as compared to IV1 that owes to the fact that the coefficient es-
timates in IV3 explains one sector receiving higher protection vis-a-vis another controlling
for changes across time. Finally, Model 4 includes both time and sector fixed effects. The
significance of most of the coefficients are wiped out such that this model controls for both
changes across sectors and time.
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Figure 4.1: Kernel Density estimates for coefficients from OLS1 and IV1
Figure 4.1 shows the coefficient estimates from Model OLS1 and IV1 for the modified PFS.
Figure 4.2: Kernel Density estimates for coefficients from OLS3 and IV3
Figure 4.2 shows the coefficient estimates from Model OLS3 and IV3 for the modified PFS.
It is important to note that there are both positive and negative signs on the coefficients
for interactions of the inverse import penetration. This can be understood on lines of the
GH hypothesis such that opposed relationships are found for organized versus unorgan-
ized sectors. The interaction term gives the disperse component in the overall relationship
between the inverse import penetration and trade protection explained by what I termed
as lobbying effectiveness γi.
Table 4.3 presents the coefficients of interaction terms from Model 3 that are used to
derive lobbying effectiveness and the corresponding estimates of lobby effectiveness. Using
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this method, the effectiveness estimates are derived as relative to each other and as a de-
viation from the mean effectiveness in manufacturing shown in Figure 4.3.
Table 4.3: Lobbying Effectiveness
NIC/ISIC Estimated Coefficients Effectiveness
1511 0.035 0.894
1512 -0.003 0.887
1513 0.004 0.889
1514 0.112 0.908
1520 0.015 0.891
1531 0.010 0.890
1532 0.016 0.891
1533 -0.068 0.876
1541 -0.008 0.887
1542 0.001 0.888
1543 -0.014 0.885
1544 -0.011 0.886
1551 0.451 0.970
1552 0.171 0.919
1553 0.000 0.888
1554 -0.002 0.888
1600 0.017 0.891
1711 0.033 0.894
1721 -0.003 0.888
1722 0.033 0.894
1723 -0.011 0.886
1729 -0.229 0.846
1730 0.045 0.896
1810 0.007 0.889
1820 -0.042 0.881
1911 -0.558 0.787
1912 -0.068 0.876
1920 -0.041 0.881
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Lobbying Effectiveness (cont.)
NIC/ISIC Estimated Coefficients Effectiveness
2010 0.332 0.948
2021 0.008 0.889
2022 0.015 0.891
2023 0.055 0.898
2029 0.106 0.907
2101 -0.485 0.800
2102 -0.014 0.886
2109 -0.449 0.807
2212 -0.014 0.885
2219 -2.372 0.458
2221 -0.010 0.886
2222 -0.360 0.823
2310 -0.423 0.811
2320 -0.209 0.850
2411 -2.164 0.496
2412 -0.489 0.799
2413 -0.724 0.757
2422 -0.104 0.869
2423 -0.268 0.839
2424 -0.116 0.867
2429 -0.843 0.735
2430 -0.062 0.877
2511 -0.032 0.882
2519 -0.498 0.798
2520 -0.158 0.859
2610 0.112 0.908
2691 -0.064 0.877
2692 0.067 0.900
2694 0.006 0.889
2695 -0.001 0.888
2696 -0.002 0.888
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Lobbying Effectiveness (cont.)
NIC/ISIC Estimated Coefficients Effectiveness
2699 -0.059 0.877
2710 -0.080 0.874
2720 -1.082 0.692
2811 0.047 0.897
2812 0.005 0.889
2813 -0.280 0.837
2893 -0.407 0.814
2899 -0.251 0.843
2912 -0.490 0.799
2919 -0.133 0.864
2921 -0.018 0.885
2922 -2.063 0.514
2924 -1.000 0.707
2925 -1.541 0.609
2930 -0.005 0.887
3000 -1.790 0.564
3110 -0.457 0.805
3130 -0.153 0.860
3140 -0.258 0.841
3150 -0.101 0.870
3190 -0.845 0.735
3210 -1.988 0.528
3220 -0.192 0.853
3230 -0.430 0.810
3311 -2.711 0.397
3320 -2.193 0.491
3330 -0.251 0.843
3410 0.618 1
3511 -2.030 0.520
3520 -0.267 0.840
3530 -4.899 0
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Lobbying Effectiveness (cont.)
NIC/ISIC Estimated Coefficients Effectiveness
3591 0.004 0.889
3592 0.041 0.896
3599 -0.001 0.888
3610 -0.025 0.884
3691 -0.414 0.813
3692 -0.549 0.789
3693 -0.540 0.790
3694 -0.288 0.836
Note: Table shows the coefficients and corresponding effectiveness measures. I assume that a = 1, the
mean lobbying effectiveness is given by
∑n
j=1 γjαj = γ. So, the term
γi−
∑n
j=1 γjαj
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
can be written as γi−γ
1+γ
.
The estimates of β measure deviation from the mean effectiveness. β will be normalized 17 into a unit
interval (0, 1). Now, if the fraction of specific factor owners is negligible such that
∑
j=1 αj = 0, then the
estimated β collapse to direct measures of lobbying effectiveness.
Figure 4.3: Lobbying Effectiveness
Figure 4.3 shows the lobbying effectiveness estimates at the 4-digit of the NIC/ISIC Rev. 3. Among the
most effective sectors, I also observe the one with the highest tariffs being the ISIC sector 1551 defined as
the Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits.
17coef − r(min))/(r(max)− r(min))
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4.4.3 Lobbying Effectiveness in India
In this section, I discuss the most effective and least effective sectors based on the estim-
ated relative lobbying effectiveness measures above.
I find the NIC industries of Manufacture of motor vehicles and Distilling, rectifying
and blending of spiritsas the most effective lobby groups and that of Manuf. of aircraft
and spacecraft and Medical, surgical and orthopaedic equipment the least effective in terms
of lobbying effectiveness over the period 1990-2007. It is important to note that these
effectiveness measures reflect the relative effectiveness of each sector in comparison to the
mean for the period of 1990-2007. The underlying theoretical framework implies this as
the government weight on these sectors relative to aggregate welfare. The list of ten most
effective and least effective sectors are listed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
The ten most effective sectors compared to the mean show an effectiveness measure
between 0.90 to 1, while the ten least effective ones range from 0.61 to 0. Across all the
4-digit NIC/ISIC sectors, the average effectiveness is found quite high at 0.82 interpreted
as the average lobbying effectiveness of the Indian manufacturing sector between 1990-2007.
Table 4.4: Most Effective Sectors
NIC/ISIC Description Effectiveness
3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles 1
1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 0.9698111
2010 Saw milling and planing of wood 0.9482902
1552 Manuf. of wines 0.9189974
1514 Manuf. of glass and glass products 0.9083804
2029 Manuf. of Vegetable and animal oils and fats 0.9083728
2023 Manuf. of other products of wood 0.9073268
2811 Manuf. of refractory ceramic products 0.9002057
2610 Manuf. of wooden containers 0.8979955
Note: Table 4.4 shows the most effective sectors.
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Table 4.5: Least Effective Sectors
NIC/ISIC Description Effectiveness
3530 Manuf. of aircraft and spacecraft 0
3311 Manuf. of medical and surgical equipment 0.3967087
2219 Other publishing 0.4581567
2922 Manuf. of optical instruments and photographic equip. 0.4905004
3320 Manuf. of basic chemicals 0.4958775
2411 Manuf. of machine-tools 0.514211
3511 Building and repairing of ships 0.520144
3210 Manuf. of electronic valves and tubes 0.5276788
3000 Manuf. of office, accounting machinery 0.5636151
2925 Manuf. of machinery for food, beverage processing 0.6087002
Note: Table 4.5 shows the least effective sectors.
I also compare my estimates on lobbying effectiveness from the PFS model with the
political organization measures constructed for India earlier in Chapter 3 and in the liter-
ature18. I find that the most effective sector of Manufacture of motor vehicles is labelled as
organized using my measure of organization but identified as unorganized in Cadot et al.
(2007) while the least effective sector of Manuf. of aircraft and spacecraft is identified as
being politically organized in both measures. This suggests support for the earlier argu-
ment that political organization alone does not imply actual lobbying, while some sectors
can be organized they may be very ineffective at lobbying. Thereby, the natural question
is to examine what determines this effectiveness in the next section.
4.4.4 What determines Lobbying Effectiveness?
Why are some industries more effective in lobbying for trade protection than others?
Whether or not firms are successful in securing protection depends on their ability to
organise and make a case for protection. A fundamental issue is what characteristics de-
termine the ability of influence interests groups to lobby for protection. There is only
scarce evidence on this question with few empirical papers that have looked at the effect-
18Outlined in table A.14 of Appendix A.2.6, political organization from Cadot et al. (2007) is presented
corresponding to the effectiveness estimates. The estimates in Cadot et al. (2007) for ISIC Revision 2 were
mapped to the 4-digit sectors of NIC/ISIC Revision 3 in my study for comparison.
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iveness of lobbying in shaping policy outcomes19 with no empirical evidence whatsoever in
the context of lobbying effectiveness for trade policy in India. I am therefore interested to
examine the determinants of the measures on lobbying effectiveness for trade policy using
a set of traditional political-economy regressors.
It is widely accepted that industry characteristics determine lobbying for trade policy
influence20 where individual firms play an important role the structure of protection across
sectors21. These factors have been shown to predict the ability of an industry to organize
and lobby the government for trade policy. In this section, I explain effectiveness of lob-
bying using the demand side of trade policy in terms of the underlying costs and benefits
of lobbying22. The success of these sectors in securing protection will in turn depend on
several political economy factors.
Trefler (1993) provides certain criteria relevant to predict whether an industry will
achieve sectoral political organization and obtain favourable legislation. The country-
specific empirical literature for Australia, Turkey and the United States discussed in
Chapter 3 uses trade specific characteristics such as imports and exports to identify polit-
ical organization. Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) use some of these trade oriented
variables, along with additional ones such as political contributions, value added, compos-
ition of employees and firm concentration that are not strictly trade oriented to explain
political organization. These determinants that have been used in the PFS framework to
explain political organization may also affect lobbying effectiveness.
The evidence on how geographic location determines effectiveness in lobbying for policy
is at best mixed23. If firms in a given industry are spread across all the country, then their
influence on the government decision-making process can potentially be stronger as they
would exert their influence through different channels. This implies broad political repres-
entation with a potentially greater voice in trade politics. At the same time, it has been
19One study in this area is by De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) who statistically estimate the returns
to lobbying by universities for educational earmarks. They find that for a university with representation
in the House or Senate appropriations committees, a 10 per cent increase in lobbying yields a 3 to 4 per
cent increase in earmark grants obtained by the university.
20In the traditional PFS setting, examples include Mitra (1999).
21The role of firms in shaping protection for a sector has been explored in Bombardini (2008).
22In my theoretical framework, effectiveness is linked to the preferences of the government on the supply
side of protection as one alternative. The estimated effectiveness measures are now explained with empirical
data on demand specific determinants of effectiveness.
23I find two opposing views that are discussed at length in Busch and Reinhardt (1999). The relationship
between geographic concentration and protection has been explained using the idea of a closed group with
no incentive to free-ride on one hand and the logic of broad political representation on the other.
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suggested in the literature that it could be harder/expensive for firms that are spread out
to organize and lobby. This is based on the idea of a closed group that implies the costs
of organization and monitoring effective lobbying is lower such that there is less incentive
to free-ride. The geographical concentration of firms in a given industry is therefore an
important determinant of the effectiveness in lobbying. However, I argue that this rela-
tionship may be dependent on the nature of goods produced in a given sector in terms of
being similar or differentiated varieties. Firms in a given sector that produce similar goods
cooperate to lobby effectively when they are concentrated, these firms may also lobby
effectively when they are geographically dispersed that can translate to better political
representation.
It is often suggested that as size of the group increases, it can lead to greater lobbying
by the group. Bombardini (2008) shows that the characteristics of size distribution of firms
are important in explaining the pattern of protection across industries in the PFS model
such that larger firms in a given sector are more likely to lobby. She shows that the share
of total output in a sector produced by firms that lobby is increasing with the average firm
size and firm size dispersion within the sector. A more unequal distribution of firm size,
implies a larger industry-level of lobbying for a given output that can get a higher level
of protection. Thereby to study lobbying effectiveness, one must account for unequal size
distribution of firms in a given sector. Following this line of analysis, I control for the idea
that unequal size distribution of firms may result in lower effectiveness. Given that the
average size of firms in a given sector is an important factor that can determine lobbying
effectiveness, I control for the average size of firms and output concentration in a given
sector in the specification below.
The dependent variable is the lobbying effectiveness measure γi estimated above that
lies between 0 and 1. Using pooled OLS, I test the hypothesis that a sector with geographic-
ally concentrated firms is more effective in lobbying by achieving cooperation to effectively
influence the government decision-making process. Additionally, I will test if the relation-
ship between geographical concentration and lobbying effectiveness varies in terms of the
elasticity of substitution in a given sector. Taking into account the bounded nature of
the response variable, I will use a fractional logit model with lobbying effectiveness in the
(0,1) interval as a dependent variable (Papke and Wooldridge (1996)) as a robustness check.
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I include the following set of political economy determinants to examine the impact on
lobbying effectiveness:
γi = α0 + α1G+ α2Elasticity + α3G ∗ Elasticity + βB + ui (4.18)
Where Geography (G) is the geographical concentration in a particular sector (that is
time-invariant) taken from Lall et al. (2003). Elasticity is the elasticity of substitution
in a given sector from Broda and Weinstein (2004). The effect of geography of lobbying
effectiveness is potentially heterogeneous such that I argue this differs by the similarity or
differences in the types of products produced in a sector.
A higher elasticity of substitution (which also implies smaller economies of scale in
equilibrium) works against regional divergence as asserted in Krugman (1990). There-
fore, the interaction of geographical concentration with the elasticity of substitution i.e.
G*Elasticity is included24. The control variables B include output concentration measured
as the share of output produced by the four largest firms in a given sector and the average
size of a sector (in terms of number of firms that proxy for lobby strength in numbers.)
from the WBES. Additionally, the effectiveness in lobbying can also be affected by the
opportunity for direct interactions with the government that will affect the ability to lobby
effectively. I construct a measure using data on the following question on average time
spent by firms on direct interactions with the government (scaled by the output of the
given sector) from the WBES to control for this effect:
“In a typical week over the last year, what percentage of total senior management’s
time was spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations including
dealings with officials, completing forms, etc.?”
The fractional logit model can be represented as the following equation:
E[y|x] = exp(Xβ)
1 + exp(Xβ)
(4.19)
Where y is the dependent variable lobbying effectiveness and X is the vector of explanatory
24Note that elasticity of substitution among the products in a given sector differs from the elasticity of
import demand faced by the firm that was included in the PFS estimations earlier.
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regressors. Both results from the pooled OLS and fractional logit are presented in Table
4.6. I find the results are qualitatively similar for both the estimations. In all columns
(I)-(V), the results suggest evidence for the hypothesis that geographical concentration is
a positive and significant determinant of lobbying effectiveness in Indian manufacturing.
The more concentrated the firms in a given industry, more effective is the industry in
lobbying for trade policy. This effect also depends on the elasticity of substitution i.e.
the similarity or differentiated varieties produced in the sector evidenced in the positive
and significant coefficient for elasticity. Being geographically concentrated and producing
similar varieties of goods is found to translate to lower costs of lobbying that determines
lobbying effectiveness significantly such that I find a negative and significant coefficient
for the interaction term25. Overall, I find a significant interaction for Geography and the
Elasticity that indicates that the effect of geographical spread on lobbying effectiveness
differs by the elasticity of the industry that also confirms Krugman (1990). This implies
that for Indian manufacturing sectors producing differentiated goods will be more effective
in lobbying the government when firms are geographically concentrated26.
25This will also be taken up in Chapter 6 where I examine how elasticity of substitution determines
collective versus individual lobbying.
26In Chapter 6, I will show evidence that suggests if firm dispersion is higher, firms will be likely to
lobby using a Dual Strategy that is arguably more effective.
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Table 4.6: Determinants of Lobbying Effectiveness
Ordinary Least Squares on Pooled data Robustness: Fractional Logit Regression
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Geography 0.4550*** 0.5401*** 0.6731*** 0.6794*** 3.2358*** 3.7970*** 4.7277*** 4.7786***
(0.0742) (0.0760) (0.1271) (0.1270) (0.5286) (0.5233) (0.9093) (0.9066)
Elasticity 0.0012*** 0.0013*** 0.0020*** 0.0020*** 0.0109*** 0.0120*** 0.0165*** 0.0169***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0028) (0.0028)
G*Elasticity -0.0202* -0.0211** -0.1458* -0.1538*
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0799) (0.0802)
Opportunity 0.0001*** 0.0006***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Controls
Concentration 0.0005** 0.0007*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0041** 0.0053*** 0.0013 0.0019 0.0018
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Avg. Size 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0019*** 0.0016*** 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Constant 0.7678*** 0.7776*** 0.7543*** 0.7499*** 0.7494*** 1.1648*** 1.2101*** 1.0568*** 1.0258*** 1.0218***
(0.0109) (0.0092) (0.0112) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0667) (0.0582) (0.0683) (0.0770) (0.0770)
N 882 882 882 882 877 882 882 882 882 877
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table 4.6 examines the determinants of lobbying effectiveness. Columns (I)-(V) for each OLS and Fractional Logit regressions control for output concentration of the
sector and average size of the sector in terms of number of firms. All columns also include a constant term in the regression.
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4.5 Conclusions
This paper suggests the origin of heterogeneity in lobbying in PFS using the idea of lob-
bying effectiveness. It provides new empirical evidence on India in terms of estimates on
lobbying effectiveness for trade policy that have been non-existent for India.
I used the estimates to examine determinants of lobbying effectiveness in terms of mar-
ket structure. The findings suggests that sectors with geographically concentrated firms
are likely to be more effective in lobbying, the effectiveness will decline with an increase
in similarity of goods produced in the sector which implies they are likely to be competitors.
In the next chapter, I examine that if introducing such a measure changes the well-
known implications and results of the PFS model.
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Chapter 5
Is Protection still for Sale with
Lobbying Effectiveness?
5.1 Introduction
The modified framework of Protection for Sale (PFS) introduced the idea of lobbying ef-
fectiveness into the traditional model. This leads me to examine if the introduction of such
a measure changes the well-known implications and results of the traditional model. In
this light, the motivation for this Chapter is to examine the following: "Is Protection
still for sale with Lobbying Effectiveness?". The primary objective is to examine
how the differences in political economy factors in terms of lobbying effectiveness explain
the variation in trade protection across Indian manufacturing sectors.
The modified framework allows to account for differences in lobbying effectiveness across
sectors to explain the variation in trade protection. To estimate this model with data, I
need a proxy for the new measure of lobbying effectiveness γi defined in Chapter 4. The
trade policy set-up in India consists of the apex government body i.e. Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry (MOCI) that oversees trade policy formulation. This leads to the
premise that the interactions of the manufacturing industry with the MOCI has important
implications for the hypothesis discussed by means of the modified PFS framework. I have
information on firm membership to associations that have close ties to the government and
are perceived as a legitimate means of lobbying1. In Chapter 3, I used this information
taken from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) to identify a binary measure of
1The associations developed close ties to the government and are perceived as a legitimate means of
lobbying with detailed information and corresponding awareness of international trade negotiations as
discussed in Narlikar (2006).
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political organization in traditional PFS. Now, I use the same data on firms that are mem-
bers of industry associations in each sector to construct the proxy measure of lobbying
effectiveness
I recognize two qualifications that are worth mentioning. First, membership alone may
not fully capture the extent of actual lobbying. Firms can lobby more or less effectively by
means of their membership. This implies a sector with a lower share of firms as members
can be more effective in lobbying than another sector with a higher share of members.
If this argument is true, it will lead to a downward bias when examining the impact of
lobbying effectiveness on trade protection2. Second, there may be additional political eco-
nomy factors at work besides interactions by means of membership to associations that can
help explain the variation in trade protection in the model. Such factors can be potential
substitutes or complements to lobbying by means of membership. I believe the nature of
this relationship will depend on the trade policy instrument under study3.
The arguments made above inform the empirical analysis of this Chapter where I at-
tempt to meet the primary objective of using a direct measure of lobbying effectiveness
and then try to deal with each of the arguments above. I construct the proxy measure of
lobbying effectiveness and estimate PFS with lobbying effectiveness as the baseline model.
The underlying motivation is to measure effectiveness based on the actual set-up of Indian
trade policy. The industry dealings with the government are often facilitated by industry
associations that include especially the national bodies of Confederation of Indian Indus-
tries (CII) and Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The
associations sponsor and participate in general policy debates as emphasized in Kochanek
(1996) and have played a significant role in Indian trade policy as outlined in Sagar and
Madan (2009). This has in turn been accompanied by rising government responsiveness
in industry association meetings. Thereby, I use the data on firms that are members of
industry associations as the proxy measure of lobbying effectiveness.
2I recognize that one may further argue that membership to associations may not always imply lobbying
only for trade policy influence. Associations can also represent interests for industrial policy. If one believes
that the associations lobby more for industrial policy than trade policy, the measure of effectiveness based
on membership will suffer from a potential measurement error. This argument is found in the existing
literature on PFS for the United States in the context of political organization where political contributions
are not always for trade policy influence Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). I have undertaken an
additional estimation using an IV for lobbying effectiveness for India. The qualitative results are similar
such that I believe that this argument does not affect the findings of this Chapter. This owes primarily
to the fact that the national associations in India engage majorly in trade lobbying while lobbying for
industries is only at the margin.
3This is a motivation for examining different lobbying strategies in Chapter 6 of my thesis.
101
It is a fair argument that membership to associations does not imply actual lobbying
that can bias the impact of effectiveness on trade protection downwards. This leads to the
first robustness check for the baseline estimation. I take the measures of lobbying effect-
iveness constructed above and use a binary equation to estimate the likelihood of a firm to
lobby effectively for trade policy influence using its membership to an association. A set of
firm and industry characteristics are used to explain this likelihood with the aim to reduce
the bias. This gives a predicted measure of lobbying effectiveness such that the PFS model
is estimated using the predicted measure as a robustness check for the qualitative findings
of the baseline.
The second qualification to my framework finds discussion in Goldberg and Maggi
(1997) who have extended the empirical specification of PFS to include variables that may
affect protection but were left out of the model. They include employment size, sectoral un-
employment rate, measures of unionisation, changes in import penetration, and buyer and
seller concentration. The conclusion was that some variables have additional explanatory
power that can significantly improve the fit of the model. Following this line of thought,
one can contest that there maybe additional political economy factors that can influence
the equilibrium level of trade protection specific to developing countries and more so for
India that may still be left out of the theoretical model. This leads to the next robustness
check for my baseline model where I add another factor that can help explain the variation
in trade protection in the model. To achieve this however, I choose to drive the empirics
using a theoretically consistent specification derived by another simple alteration to the
functional form of the modified PFS framework.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present a dis-
cussion of relevant literature, followed by Section 3 where I will outline the theoretical
framework and build the hypothesis for analysing the data outlined in section 4. Section 5
then outlines the Methodology. Section 6 summarizes the overall findings. Finally, Section
7 outlines concluding remarks.
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5.2 Literature
The literature on PFS has recognized the limitations for undertaking this estimation for
developing countries. Issues with the availability of data has made it hard to discern the
extent to which political economy factors determine trade policy for these countries. This
section presents the literature that has attempted to deal with such issues and identifies
possible ways forward.
Weymouth (2012) uses the WBES data for 2002-2005 for over 42 developing and trans-
ition countries to examine the determinants of lobbying and perceived policy influence.
He argues that firm-level heterogeneity explains political behaviour while political institu-
tions shape the incentives of policy-makers to respond to business interests. On the whole,
the estimates give support to the hypotheses that lobbying and influence increases with
the firm size and market power in these countries. However, India is not included in this
study because WBES data for India is not comparable with the global dataset. This war-
rants a case specific study of India using the WBES data that is undertaken in this chapter.
Chen (2013) shows firm-level heterogeneity determines the nature of firm engagement
with government officials in China. A Chinese firm-director panel dataset is used to exam-
ine the matching of heterogeneous firms and politicians using 36, 308 detailed observations.
The results show that the more productive firms are the ones paired with more powerful
politicians. The preference for political capital relative to human capital increases with firm
dependence on external financing and the inefficiency of local governments. This provides
further evidence on the importance of industry-government interactions and lobbying in
developing countries.
Olarreaga et al. (1999) conclude that industrial lobbies had an important influence on
the determination of Mexican trade policy. They conduct a survey with Mexican business
executives and conclude that only three percent of the executives think that it is useless to
attempt and influence government policy. This shows the importance attached to lobbying
as a means of influence on trade policy for Mexico. It is shown that foreign firms may in
fact have a higher influence than domestic firms in Mexico as the industries with a higher
concentration of foreign firms are likely to achieve greater trade protection. The influence
of foreign firms versus domestic firms in lobbying for trade policy of a country has emerged
as an important element of policy processes for developing countries.
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The determinants of association membership have received significant attention in the
lobbying literature. One important factor is firm size that is expected to be positively
correlated with the likelihood of lobbying as shown in Kerr et al. (2014). One reason
cited is that larger firms offer greater potential pay-off to support policy-makers such that
firms with more employees provide politicians with a greater pool of potential support.
For example, if policy-makers aim to reduce unemployment with a policy outcome, firm
expectations of lobbying success will potentially increase with size. While, smaller firms
often lack sufficient scale to cover the fixed costs of becoming a member of a lobby associ-
ation. This proposition is examined in the context of the firm decision to be a member of
a lobbying association in India.
Campos and Giovannoni (2007) provide evidence on lobbying and influence for 25 trans-
ition countries. Their results suggest that firm size and ownership are amongst the most
important determinants of lobby membership even for less developed countries. Further,
if a firm is foreign-owned it is more likely to be a member of a lobby group and in turn
to attract foreign investment, governments could also be particularly attentive to requests
from foreign investors. Foreign firms in India are subject to greater trade regulations than
domestic firms such that foreign ownership could imply that they must lobby harder to
achieve the same influence. It can also be hypothesized that firms with foreign ownership
are also likely to have an advantage in negotiating with foreign partners in international
negotiations such that they would leverage this by taking membership in domestic lobbying
associations for a better stance at lobbying the policy-makers.
If firms in a given industry are spread across the country, then their influence on the
government’s decision-making process can potentially be stronger as they would exert their
influence through different channels Facchini et al. (2006). This can in addition be linked
to greater political representation across different locations in the country. At the same
time, it has been suggested in earlier literature that it could be harder/expensive for firms
that are spread out to organize and lobby. As argued in Chapter 4, this is based on the idea
of a closed group that implies lower costs of organization and correspondingly lower incent-
ive to free-ride. The concentration of firms in geographical locations can have important
implications for cooperation in lobbying. To explain effectiveness in terms of membership
to associations, this reasoning would imply that firms in sectors with lower geographical
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concentration would be more likely to achieve effectiveness in lobbying by means of its
membership.
To examine the political economy of trade protection in India, the next section presents
the structural model to guide the analysis of PFS accounting for differences in lobbying
effectiveness and the underlying set up to examine membership of firms to associations.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
This section outlines the theoretical framework in two steps. First, I present the model
motivated earlier in Chapter 4 and use a direct measure to proxy for lobbying effectiveness
to estimate the baseline model. To check robustness of the findings to the concern that
membership may not always imply actual lobbying effectiveness, I predict the likelihood
of a firm being lobbying by means of its membership of an association and construct the
second proxy measure for effectiveness. Second, I introduce additional political factor into
the PFS framework with lobbying effectiveness.
5.3.1 PFS and Lobbying Effectiveness
Chapter 3 outlines the fact that the original PFS model explains the trade policy outcome
when the industry is organized and when it is not organized. A heterogeneous measure of
lobbying effectiveness γi was introduced in Chapter 4 to replace the binary identification
that gave Equation 4.12. Assume that the
∑n
j=1 αjγj is given by a constant A that shows
the product of the proportion of a country’s population that is politically organized and the
lobbying effectiveness measure as aggregated across the j sectors4. The stochastic version
of the equation with time-variation is shown below5.
tit
1 + tit
ei = (
γi
a+A
− A
a+A
)zit + uit (5.1)
Separating the two terms, the equation can be re-written as:
4A is summed over the product of αj which represents the proportion of of specific factor owners that
are organized and the lobbying effectiveness measure for the other j sectors
5To deal with the measurement error in the estimates of import demand elasticities, I have taken the
elasticities to the left hand side as in Chapter 3.
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tit
1 + tit
ei = (
1
a+A
)γizit − ( A
a+A
)zit + uit (5.2)
With reference to Cooperative Lobbying in Chapter 4, a requisite for such lobbying is
membership to trade associations. This form of cooperative lobbying seems to have also
been more effective in India as discussed above on lines of Narlikar (2006). The literature
on collective action has often repeated that trade associations provide a common lobbying
organization that can handle the concerns of industries in a more effective manner than if
the firms lobbied themselves as argued in Olson (1971). The national associations in India
also seem to have a significant say in policy formulation of the government. I construct
direct measures of lobbying effectiveness γi using information about the membership of
firms to associations across industries6 I also argued that following political organization,
the industries were able to overcome the free rider-problem to different degrees to lobby
such that they are more or less effective in lobbying. To test this proposition, I construct
γai that is the proportion of firms that are members of associations in every industry. This
measure can potentially account for the extent of cooperation versus free riding in every
sector. The specification will constitute the baseline for PFS with heterogeneity in lobby-
ing effectiveness.
Then, I check the robustness of the baseline findings to the concerns that member-
ship may not always imply actual lobbying effectiveness. I construct another measure by
introducing a preliminary stage where I examine the determinants of membership to asso-
ciations to lobby effectively for trade policy influence. Consider the decision of a firm j in
sector i to become a member of an association as Membershipji. The trade association
lobbies the government on behalf of its members. The members consist of firms within each
industry that seek membership to the association. As noted before, lobbying by means of
such membership is seen as more legitimate and can provide advantages by way of greater
information about the costs and benefits associated to a particular policy. In addition to
lobbying for trade policy influence, it is a source of political support for vote-maximizing
politicians. Membership with an association may thereby increase the political activity
and influence of the firm as emphasized in Weymouth (2012). There is a cost fji for
6It is important to note that there is no existing data on actual lobbying by association members for
India. I collect original information on lobbying in Chapter 6.
106
membership to the lobby association. In turn, a member of an association then derives
a benefit bji. Both the lobbying costs and benefits depend on firm and industry-level
characteristics as evidenced in the existing literature. This can be defined as a function
of the membership cost and the benefit to be derived from the membership as shown below:
Membershipji = f(fji, bji) (5.3)
The decision to lobby by means of membership to an association now depends on the be-
nefit outweighing the cost. Let the decision be based as a latent variable formulation such
that the unobserved (latent) continuous variable y∗ represents the excess utility derived by
lobbying as a member compared to not lobbying via membership in the association. The
observed decision takes a value of 1 (becomes a member) if the excess utility from lobbying
via membership to associations compared to not doing sp (value 0) is positive.
Membershipji =

1 if y∗ > 0
0 otherwise
(5.4)
This decision to lobby by means of membership of an association is taken by the firm, such
that in every sector there are a number of firms that lobby as members of associations and
some firms that are members but do not actually use their membership to lobby. Mem-
bership brings benefits when firms cooperate in a given sector and lobby the government
through the association. If all firms in a given sector lobby the government as members
of associations, they have solved the free-rider problem and all firms cooperate to lobby
effectively. While, as stated earlier not all membership is to lobby and may in fact be
just to serve the purpose of political support. Therefore, if some firms join the association
but do not actually lobby as members, this would mean that such firms free-ride and that
would make a sector less effective than a sector where all firms are lobbying as members of
associations. Thereby, I predict the likelihood of firms to lobby effectively as members of
trade associations to achieve influence on trade policy. The predicted probabilities for firms
will be collapsed by sectors of the WBES by taking an average across all firms that map
to each sector. Therefore, such a predicted measure can be understood as the likelihood of
firm lobbying as members of associations in terms of cooperation in lobbying versus free
riding which then gives the lobbying effectiveness of the sector.
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5.3.2 Additional Political Factors
There are specific arguments relevant for Indian trade policy that may be left out in the
empirical specification for protection in the PFS and the modified framework. As men-
tioned earlier, there is no usable data on lobbying in India such that information on direct
industry and government interactions are not available. Direct interactions between the
government and industry can take various forms which in the traditional PFS set-up can
be attributed to the additional error term in the empirical estimation. I seek to include
such interactions by introducing an additional factor in the government objective.
Goldberg and Maggi (1997) introduced such variables into the PFS7. This argument
was taken forward by Ederington and Minier (2008) who included additional terms into
the trade policy equation, arguing that this can actually reverse some of the fundamental
predictions of the model8. It can be argued that in the traditional PFS, the government
maximizes industry contributions and (anonymous) utilitarian social welfare and there are
no scope for additional factors. However, there can be other political factors that can influ-
ence government maximization. Examples include employment in marginal constituencies
and other forms of representation.
In terms of the strict structural interpretation of the model, import-penetration, trade
elasticities and a measure for lobbying can explain protection and no other additional vari-
ables should be included. Following the explanation in Goldberg and Maggi (1997) and
Ederington and Minier (2008), I estimate Model 3 with the additional political economy
factor that can potentially affect trade protection in India. The empirical extension de-
rives from a well-specified alternative hypotheses, suggesting the additional regressor and
its functional form that enables a further check on the robustness of the findings in the
baseline.
To include additional political economy factors, the government objective can be char-
acterized as a sum of the contribution schedules of lobby groups weighted by lobbying
effectiveness γi, the aggregate voter welfare W (anonymous) weighted by a, and an addi-
tional factor. This new factor is introduced as an additional term Li that could potentially
7These included employment size, sectoral unemployment rate, measures of unionisation, changes in
import penetration, buyer and seller concentration among others.
8To the best of my knowledge, while the PFS including additional explanatory variables has been
estimated with empirical data, the estimation of a modified framework of PFS with additional factors has
not been attempted
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affect the trade policy outcome for the manufacturing industry in India9. In my framework,
the government attaches a relative weight of b to this additional factor, which implies the
government weighs every individual by the weights attached to the overall welfare, their
effectiveness in lobbying as producers and any other political factor (a + γi + b):
G = aW +
∑
i=1
γiCi + b
∑
i=1
Li (5.5)
In terms of the traditional PFS, the government maximization implied that a change in
the contribution schedule equals the change in welfare weighted by a:
∂Ci
∂ti
= −a∂Wi
∂pi
(5.6)
Now, with an additional political economy factor, the government maximization is now
given as follows:
∂Ci
∂ti
= −a∂Wi
∂pi
− ∂Li
∂pi
(5.7)
Substituting for W and Ci in the government objective, where Ci = Wi − Bi as in PFS,
gives:
G = a
[
1 +
n∑
i=1
pii +
n∑
i=1
(tiMi + si)
]
+
n∑
i=1
γi
pii + αi
1 + n∑
j=1
(tjMj + sj)
−Bi
+b∑
i=1
Li
(5.8)
Maximizing this government welfare function with respect to trade protection ti (that is
equivalent to differentiating with pi gives the following:
∂G
∂ti
= (a+ γi)Xi +
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
(tiM ′i +Mi − di)+ b∂Lj∂ti = 0 (5.9)
I make the simplifying assumption that there are no cross-price effects across the sectors
for the additional political factors (∂Li∂tj = 0 ∀j 6=i)10.
9 Ederington and Minier (2008) discuss two means of integrating such factors into the PFS model.
First, by defining the government objective in terms of contributions and non-anonymous social welfare in
each industry. Second, they discuss the theoretical model in terms of appending an additional term into
the government’s welfare function when the industries are either organized or unorganized. However, there
is no formal test with empirical data in the paper.
10This can also be thought on lines of additional political factors that come into play primarily from the
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Now, substituting Mi − di = −Xi and separating the terms, I get:
∂G
∂ti
= (a+ γi)Xi +
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
 tiM ′i −
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
Xi + b∂Li
∂ti
= 0 (5.10)
Simplifying and re-arranging, I get the following specifications:
−
a+ n∑
j=1
γjαj
 tiM ′i = γiXi −
 n∑
j=1
γjαj
Xi + b∂Li
∂ti
(5.11)
ti =
γiXi −
(∑n
j=1 γjαj
)
Xi + b
∂Li
∂ti(
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
) −1
M ′i
(5.12)
Assume li is the additional political economy factor defined above that is transferred to
the government. The marginal effect of the additional political economy factor now enters
the structural determination of trade protection.
ti =
γi −
(∑n
j=1 γjαj
)
+ b(li/Xi)(
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
) −Xi
M ′i
(5.13)
Multiplying on both sides of the equation:
Mi
pi
ti =
γi −
(∑n
j=1 γjαj
)
+ b(li/Xi)(
a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj
) Xi−M ′i piMi (5.14)
producer end and do not include any consumption externalities (for producers) in relation to price changes
in other sectors. This effect is so small that it can be well approximated to zero. The original approach in
Grossman and Helpman (1992) article calls such an approximation as Example 3 which is employed here.
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Let elasticity of import demand ei equals −M ′i piMi and pi = p∗i + ti where international
prices p∗i are assumed equal to one. Substitution gives:
ti
1 + ti
=
γi −
∑n
j=1 γjαj + b(li/Xi)
(a+
∑n
j=1 γjαj)
zi
ei
(5.15)
A question of importance in terms of the PFS framework is how the interest groups
would choose between cooperative lobbying and other factors. For the total offerings for-
warded to the government in the PFS model, firms in an industry could choose to divert
resources from cooperative lobbying to additional political factors11.
For this specification, note that if γi = 1∀i, and li is zero, then Equation 5.15 will
collapse to standard PFS that implies the following:
ti
1 + ti
=
1−∑nj=1 αj
a+
∑n
j=1 αj
zi
i
=
1− αL
a+ αL
zi
ei
(5.16)
If γi equals 1 such that all sectors are equally effective in lobbying by means of associations
and the only differences in lobbying arise from the additional lobbying factor (li is not
zero), then:
ti
1 + ti
=
1− αL + b(li/Xi)
a+ αL
zi
ei
(5.17)
11There are two ways to think about this. First, government may receive this additional political resource
such that these are employment in marginal constituencies and there are no associated cost for the firms
in every sector. Second, the additional political economy factors in PFS could imply that the lobbies may
potentially follow non-truthful strategies. The competition between the firms would no longer be limited
to the choice of a scalar amount. The additional factor would in turn depend on the producer returns. It
has been shown in Grossman and Helpman (1992) working paper that every lobby can always substitute
a truthful strategy for a non-truthful strategy and achieve the same net pay-off after the substitution as
in the non-truthful equilibrium. Truthful contributions as outlined in the PFS is discussed in Chapter 3
of the theses.
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5.4 Data
This section explains the data employed in the empirical section. One contribution of
this study is to assemble a dataset that combines industry, trade and lobbying data for
the Indian manufacturing sector. I use industry data from All India Survey of Indus-
tries (ASI). The Indian Industrial Classification is the National Industrial Classification
(NIC) developed following the ISIC Revision 3 of classifying data according to the kind of
economic activity. The industry sample consists of 98 sectors (i) at the 4-digit of manu-
facturing industries. The firm-level characteristics are from the WBES in 2005 for 2, 286
firms (j ), but these are categorized into 22 sectors (k). The distribution of firms across the
WBES sectors is attached in Table A.18 of Appendix A.4.1. However, there is no standard
identifier for firms in the WBES to match to sector identifiers of NIC. To overcome this,
the 22 sectors in the WBES are manually matched to the 98 sectors in the ASI by careful
examination of product descriptions attached in Table A.1.2 of Appendix A.1.1.
Using the firm-level data from WBES, measures are constructed across the 22 sectors
and then matched with the 98 NIC sectors using product descriptions12. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to measure the effects of lobbying using
the WBES data13 combined with trade and industry data for India. Following a probit
estimation for firm membership using the WBES data in the following sections, the predic-
tions will collapsed at the level of 22 sectors to construct measures of lobbying reflecting
variation within each sector.
5.4.1 Lobbying Effectiveness γai
The first proxy measure for lobbying effectiveness is γai measured as the proportion of firms
that are members of associations in each sector. This is a potential measure to account
for heterogeneity in lobbying effectiveness across various sectors. It is constructed using
information identified from the WBES, the following question is asked for each firm:
12The selection of sectors in the WBES represented the largest manufacturing sectors in India in terms
of employment and output shares. The count distribution of firms is presented as a reliable estimate for
the proportion of firms by sectors for the scope of the conducted interviews. Note that some sectors are
populated by fewer firms. However, constructing average measure of lobbying effectiveness should not be
affected by this as I attempt to construct the measures using proportion of firms and average time spent
by firms in a particular sector. This gives an idea of within sector lobbying dynamics based on the sample
of WBES.
13Details on WBES are included in Chapter 3.
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“Is your firm a member of a producer or trade association?”
A positive answer is coded as 1, while the value of 0 was assigned to a negative answer
that gives a binary variable termed as Membership at the firm-level. Using this identific-
ation, I get the number of firms that are members of associations in every sector across
the 22 sectors of the WBES. I construct a measure based on the proportion of firms that
are members in each sector. The 22 sectors are mapped to the corresponding 98 4-digit
sectors of NIC using the concordance developed above. Each 4-digit sector is then alloc-
ated the measure of the corresponding sector of the WBES. Therefore, the measures γai are
constructed as the proportion of firms that are members of associations across the 4-digit
sectors, shown in Table 5.1 at the end of this section.
Approximately 77 per cent of the firms in the WBES sample (2, 286 firms) said they
were members of an association. The sectors of Textiles and Electrical Appliances are
found to have the highest percentage of firms as members of associations. It is import-
ant to note that in this Chapter, I consider the first measure of effectiveness in terms of
collective lobbying where firms seek membership to associations for lobbying the govern-
ment.This definition of lobbying effectiveness identifies sectors in terms of differences in
their capability to lobby as an organized group.
5.4.2 Predicted Lobbying Effectiveness γ̂bi
The second measure for lobbying effectiveness is denoted by γ̂bi that consists of the pre-
dicted probability values (of the likelihood of firm membership to lobby effectively for trade
policy) from a probit regression for the binary measure of Membership defined above. It
is explained by the following firm-level and the sector-level determinants discussed in the
literature above.
Firm Size is measured as the log of average number of workers for each firm from the
WBES survey. The information is identified using the following question on the number
of permanent workers: "Average number of workers during fiscal year 2002. Permanent
workers are defined as all paid workers that are employed for a term of one or more years
and/or have a guaranteed renewal of their employment contract."
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A dummy for foreign ownership Foreign Ownership is constructed across firms using
percentage foreign ownership calculated across sectors using the following question: “What
percentage of your firm is private foreign ownership?"
Competitors is the number of competitors faced by a firm from the WBES using the
question: "Thinking of your firm’s major product line in the domestic market, how many
competitors do you face?"
Finally, the sector level determinants that enter the probit estimation include geo-
graphic concentration Geog. Concentration from Lall et al. (2003) that provide estimates
on concentration across the states of India in a given sector. Output concentration is
denoted as Output Concentration measured as the share of output produced by the four
largest firms in a given sector i using data from the ASI and mapped to the 22 sectors of
the WBES.
5.4.3 Additional Political Factors Ei
Next, I define a potential measure of additional political economy factors for Indian trade
policy. While γi reflects the collective lobbying effectiveness of sectors, there can be firm-
specific individual lobbying that may be a substitute for collective lobbying. If additional
political factors can be understood as the firm-specific strength of a sector, the measure
for such factors can be seen as the opportunity for firms to interact with the government
directly. I argue that such interactions do not occur by means of cooperative lobbying that
is undertaken via the association and are firm-specific. I measure this using information
from the WBES on the following question:
“In a typical week over the last year, what percentage of total senior management’s
time was spent in dealing with requirements imposed by government regulations including
dealings with officials, completing forms, etc.?”
This is taken as the mean for each sector across the 22 sectors of the WBES to con-
struct the proxy measure for additional political economy factors Ei that may impact trade
protection. Taking the average value per sector allows to interpret the additional factors as
an average measure of time spent by the firms in each sector. The measures for the WBES
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sectors are mapped to the 4-digit sectors where similar to the method to construct γai , each
4-digit sector is allocated the measure of the corresponding sector of WBES. This measure
can be seen as the opportunity to interact with the government directly, shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Lobbying Effectiveness and Additional Political Factors
S. No. Industry Firms γai Ei
1 Textiles 222 1.000 0.159
2 Electrical Appliances inc. white goods 155 0.944 0.129
3 Paper & paper products 24 0.903 0.329
4 Rubber & rubber products 38 0.891 0.320
5 Electronics inc. Cons. Durables 100 0.867 0.178
6 Food Processing 155 0.855 0.178
7 Leather & leather products 74 0.842 0.270
8 Other chemicals 112 0.840 0.192
9 Machine tools, Mach. & parts 195 0.833 0.146
10 Drugs & Pharma 165 0.821 0.149
11 Mineral processing 32 0.817 0.128
12 Mining 3 0.816 0.145
13 Marine food processing 14 0.792 0.180
14 Structural metals and metal products 303 0.786 0.087
15 Agro processing 26 0.766 0.130
16 Garments 275 0.745 0.361
17 Paints and varnishes 20 0.680 0.203
18 Plastics & plastics products 122 0.667 0.175
19 Auto Components 218 0.614 0.143
20 Wood and furniture 16 0.466 0.733
21 Sugar 4 0.462 0.147
22 Cosmetics and toiletries 13 0.188 0.157
Total 2,286
Pearson Correlation -0.213
Note: Table shows the sectors and corresponding measures of Lobbying Effectiveness γai and the measure
for Additional Political Factors Ei, the average time firms in a sector spend on direct interactions with the
government.
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Ei is an average measure of how much time firms in a sector spend on direct interac-
tions with the government. The sector of Garments and Wood and Furniture seem to be
spending the most time on average in such interactions. By way of construction of this
empirical measure, I believe these are substitutes to the previous lobbying effectiveness
measures which are in the nature of lobbying by means of membership to associations.The
additional factor is firm-specific such that it represents individual lobbying by firms in a
given sector. The correlation between the two measures appear in Table 5.1 which shows
evidence of these being substitutes. However, a natural question here is that if such in-
dividual lobbying could complement association lobbying. I argue that the nature of this
relationship would be determined by the specific policy instrument and will be examined
at the firm-level in Chapter 6.
Figure 5.1 outlines the correlation between the lobbying effectiveness measure γai and
the additional political factors Ei. Textiles is the sector that is most effective in terms of
γai , while the use of additional factors is quite low for that suggests this sector is very ef-
fective in lobbying by means of membership to associations and does not resort very much
to additional political factors for influence on trade protection. Therefore, these seem to
be substitutes. On the other hand, I draw attention to the sector Wood for which I find the
highest use of additional political factors and correspondingly low lobbying effectiveness in
terms of γai . At the same time, I also find sectors such as Paper and Leather that are not
only very effective in lobbying but also using substantial additional factors. This suggests a
weak negative correlation such that this choice needs careful examination at the firm-level
both in terms of specific policy instruments and its determinants 14.
14The evidence in this paper can therefore be read as motivation for Chapter 6 where I collect primary
information on these choices.
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Figure 5.1: Lobbying Effectiveness and Additional Political Factors
Figure 5.1 shows lobbying effectiveness and additional political factors across the WBES sectors.
5.5 Methodology
I discuss the methodology and corresponding empirical results in this section. A specific
focus is to examine the findings of the modified PFS in terms of interpretation and the
IV strategy that builds on the approach from Chapter 3 of the thesis. I estimate the
model derived from the PFS framework in Chapter 4 termed as Model 1 using the measure
γai which outlines the baseline result. Additionally, Model 2 tests the robustness of the
baseline by using predicted values of lobbying effectiveness. The results from estimating
both Models 1 and 2 are outlined in Table 5.4 to enable comparison across the estimates.
5.5.1 PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness
In Chapter 3, I used the data from the WBES to identify a binary measure of political
organization to estimate the traditional PFS model. Now, I use the same data to construct
a proxy for the measure of lobbying effectiveness motivated in the PFS framework outlined
in Chapter 4.
Model 1 includes γai the lobbying effectiveness measure defined as the proportion of
firms that are members of associations for each 4-digit level of the NIC15. Lobbying ef-
15Note that the WBES data is on the number of firms that are members of associations in each of the
22 sectors. This was mapped to the 98 sectors at the 4-digit of NIC.
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fectiveness is interacted with import penetration where the parameter β will test if the
relationship between inverse import penetration and trade protection is homogeneous or
depends on the lobbying effectiveness of the sector below. Re-writing equation 5.2 above,
I get the following estimable equation16:
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + β(γ
a
i .zit) + uit (5.18)
Here ρ and β are comparable to Chapter 3 and defined in terms of the underlying para-
meters a and A:
ρ =
−A
a+A
β =
1
a+A
The partial derivative of trade protection with respect to inverse import penetration is the
sum ρ + βγai . Therefore, the interpretation of the coefficient ρ is the partial derivative of
trade protection with respect to inverse import penetration if γai = 0. The coefficients ρ
and β can be estimated using the variation in zit and its interaction with γai .
Empirical estimation of equation 5.18 yields the coefficients ρ and β. The structural para-
meters a and A can then be derived as point estimates using the non-linear combinations of
the parameter estimates. Calculation of point estimates for (possibly) non-linear combin-
ations of parameter estimates after any Stata estimation command are based on the delta
method that is an approximation. However, with the modified model the interpretation
of the structural findings cannot be compared with the traditional PFS and is not the
primary purpose in this chapter. I discuss these briefly in section 5.7.
As outlined in the earlier chapters, the tariff levels have an effect on import penetration
ratios that must be treated as endogenous. I adopt a similar IV strategy to Chapter 3.
The instruments used for import penetration include the lagged values of inventories for
each sector (as a measure for physical capital) and the square of the number of production
workers for every sector (as a measure of the labour intensity across sectors). I use a similar
strategy to enable comparison with previous results. As observed in Chapter 3, following
Gawande and Li (2009), the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator
16Note that I do not include lobbying effectiveness as an additional explanatory variable in this specific-
ation as it derives from the structural model. To check the robustness of the results, I will examine the
findings if lobbying effectiveness enters as an exogenous variable in addition to its interaction term.
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is used to enable inference with weak instruments owing to better small sample properties
than Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS).
In Model 1, there are two endogenous variables, the inverse import penetration ratio
and its interaction term. First, the inverse of the import penetration (X/M) is endogenous
with respect to tariff protection that can in turn affect penetration. Second, the interac-
tion of the inverse import penetration with the proportion of members of trade associations
(X/M ∗ γai ) is potentially endogenous as it is an interaction of the endogenous variable
with the proxy measure γai that is assumed exogenous. To instrument for an endogenous
variable and its interaction with another exogenous variable, a standard approach sugges-
ted is to include the interaction of the instrumental variable with the exogenous variable
as another instrument17.
I instrument for the two endogenous variables using a set of instrumental variables Fi18
that includes Lag Inventories and Workers Squared and another instrumental variable
Lag Workers∗γai 19. Therefore, I adopt an approach where the interaction of γai with the
lagged measure of Workers is used as an IV. Lobbying effectiveness in terms of the pro-
portion of firms that are members of associations in every sector is assumed exogenous to
trade protection where effectiveness depends on the underlying costs and benefits to seek
membership for lobbying. Membership to associations enters the structural framework
only in its interaction with the endogenous variable.
Therefore, the final set of empirical equations for Model 1 are as shown below:
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + β(γ
a
i zit) + uit (5.19)
zit = ζ
′
1Fi + e1it (5.20)
17To deal with this endogeneity issue, I find two approaches discussed in the literature. First, given a
vector of valid instrumental variables, the interaction term is treated as exogenous and included as part of
the instrument set. This can however lead to under identification as shown in Maurice and Teresa (2014).
Second, the interaction term is treated as a second endogenous regressor, such that the instrument set
should include interactions of the instrumental variables with the exogenous variables in order to satisfy
the necessary rank condition for IV estimation. The literature does not agree on one accepted way to
deal with this. However, the second approach is suggested as the most natural approach. Some headway
in this direction is in Hatice and Bent (2013) that provides empirical observation on the validity of the
instruments in this case.
18I use lag values of the instruments to further alleviate endogeneity concerns.
19When estimating the empirical model, the complete set of three instruments have to be specified for
both the endogenous variables such that the set of instruments are identical for both endogenous variables.
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γai zit = ζ
′
2Fi + e2it (5.21)
In the earlier specification, I assumed lobbying effectiveness in the PFS model is given exo-
genously. This was constructed using intra-sector variation of firms. A further step is to
account for the issue that membership to associations may not imply actual lobbying that
can bias the impact of effectiveness in the resulting model. The results will be compared
with the baseline Model 1. I estimate Model 2, where I use a binary equation to estimate
the likelihood of firm lobbying via its membership of associations. This is undertaken using
the set of firm and industry characteristics (discussed above) to construct a proxy measure
for lobbying effectiveness γ̂bi .
The firm decision to lobby as a member of an association is directly linked to produ-
cer returns and the costs of lobby membership. The dependent variable Membershipji is
binary that indicates whether or not a firm j in a given sector i is a member of a lobby
association. An appropriate econometric methodology to study the likelihood of lobbying
via this membership is the probit estimation. The unit of observation here is the firm j
from the WBES (distributed across the 22 sectors of the WBES matched to the 4-digit
sector i. Membershipji is explained by both firm-level and industry characteristics based
on the underlying assumption of homogeneity across firms. This can be specified as shown
below.
P (Membershipji) = φ(θDji + piCji) (5.22)
Here, Dji represents the main variables of interest that includes FirmSize of each firm
j, the measure for geographic concentration Geographic for firms in every sector i, and
foreign ownership is Foreign for every firm j. Cji is the vector of controls on competition
that includes the Concentration in a given sector i and Competition which is the number
of competitors faced by each firm j. φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution
function. The predicted values based on the marginal effects is used to construct the lobby
effectiveness measure aggregated by each sector i from the following equation:
γbji = φ(θD
′
ji + piC
′
ji) (5.23)
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The predicted values are then used to proxy for lobbying effectiveness as γˆbi , that enters the
structural framework of PFS as an interaction with the endogenous variable X/M . The
IV strategy is similar to Model 1, such that I instrument for the two endogenous variables
using the set of instrumental variables Fi that includes Lag Inventories and Workers
Squared and the interaction variable Lag Workers*γ̂ib as another IV.
The final set of equations for Model 2 include the following:
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + β(γ̂
b
i zit) + uit (5.24)
zit = ζ
′
1Fi + e1it (5.25)
γ̂bi zit = ζ
′
2Fi + e2it (5.26)
Predicted probabilities from equation 5.23 are used in the specifications 5.24-5.26.
Table 5.4 presents the results from estimating Model 1 and Model 2. It is important
to note that introducing the heterogeneous measures of lobbying effectiveness changes the
interpretation of the coefficients of the traditional PFS model while the overall predictions
are preserved20. The first stage statistics are attached in Table A.19 of Appendix A.4.2
where the F-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. The Weak Identification Test exam-
ines the null hypothesis that the equation is weakly identified where the Kleibergen-Paap
rk Wald F statistic is more than 10 in both Models for each endogenous variable. The
Anderson-Rubin Statistics tests the joint significance of endogenous regressors in the main
equation such that over-identifying restrictions are valid and in both Models.
In the original model, the partial derivative of trade protection with respect to inverse
import penetration would be ρ for sectors that were politically unorganized (binary meas-
ure of political organization being 0) and ρ+β for sectors that were fully organized (binary
measure being 1). Thereby, if ρ+β is positive and significant for γi = 1, the estimates seem
to be in line with the findings of the PFS model. Further, in my model the partial derivat-
ive of trade protection with respect to the inverse import penetration is the sum ρ+ βγi,
that means this relationship is no longer homogeneous and differs by the value of lobbying
effectiveness. This relationship is depicted in Figure 5.2 for different sectors. It shows an
20The modified PFS framework is a simple alteration of traditional PFS to incorporate differences in
lobbying.
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upward sloping relationship for the most effective sector of Textiles (Effectiveness=1) that
can be said to correspond to full organization as defined in traditional PFS. For the least
effective sector of Cosmetics, the downward sloping relationship is comparable to being
unorganized in traditional PFS.
Figure 5.2: Traditional PFS versus PFS with γai
Figure 5.2 shows the sum ρ+βγi, the relationship between trade protection and inverse import penetration
is no longer homogeneous and differs by the value of lobbying effectiveness for different sectors. It shows
an upward sloping relationship for the most effective sector of Textiles (Effectiveness=1) that can be said
to correspond to full organization as defined in traditional PFS. For the least effective sector of Cosmetics,
the downward sloping relationship is comparable to being unorganized in traditional PFS.
Model 1 presents the results of the baseline for PFS with lobbying effectiveness meas-
ures γai . The coefficient for lobbying effectiveness γ
a
i interacted with import penetration
shows a positive relationship between tariff protection and inverse import penetration that
is found increasing in lobbying effectiveness γai . To check the robustness of the baseline, I
estimate Model 2. To examine the likelihood of Membership, I rely on findings of previous
studies discussed above to inform the specification outlining the main variables of interest.
Table 5.2 presents the results for the probit estimation on the determinants of membership
to associations. Columns (1) to (4) include controls on competition and output concentra-
tion and standard errors are robust and clustered by 22 sectors of WBES. I find evidence
that supports the fact that lobbying via association membership is increasing with firm
size and foreign ownership, while firms in more concentrated sectors are less likely to seek
membership to lobby via associations. These results are not surprising in terms of firm
size and are in line with the existing literature. Lobbying by foreign owned firms seem
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in confirmation with Olarreaga et al. (1999) for Mexico. Further, this lends support to
the hypothesis that if firms are geographically concentrated, the costs of organizing by
themselves is lower and they are less likely to join an association for lobbying. The finding
implies that in these sectors, firms may be lobbying using other channels. I attempt to
incorporate these as additional political factors that can be used to lobby the government
in the following section. The predicted probabilities are used to construct γ̂bi .
Table 5.2: Determinants of Effectiveness in Lobbying using Membership
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Size 0.253*** 0.237***
(0.070) (0.065)
Foreign Ownership 1.164*** 0.787**
(0.376) (0.382)
Geog. Concentration -0.269*** -0.224***
(0.079) (0.077)
Controls
Output Concentration -0.207 -0.013 -0.046 -0.247
(0.14198) (0.057) (0.062) (0.160)
Competitors -0.0001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.107 0.788*** 1.350*** 0.583**
(0.262) (0.096) (0.174) (0.262)
N 892 1,052 1,052 892
Psuedo R-Square 0.039 0.017 0.021 0.057
Log Likelihood -432.450 -534.582 -528.998 -424.256
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 5.2 examines the determinants of membership to associations for manufacturing firms in
India using data from the WBES for 2005. Columns (1)-(4) include control variables on Competition and
Output Concentration. Probit coefficients are reported and the marginal effects are used to construct lobby
effectiveness. This is undertaken with the underlying intuition that lobbying by means of associations is
potentially more effective than any other means in India. Individual correlations are observed in column
(1) to (3). Robust standard errors clustered by 22 sectors of WBES in parentheses.
Figure 5.3 outlines the correlation between lobbying effectiveness measure γai and the
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predicted measures γ̂bi that exhibits the differences in membership and actual lobbying
across sectors. The lobbying effectiveness measures γai and the predicted estimates γ̂
b
i are
compared in Table 5.3 below. I find only weak correlation between these measures. This
aligns with the first qualification made in the introduction regarding membership not being
the same as lobbying by means of this membership. Therefore, I check the baseline model
to check for robustness to these differences. The predicted measures suggests that the
coefficients for the effect on trade protection in the modified PFS framework are expected
to change. However, it is important to examine if this changes the overall findings of the
model.
Figure 5.3: Lobbying Effectiveness and Predicted Effectiveness
Figure 5.3 shows lobbying effectiveness and predicted effectiveness across the WBES sectors.
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Table 5.3: Lobbying Effectiveness and Predicted Effectiveness
S. No. Industry Firms γai γ̂
b
i γ
∗
i
10 Textiles 222 1.000 0.843 0.891
13 Electrical Appliances inc. white goods 155 0.944 0.799 0.584
20 Paper & paper products 24 0.903 0.823 0.792
2 Rubber & rubber products 38 0.891 0.852 0.840
12 Electronics inc. Consumer Durables 100 0.867 0.813 0.781
18 Food Processing 155 0.855 0.793 0.897
16 Leather & leather products 74 0.842 0.423 0.858
3 Other chemicals 112 0.840 0.832 0.727
14 Machine tools inc. Machinery & parts 195 0.833 0.810 0.730
11 Drugs & Pharma 165 0.821 0.865 0.839
5 Mineral processing 32 0.817 0.797 0.890
4 Mining 3 0.816 0.603 0.831
6 Marine food processing 14 0.792 0.853 0.891
22 Structural metals and metal products 303 0.786 0.656 0.835
7 Agro processing 26 0.766 0.811 0.899
1 Garments 275 0.745 0.825 0.871
23 Paints and varnishes 20 0.680 0.799 0.869
19 Plastics & plastics products 122 0.667 0.793 0.808
15 Auto Components 218 0.614 0.806 0.850
9 Wood and furniture 16 0.466 0.743 0.902
17 Sugar 4 0.462 0.863 0.888
24 Cosmetics and toiletries 13 0.188 0.776 0.867
Total 2,286
Pearson Correlation -0.017 -0.356
Note: Table shows the sectors with corresponding measure of lobbying effectiveness and predicted lobbying
effectiveness measures, and compares them with lobbying effectiveness estimates from Chapter 4.
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In Table 5.4, I observe a negative and significant coefficient of −0.103 for ρ in column
(1), that suggests the corresponding inverse relationship for inverse import penetration
and tariff protection when the measure of lobbying effectiveness is zero. This relationship
turns positive at the value of lobbying effectiveness of 0.745 for the sector Garments. For
the most effective sector (γi = 1), the sum of the coefficients ρ and β is positive and sig-
nificant at 0.04 that suggests an overall positive relationship with the inverse of import
penetration. The higher the ratio of output to imports, higher is the lobbying effectiveness
for positive influence on tariff protection. In Model 1, Textiles which is the most effective
sector in terms of γai exhibits a positive relationship with the ratio of output to imports.
This is similar to the observed finding for fully organized sectors in traditional PFS. If I
pick another sector of Food Processing which is effective but has a lower effectiveness than
Textiles with γai = 0.85, I observe a positive relationship but with a lower marginal effect
of 0.02 than the most effective sector as also highlighted in Figure 5.2 above. Therefore,
for the very effective industries, a higher output to import ratio maps to higher trade pro-
tection. The relationship between import penetration and trade protection is thereby not
homogeneous and depends on the lobbying effectiveness of the sector.
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Table 5.4: Protection for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2
Baseline Robustness
Variables (I) (II)
X/M -0.103** -0.840*
(0.037) (0.347)
X/M*γai 0.143**
(0.047)
X/M*γ̂bi 1.051*
(0.432)
Instrumental Variables Lag Inventories, Lag Inventories,
Workers Squared, Workers Squared,
γai .Lag Workers γ̂bi .Lag Workers
Weak identification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk X/M 10.80 11.86
Wald F statistic X/M*γi 10.20 11.77
Overidentification
Anderson Rubin Statistics 0.243 0.774
Chi-square P-values 0.62 0.37
N 876 876
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 5.4 shows the results from the estimation of the PFS using LIML as it gives better inference
with potentially weak instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. First-stage F-statistics are
heteroskedasticity-robust. The Weak Identification Test has Ho: equation is weakly identified, gives the
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic as more than 10 in both Models for each endogenous variable. The
Anderson-Rubin Statistics tests the joint significance of endogenous regressors in main equation such
that over-identifying restrictions are valid. In both Models, the null cannot be rejected.
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Model 2 presents the results for robustness of PFS using the predicted lobbying effect-
iveness measure γ̂bi . The signs of the coefficients ρ and β are robust such that I observe
that the relationship between trade protection and inverse import penetration is increasing
in the predicted probability of lobbying by means of being a member of an association.
This reaffirms the finding that the higher the import penetration, the more intense is the
association lobbying for positive influence on tariff protection. The marginal effect for
X/M (when γbi = 0) is however lower at −0.084 compared to Model 1, while the overall
relationship is more positive (for γai = 1). This suggests that even if the qualitative find-
ings of the model are robust, the donward bias in the interaction term is reduced by the
predicted measure of effectiveness. Examining the first stage estimates in Table A.19 of
Appendix A.4.2, I find that the partial R-square is slightly higher for the interaction term.
However, in terms of the traditional PFS, the findings are preserved in both Models
1 and 2. This suggests that the overall results of the baseline model holds even when I
use alternate measures of effectiveness. The overall picture provides evidence that intro-
ducing heterogeneity in the PFS model in terms of differences in lobbying effectiveness
helps understand the non-homogeneity in the nature of relationship between import pen-
etration and trade protection. In our modification of the PFS model, this relationship is
found to depend on the lobbying effectiveness of the sector. Introducing different measures
of effectiveness further re-iterates this evidence. The findings also confirm to the overall
positive correlations observed between protection and import penetration in Trefler (1993)
and Baldwin (1989) across industries. Finally, using the estimated coefficients ρ and β
from Model 1, I examine the resulting relationship between trade protection and lobbying
effectiveness in terms of the sum of coefficients ρ + βγai across various values of lobbying
effectiveness in Figure 5.4.
This leads to the next question of how the lobbying effectiveness measures in Chapter
4 compare to the lobbying effectiveness measures in this Chapter. Table A.4.4 in Ap-
pendix A.4.4 compares the estimated effectiveness measures from Chapter 4 with lobbying
effectiveness γai . While, lobbying effectiveness in Chapter 4 reflects an overall measure of
effectiveness derived from actual protection and inverse import penetration across sectors,
this Chapter attempts to construct direct measures of effectiveness based on information
on lobbying via membership associations. A noteworthy observation includes the finding
that the most effective sectors in terms of lobbying by means of associations membership
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Figure 5.4: Sum of Coefficients versus Lobbying Effectiveness
Figure 5.4 shows the resulting relationship between trade protection and lobbying effectiveness in terms of
the sum of coefficients ρ+ βγai across various values of lobbying effectiveness.
(under Textiles) are different from the ones that are the most effective in terms of overall
effectiveness in Chapter 4 (such as Distilling of spirits andManufacture of Motor Vehicles).
This further re-instates additional political economy factors for the modified PFS frame-
work in the next section21
5.5.2 PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness & Additional Political Factors
Now for equation 5.15, I adopt the earlier assumption of
∑n
j=1 αjγj equals the constant
A from Chapter 4. Taking elasticities to the left and separating the three terms gives the
following equation:
ti
1 + ti
ei = (
1
a+A
)γizi − ( A
a+A
)zi +
b(li/Xi)
a+A
zi (5.27)
Assume that the additional political factor is the opportunity to interact with the gov-
ernment in the structural model given by Ei = li/Xi that varies across sectors. Ei can
be interpreted as an additional political economy factor of importance to the trade policy
process in India. This enters as an interaction with the inverse import penetration in the
final specification that follows from the model. I test the hypothesis that industries with
21I also observe that the least effective sector in terms of overall effectiveness is still quite effective in
terms of association membership. This is explained by my first qualification to the effectiveness measure
that they reflect firm membership and may not necessarily imply actual lobbying. I checked for robustness
to this issue that changed the size of the coefficients but the qualitative findings are preserved.
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higher import penetration achieving higher protection can be further explained by addi-
tional political economy factors that vary by the sector. Re-specifying the equation and
introducing time variation, I get the following stochastic version of the estimable equation:
tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + β(γizit) + δ(Eizit) + uit (5.28)
ρ, β and γ are defined in terms of the underlying terms a, A and b:
ρ =
−A
a+A
β =
1
a+A
δ =
b
a+A
The partial derivative of trade protection with respect to inverse import penetration is
now the sum ρ+βγai +δEi. I have three coefficients ρ, β and δ that are estimated off the
variation in zit and its interaction with γi and Ei respectively. Note, δ is estimated using
the interaction of Ei with zit. Empirical estimation of equation 5.28 yields the coefficients
ρ, β and δ. The structural parameters a, A and b can then be derived as point estimates
using the non-linear combinations of the parameter estimates. However, as mentioned
above these structural parameters cannot be compared to those from the traditional PFS.
I present these later as a means of possible understanding of relative weights in the gov-
ernment objective.
Now, I have three endogenous variables, the inverse import penetration and two interac-
tion terms for import penetration. Again X/M is endogenous with respect to tariff protec-
tion and the interaction termsX/M∗γai andX/M∗Ei are also endogenous as they are inter-
actions of the endogenous variables with proxy measures γai and Ei that are exogenous by
assumption. The instrumental variables include the measure Lag Inventories, Workers
Squared and additionally the interactions γai * Lag Workers and Ei* Lag Inventories as
two IVs. The opportunity for direct interactions with the government enters the structural
set-up of PFS only in its interaction with the endogenous variable.
Therefore, the final set of equations for Model 3 include the following:
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tit
1 + tit
ei = ρzit + β(γ
a
i zit) + δ(Eizit) + uit (5.29)
zit = ζ
′
1Fi + e1it (5.30)
γai zit = ζ
′
2Fi + e2it (5.31)
Eizit = ζ
′
3Fi + e3it (5.32)
The results are outlined in Table 5.5 when Ei is interacted with import penetration. The
relationship of trade protection is now defined in terms of the inverse import penetration
and two interaction terms. This relationship between tariff protection and the ratio of
output to imports now depends on lobbying effectiveness and additional political factors.
The first stage results attached in Table A.20 in Appendix A.4.2 show the F-statistics that
are lower than the baseline model.
The overall positive relationship between tariff protection and inverse import penet-
ration still holds when there are no additional factors such that Ei = 0. However, this
relationship is reversed when the additional political economy factors are high. This sug-
gests that lobbying effectiveness in terms of association membership and the opportunity
for direct interactions with the government may in fact be substitutes as lobbying strategies.
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Table 5.5: PFS with Additional Political Factors
Model 3
Lobbying
Effectiveness
Variables (I)
X/M -0.074**
(0.037)
X/M*γai 0.142***
(0.044)
X/M*Ei -0.132*
(0.077)
Instrumental Variables Lag Inventories,
Workers Squared,
γai .Lag Workers Ei.Lag Inventories
Weak identification test
Kleibergen-Paap rk X/M 8.87
Wald F statistic X/M*γi 8.52
X/M*Ei 7.67
Overidentification
Anderson Rubin Statistics 0.001
Chi-square P-values 0.978
N 876
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 5.5 shows the results from the estimation of the Protection for Sale (PFS) using Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) as it gives better inference with potentially weak instruments.
Model 3 uses the additional political economy factors in every sector to proxy for lobbying effectiveness
in the modified PFS model. The specification derives from the structural model of PFS. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. First-stage F-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. The Weak Identification Test
has Ho: equation is weakly identified, gives the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic as more than 10 for
each endogenous variable. The Anderson-Rubin Statistics tests the joint significance of endogenous
regressors in main equation such that over-identifying restrictions are valid. The null cannot be rejected.
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5.6 Overall Findings
Table 5.6 summarizes the marginal effects for the baseline Model 1 and in addition Model
3 from the empirical analysis above. This is interesting as a means of comparison of dif-
ferent kinds of lobbying. Given the estimated overall positive relationship between trade
protection and inverse import penetration, the evidence suggests that higher lobbying ef-
fectiveness is associated with higher trade protection. However, in Model 1 this depends
on lobbying effectiveness while in Model 3 in addition to effectiveness, it depends on other
political factors. So, is "Protection still for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness?". In light of
the findings above, I conclude that protection is still for sale with Lobbying Effectiveness,
but the traditional findings of the GH model will differ by the values of the heterogeneous
measure of effectiveness.
I find that the traditional PFS hypothesis in terms of the sum of the coefficients ρ+ β
for Model 1 and ρ+β+ δ for Model 3 is positive for higher values of lobbying effectiveness
and in addition the political factor respectively. These estimates seem to confirm to the
traditional findings of the PFS model. However, it is interesting to note that for lower
values of effectiveness and higher measures of additional political economy factors, the
sum of coefficients is no longer positive. For lower values of these heterogeneous measures,
the relationship between trade protection and inverse import penetration is found reversed.
Therefore, for the PFS model with lobbying effectiveness, protection is for sale but
only for those sectors that are very effective in lobbying the government. In terms of the
empirical measure, this implies that the sectors with a greater number of firms that lobby
by means of their membership to associations are very effective in lobbying and are suc-
cessful in achieving positive trade protection. Controlling for additional political economy
factors in this model, further re-instates this finding but factors in a substitute in terms of
lobbying strategy. This observation leads to the objective of examining different lobbying
strategies in the next Chapter.
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Table 5.6: Overall Findings
Model 1 Model 3
Industry γai ρ+ βγ
a
i Ei ρ+ βγ
a
i + δEi
agro processing 0.766 0.006546 0.130 0.017609
auto components 0.614 -0.01522 0.143 -0.00565
cosmetics and toiletries 0.188 -0.07619 0.157 -0.06807
drugs & pharm 0.821 0.01443 0.149 0.022947
electrical appliances inc. white goods 0.944 0.032056 0.129 0.043125
electronics inc. consumer durables 0.867 0.020933 0.178 0.025546
food processing 0.855 0.0192 0.178 0.023789
garments 0.745 0.0036 0.361 -0.01578
leather & leather products 0.842 0.017421 0.270 0.009939
machine tools inc. machinery & parts 0.833 0.016167 0.146 0.02506
marine food processing 0.792 0.010208 0.180 0.014609
mineral processing 0.817 0.01383 0.128 0.025057
mining 0.816 0.013735 0.145 0.022773
other chemicals 0.840 0.01719 0.192 0.019966
paints and varnishes 0.680 -0.00576 0.203 -0.00424
paper & paper products 0.903 0.026161 0.329 0.010881
plastics & plastic products 0.667 -0.00767 0.175 -0.00245
rubber & rubber products 0.891 0.0244 0.320 0.010269
structural metals and metal products 0.786 0.009357 0.087 0.026131
sugar 0.462 -0.037 0.147 -0.0279
textiles 1.000 0.04 0.159 0.047051
wood and furniture 0.466 -0.0364 0.733 -0.10466
Note: Table compares the coefficients across the models.
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I have stated above that the structural parameters in my specifications do not have any
direct meaning as in the theoretical framework of traditional PFS. However, I attempt to
interpret these in the context of the proxy measures of lobby effectiveness in the baseline
Model 1 and additional political economy factors for Indian trade policy in Model 3. The
non-linear transformations of the estimated parameter vector from the fitted models can
be calculated to obtain the structural parameters a, A and b as shown in Table 5.7 with
their standard errors. The weight on welfare is found lower at 0.862 and 0.867 in Models
1 and 3 as compared to Chapter 3.
Table 5.7: Structural Estimates from the PFS models
(I) (II)
Structural Estimates Model 1 Model 3
Weight on Welfare (a) 0.862*** 0.867***
(0.040) (0.040)
A 0.716*** 0.522***
(0.130) (0.130)
Additional Political Factor (b) 0.560
(0.478)
Note: Table 5.7 presents the structural estimates from the PFS estimations for Models 1 and 3. In
each case the interpretation of the structural estimate is different and derived from the underlying set-
up. In Model 1, the empirical estimation yields the coefficients ρ and β defined in terms of the underlying
parameters a and A: ρ= −A
a+A
and a= 1
a+A
. The structural parameters a and A can then be derived as point
estimates using the non-linear combinations of the parameter estimates. Calculation of point estimates
for (possibly) non-linear combinations of parameter estimates after any Stata estimation command are
based on the delta method that is an approximation. In each case, the estimated coefficients are used to
calculate the parameters such that A = − ρ
β
and a = 1+ρ
1+ρ+β
. Similarly, ρ, β and γ are defined in terms
of the underlying terms a, A and b: ρ= −A
a+A
, β= 1
a+A
, and δ= b
a+A
. Now, the parameters are calculated
such that A = − ρ
β
, b = ρ
δ
and a = 1+ρ
1+ρ+β+δ
.
In each model, the interpretation of the structural estimate is different and derived
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from the underlying set-up. The interpretation of the government weight on welfare is rel-
ative to the weight on contribution in Model 1 and relative to contributions and additional
political economy in Model 3. In both models, a is significant and approximately close
to 1 that suggests the government weight on welfare is comparable to that for political
contributions. The aggregate lobbying effectiveness times the specific factor owner share
of the population is approximately 0.762 when I estimate Model 1. Using the predicted
probabilities in Model 3, the measure of A is found quite low at 0.522. The role of A is
less clear and needs further examination.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence on political economy of protection in India. Lobbying ef-
fectiveness is proxied using measures on membership to associations that seem the more
effective mechanism to lobby the government in India. Additional political factors may
enter the government objective in explaining trade protection in India. The findings of the
model confirm to traditional findings of PFS but differ in terms of interpretation on lines
of heterogeneity in lobbying effectiveness.
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Chapter 6
Join Hands or Walk Alone? Evidence
on Lobbying for Trade Policy in India
6.1 Introduction
The choice of lobbying strategy includes collective lobbying (Join Hands) by a group of
firms or individual lobbying (Walk Alone) by a single firm1. The existing literature on
lobbying has identified the two strategies as a means of influence for the policy choice of
the government2. However, the analytical evidence on this specific choice is only limited,
with one useful framework outlined in Bombardini and Trebbi (2012) (BT henceforth)
that provides evidence for the United States, while there are limitations in examining such
specific questions on lobbying for developing countries mainly due to the lack of data. The
main objective of this chapter is to provide primary evidence on the choice of lobbying
strategy for India.
While public discussion on lobbying for trade policy in India seems widespread3, aca-
demic research has been limited owing to little or no data. The model of Protection for
Sale(PFS) by Grossman and Helpman (1994) estimated by Bown and Tovar (2011) and
Cadot et al. (2014) provides some political economy evidence for India4, but it remains an
open question as to what extent the existing studies reflect actual lobbying in India.
1Lobbying is defined in terms of attempts to communicate information to political actors following
de Figueiredo and Richter (2014)
2Examples include the work of Stigler (1971) and Olson (1994)
3Saha (2013) draws attention to lobbying in India.
4As observed in previous chapters of my thesis, no actual lobbying data is available for India. Bown and
Tovar (2011) used data on organizations from World Guide to trade associations in 1995 and identify an
industry in India is organized if it lists at least five organizations, while Cadot et al. (2014) and Cadot et al.
(2007) identify politically organized industries using trade and production data in a multi-stage iterative
procedure.
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The objective of this paper is to address the obvious gap in the context of lobbying
in developing countries by investigating the choice of lobbying strategy for trade policy in
India. The paper seeks to answer the following questions:
• What lobbying strategies do firms use for trade policy influence?
• How do lobbying strategies link to specific trade policy outcomes?
An understanding of the factors that affect the choice of lobbying strategy for trade
policy has important implications for democratic policy-making by offering evidence to
recognize the types of lobbying strategies and their influence across different instruments
of trade policy. Further, the link between lobbying strategies and trade policy outcomes is
important to assess the resources used and potential benefits for each strategy5. Collective
lobbying can provide the advantage of lower costs to each firm6 and greater legitimacy
especially in developing countries as also observed for India by Narlikar (2006). An indi-
vidual lobbying strategy on the other hand is expected to be more viable when fixed costs
are low and the output includes product-specific policy across firms. Following the line of
argument on collective lobbying above, government support for collective lobbying would
be more forthcoming, while firm-specific outcomes maybe supported only in particular cir-
cumstances.
My analysis proceeds in two steps. I begin by outlining the details of a primary survey
that was undertaken specifically for this study. There are two prior surveys that attempt
to capture general industrial lobbying in India. First, Yadav (2008) provides a useful
examination of the various stages of the lobbying process. However, a limitation to her
study is that she interviews only members of business associations. Second, the World
Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) in 2005 asked one question on membership to industry
associations which does not however directly imply actual lobbying. In the absence of data
on lobbying specifically for trade policy in India, I designed and implemented a primary
survey to collect original information across 146 manufacturing firms interviewed from the
period of July 2013 to November 2014. Following the outline of the survey, I use the
primary data to examine the choice of lobbying strategy for manufacturing firms.
5Olson (1994) provides a discussion on the use of political strategies by firms and expected outcomes.
6The fixed cost of collective lobbying is the membership fees of an association. Once the fixed cost is
paid, there is a variable cost shared by the members that cooperate to lobby as a group.
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The survey identified that Indian manufacturing firms prefer the use of a dual strategy
i.e. a combination of collective and individual lobbying. In light of this stylized finding, I
set up a broad framework to motivate the empirical evidence. The main objective was to
explore the possibility of adopting a dual strategy to lobby for trade policy. BT provide
empirical evidence for the United States using individual lobbying expenditures, output
concentration and product substitutability, where an increase in concentration has two
effects, the Competition Effect that would imply that for sectors with higher concentration
firms lobby more individually (sectors with a lower output concentration, firms choose to
lobby together), and the Free-Riding Effect such that a higher concentration creates higher
incentive to lobby via associations when the larger firm can internalize a higher fraction of
the total return from an increase in the sector-wide outcome. Their estimates show that
lower concentration in the product market can deliver more cooperation in lobbying for
protection7 that is the competition effect. I confirm findings for the competition effect also
for India such that the competition effects are clearly dominating any free-riding effects
for Indian manufacturing firms.
Second, I examine an underlying assumption (also made in BT) that firms are more
likely to adopt a collective lobbying strategy for sector-wide trade policy in the nature of
public goods while they are likely to lobby individually for product-specific outcomes for
India. Examining lobbying strategies with regard to specific trade policy derives from the
argument that each policy outcome requires a group to convey to policy-makers different
types of information8. This suggests there are differences between the use of each lobby-
ing strategy. I argue that certain firms with higher stakes in the specific policy are likely
to adopt a dual strategy and lobby individually in addition to collective lobbying9. The
premise of such differences between the use of each single strategy and a dual strategy
lends itself to examine the use of lobbying strategies across trade policy choices. Finally,
the unique finding is the overall preference of the dual strategy over each exclusive single
strategy by Indian firms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the motivation
7However, the empirical literature on lobbying has shown ambiguity in results that connect firm con-
centration to political influence.
8Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) argue that while collective lobbying helps communicate preferences of
a group (in my case the industry), direct interactions on the other hand allow interest groups to provide
specialized and discrete information to policy-makers.
9Hojnacki and Kimball (1998) also provide empirical evidence to show that when lobbying for change
in a policy, groups are likely to lobby using both kinds of lobbying, while a single strategy is sufficient to
defend an existing policy.
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and specific details on the survey. Section 3 outlines stylized facts on the choice of man-
ufacturing firms to lobby the government for trade policy. In Section 4, I motivate the
hypothesis for analysing the survey data. This is followed by Section 5 that presents the
empirical analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper by providing a discussion on
policy implications and further research.
6.2 Survey
This section summarizes the multi-stage stratified random sampling that I implemented
to collect the data. The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) was the starting point
for my survey. A list of target firms was provided from the member directories of the CII.
A questionnaire was designed carefully incorporating views from preliminary interviews
with industry associations and a pilot survey. I initiated the survey with a pilot for 20
firms10. Preliminary findings were recorded and changes made to the sample questionnaire
incorporating certain additional elements. Sensitive questions can discourage respondents
from answering openly such that any questions on informal payments were also dropped.
Finally, the survey asked the firms their responses on lobbying in a typical year across
2010-2014 in particular, and how lobbying evolved for them since liberalisation in 1991. A
copy of this questionnaire is attached in Figure A.1 in Appendix A.5.1, outlining the list
of questions and corresponding choices for the firms.
The survey scheme comprised five stages in total. Table 6.1 presents a summary of each
stage along with the criteria followed. It begins with a sampling reference and then under-
takes stratified sampling. The attempt was to make the sample representative to include
both association members and non-members. The sampling procedure is randomized and
the final target sample consists of 250 firms that eventually gave 146 eligible responses11.
10No specific criteria was used for the pilot and these interviews were not included in the final interviews.
The 20 firms were taken from the lists provided by CII.
11This is arguably a reasonable representation of the population of firms I am studying, the sample being
roughly ten per cent of the population.
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Table 6.1: Survey Summary
Detail/Stage Numbers Sources/Task Criteria Target Preci-
sion (Reduce
Possible Bias)
Sampling Reference 508+913
=1421
Lists from Asso-
ciations & Phone
Directories
Sectoral weights from
World Bank Enter-
prise Survey
By Economic Sec-
tors
Stratification 1032 Comparison of
Lists
Drop overlapping
firms (389)
By Association
Members & Non-
Members
Randomization 508+524
=1032
Lists Re-arranged
in descending order
Distribution of firms
by size.
By Firm Size
(Number of Work-
ers)
350 Random Selection Draw one firm at
fixed intervals of size
+ Budget (Optimum
Allocation)
By Strata
E-Mails 320 Potential Respond-
ents
Sectoral weights
from World Bank
Enterprise Survey
(30 Firms dropped)
By Economic Sec-
tors
Final Appoint-
ments
250 Target Coverage Follow-ups + Contri-
bution to economic
activity + Budget
By Economic Sec-
tors
Actual Interviews 146 Actual Coverage Complete and
eligible responses
By Economic Sec-
tors
Note: Table shows the summary of sampling scheme for the survey.
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6.2.1 Survey Design and Sampling Reference
Lists from associations have been traditionally used for lobbying surveys as in Yadav (2008).
However, there is a potential drawback in interviewing only association members. I aimed
to target a more representative sample of firms that would include both members and
non-members of trade associations. This is important as the objective of my study was
to examine different strategies of lobbying, these being collective and individual lobbying.
While, association members can lobby individually in addition to their collective member-
ship, it is important to include non-members who might decide to lobby the government
only individually. In this light, while the members directories of CII is a good starting
point, I aimed to capture other firm lobbying behaviour usually left out in existing studies.
Following this, a systematic sampling procedure was chosen with two strata, the list from
CII and list of non-members from phone directories in major cities in India.
With the assistance of carefully monitored and trained local survey teams based in New
Delhi, details regarding the survey were sent out via personalised emails to potential re-
spondents. The target respondents were trade specialist officers at the firms such that they
were fully aware of lobbying strategies of their organization. Not all firms in my sample
had specialist officers dealing with trade activities. In those cases, the high-level managers
were targeted. Appointments were then sought for face-to-face interviews. Interviews in
Delhi and NCR were conducted in person, for the remaining geographical locations, we used
telephone conversations and voice over internet protocol (IP) to avoid transportation costs.
The first contact emails were sent in late May 2014 followed by telephone conversa-
tions to brief the respondents about the nature of the survey. Reminders were sent two
weeks later for those who had not yet responded to the requests. There were follow-ups
when appointments were made and interviews carried out. Guarantees of anonymity were
provided to the firms and thorough advance information supplied in all cases.
6.2.2 Stratified Sampling
The first step was to create a reliable reference for the sampling. The closest and most
relevant reference in my case was the WBES conducted in India in 2005. The distribu-
tion of firms across the 20 sub-sectors was taken as the reference for the sampling. The
selection of these sectors in the WBES is claimed as representative of the largest manu-
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facturing sectors in India in terms of employment and output shares by 2005. The aim
was to sample the same proportions such that the count distribution of firms in each sec-
tor was taken as the reference estimate for the proportion of firms to be drawn across the
sectors. This count distribution is attached in the Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1 for reference.
Following this reference, I constructed a base list of firms distributed across the 20 man-
ufacturing sub-sectors of the WBES classification. For this I used stratified sampling using
two strata, first the list from CII and second the list based on various phone directories.
I began with a list of 508 firms that was provided by CII, compiled as a random sample
based on the WBES count distribution of firms in each sector. I believe this sample is a
reasonable representation of the population of firms who are members of associations, the
sample drawn being roughly ten per cent of the population of firms. Second, the phone
directories in the major cities of India were used to build another list. The second list
was constructed by an initial draw of a list of firms from the phone directories, of which
913 were kept based on the criteria of working contact details12. This was followed by
dropping any overlapping firms as there was the possibility that the ones from the phone
directories could be members of associations. Overlapping firms were dropped from the
second list (389 firms were dropped) that finally consisted of 524 member fims that were
not on the CII lists. Therefore, each stratum was made mutually exclusive. The purpose
of using these two lists was to attempt to draw a representative sample of firms such that
the broad target population comprised both the association members and non-members.
Using this stratified sampling frame as the base, the next objective was to enable random
selection of a sample of firms to be included in the survey.
The two lists together consisted a total of 1, 032 firms. Note two important points
about the final list of firms. First, the manufacturing sector is complicated by firms that
are active in more than one sector for more than one product. For this analysis, all the
designated sectors of activity and products were used when compiling the final list of firms.
Therefore, multi-sector firms can appear more than once in a few cases13. Second, I ad-
opted a disproportionate random sampling technique as there was no a priori14 for the
distribution of firms across the two strata in my survey. This means that the sampling
12This included a working phone number. In several cases, where the phone number was not working,
an internet search for an e-mail address and/or a website was done.
13Roughly 10 per cent of the firms appear more than once.
14To the best of my knowledge there is no existing survey that interviews members and non-members of
associations on lobbying in India.
143
fraction for each stratum will be different such that the criteria are discussed in the next
section.
6.2.3 Randomization
Following this broad sampling procedure, in the third stage the complete list of firms
were arranged in descending order of firm size expressed in terms of number of workers.
The sampling was then randomized such that firms were selected at random from the
re-arranged lists. One firm was drawn at fixed intervals (ranking size) from the entire dis-
tribution to create a target list for the survey interviews. This enabled random selection
and covered the entire range of firms in terms of size (in my list) than mostly from any one
end of the distribution. This was done to deal with the potential problem of large firms
being over-represented in the sample.
I use a disproportionate sampling procedure outlined in Table A.23 in Appendix A.1.
This consists of using a different sampling fraction to each stratum.Following this approach,
I set the final sample size (distributed across the two different strata) taking into account
two important aspects of costs and precision. The precision is targeted at the level of eco-
nomic sub-sectors and contribution to economic activity. Using optimum allocation, the
number of elements selected from each stratum were made directly related to the standard
deviation of the firm size in the stratum. The greater the variability in the stratum, higher
sample size of the stratum should be. Moreover, taking into account data collection costs,
the higher the data collection costs of a stratum, the lower the targeted sample size. Note
that data collection costs were lower for firms in member directories than in the phone
directories15. Costs (c) for the two lists were 20 USD and 5 USD per firm respectively.
The distribution of the sample sizes for the two strata takes into account these varying data
collection costs. Standard deviations of size (s) were 6.4 and 5.2 for member directories
and phone directories each. The resulting list consisted of 350 firms drawn randomly from
the distribution of firms.
15Interviews with member directories were facilitated by CII and did not incur a very high cost.
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6.2.4 Potential and Target Respondents
Of the randomly selected firms, local survey teams were instructed to target a total of 320
potential respondents. 30 firms were dropped based on the WBES count of firms across all
the sectors discussed above. This enabled coherence with the reference for the sampling
frame in stage one of the sample selection procedure. Following this, the local survey
teams sent out personalized e-mails with the survey details to the potential respondents.
Appointments were sought and follow-ups were done with all potential respondents. Fi-
nally, of the 320 potential respondents, 250 were finalised for the interviews. This target
was based on the following criteria, first being the responses from the follow-ups and second
based on contribution to economic activity from All India Survey of Industries for 201016.
The process so far was therefore based on the following set of criteria. First, being the
budget and response to the e-mails and follow-ups. Not all firms responded to the e-mails
and telephone calls. Reasons being unavailability of the high-level officers for interview.
The response rate remained fairly even across all the follow-ups such that for every five
firms that responded there was on average one non-responsive firm17. Second, the distri-
bution of the initial 350 firms between the two stratum were based on optimum allocation
for disproportionate sampling discussed above. Third, the distribution of the final 320 po-
tential respondents is based on the WBES count across sectors. Finally, the target sample
size was set at 250 firms across the manufacturing sectors based on the contribution to
economic activity and response to follow-ups.
6.2.5 Final Sample and Limitations
At this stage, there were incomplete and no responses to questions in a few cases such
that some interviews did not give usable information. In total, the survey rendered 146
useful responses, representing a final response rate of 58 per cent (146/250)18. I find some
firms were unwilling to divulge part or full information on lobbying strategies and refused
16The data on contribution to economic activity across the ASI sectors is attached in Table A.24 in
Appendix A.1 that were adjusted for the scope of the sectors in the survey (this was done using corres-
pondence between the 20 sectors in the World Bank with the National Industrial Classification sectors
for India). The primary reason for this is that the sampling reference is based on the WBES that was
conducted in 2005 while my interviews were done in 2013-2014. Therefore, in an attempt to update the
distribution in light of changes across the years I use this criterion.
17I find no significant differences between responsive and non-responsive firms by firm size and economic
sector
18Table A.25 of Appendix A.1 contains a comparison of the target and actual coverage to examine the
response rates across the sectors.
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to participate in the survey. The reasons given for this were lack of willingness to reveal
information to a foreign university student, refusal to comment on few questions and lack
of knowledge. I believe these reasons were unrelated with the lobbying behaviour of the
firms and thus should not bias the results19. The sectors recording lowest responses were
Electrical Appliances, Auto Components and Sugar. Owing to these reasons, some re-
sponses were not obtained and others were incomplete and could not be used. While, 23
responses were not obtained, 81 were dropped.
Figure 6.1: Geographical Distribution of Sample
Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the sample across the cities of India.
Geographical distribution of the final sample was in four main cities of India and its
periphery, Delhi and National Capital Region (NCR), Mumbai (Maharashtra), Kolkata
(West Bengal) and Chennai (Tamil Nadu). The surveyed firms were broadly located in
the large cities and the periphery of small towns across the states. 58 per cent of the
interviewed firms had a presence in New Delhi. It is likely that firms have corporate offices
in the capital city of Delhi owing to commercial significance of location20. The distribution
of the sample across the cities is shown in Figure 6.1.
Every possible attempt was made to ensure that the sample of firms surveyed were rep-
resentative of the population of firms under study, although I recognize it is not possible
to do so fully and there may be potential issues with the final sample that could bias the
19Based on the response rates, I test the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference
in the response rates across economic sectors (responses and economic sectors are independent). Using the
Pearson chi-square test, I find a p-value of 0.880 for the range of expected and actual response rates that
suggests that the non-response rates are independent of the sector identity.
20This is also the case in the WBES and in Yadav (2008).
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results. The attempt was to deal with the potential bias at each stage as explained below.
First, the sample could be biased in terms of economic sector or size due to non-response.
The distribution of responses deviates from the initial sample design due to low response
rates in some sectors. In terms of the economic sector, I do not find any significant differ-
ence in non-response such that non-response rates are independent of the sector identity.
Also, the list of respondents and non-respondents were compared by the number of work-
ers such that the non-response rates were independent of firm size with no statistically
significant differences between respondents and non-respondents. I find respondents had
an average of 74 number of workers compared to 82 for non-respondents. Second, concern
regarding the reliability of information revealed by the firms. In terms of industry and
government interaction, I find evidence of high lobbying intensity (discussed in the next
section) such that the sample of firms engage regularly in the policy-making process. This
is important to assess if firms responses are based on actual lobbying interactions. Since,
I find high evidence of lobbying, I can assert that the lobbying data could be based on
actual experience of the firms.
Finally, I consider any possible bias in terms of the distribution of the realized sample
across the two initial strata. This is important as one aim of the study was to obtain a
representative sample and interview both members and non-members of associations which
is a potential contribution to the lobbying literature. I have used a disproportionate strati-
fied sampling method as outlined earlier. It provides the advantage to study the responses
of both sub-groups of members and phone directories accounting for the fact that firms
drawn from phone directories were harder to reach for appointments. A proportionate
sample in this case would give a smaller sample than the 250 firms on the whole. Also, it is
important to re-iterate that members of associations can also lobby individually, I refer to
phone directories to include representation for firms that lobby only individually without
membership to an association. In this case, the views of the total firms interviewed will be
representative of the lobbying strategies and a disproportionate sampling will provide more
accurate responses. I believe this sample is a reasonable representation of the population of
firms I am studying, the sample size being roughly ten per cent of the population of firms.
On the whole, in spite of the potential limitations of the data, information from the survey
helps reveal important lobbying phenomena for trade policy across Indian manufacturing
firms that has been non-existent so far.
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6.3 Stylized Findings on Lobbying for Trade Policy in India
At present, there exists an effective but quite informal mechanism on government-industry
consultations for trade policy-making in India. I find that the sample of firms surveyed
stressed the rise in their lobbying efforts from the 1990s as the government became more
responsive to industry. Also, I find while MFN tariffs, import licenses and Non-tariff meas-
ures were primary issues of approaching the government in late 90s, instruments such as
special consignments at the border21 and preferential tariffs became quite important by
the end of 2000s.
Before exploring the mechanism of this interaction, I attempt to assess how often firms
interact with the government for lobbying for trade policy in India. In my survey, firms
were asked a general question about their overall decision to lobby the government. Lob-
bying Decision was measured as: Does your firm undertake activities for lobbying the
government for trade policy? Responses are binary coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes based
on firm lobbying in a typical year during the period 2010-2014. 137 of the 146 firms in my
sample reported to be lobbying, such that I find 94 per cent of the manufacturing firms in
my sample decided to actively lobby the government in a typical year in that period. This
means that most Indian firms interact with the government on trade issues.
However, it seems that the exact form of government consultations with industry for
the trade policy-making process is not defined. There exist industry associations that of-
ten facilitate these interactions. At the same time, Indian firms can choose to approach
the government by themselves. The argument that associations are allowed to operate
officially and openly as legal entities but lack a confirmed status to be heard is found in
Sen (2004). Further, Saha (2013) has also repeated that while there are no regulations
governing lobbying in India, it is not deemed an illegal activity either. Also, there seems to
be an absence of a set criteria or standards for access or acceptance of industry suggestion
in these consultations as in most developing countries. There are no formal laws like in
the United States and Europe where it is mandatory to disclose the amounts invested in
lobbying and neither is there a disclosure body that allows sharing of such information.
21A question on special consignments was added to the survey following the pilot interviews that revealed
consignments at the border being an important lobbying objective for the firms. In this case, I found that
firms might face specific issues related to incoming imports at the border which relate to custom delays
and procedures.
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In this light, an understanding of lobbying decisions on various choices followed by
Indian firms can motivate a clear mechanism for both associations and firms to interact
with the government. Overall decision on lobbying differs from pursuing different choices
to lobby, such that I also ask questions to measure the firm decision on the different choices
again based on a typical year during the period 2010-2014. Being a member of an associ-
ation does not necessarily mean actual lobbying (as argued in Chapter 5) and it arguably
covers only the fixed membership cost of lobbying. Therefore, I will also examine what
can potentially account for the marginal cost component such that I ask firms about their
actual lobbying activities using their decision to lobby via the membership. Following a
question on general lobbying decision, primarily two kinds of choices were quoted by the
sample of 146 firms: Collective lobbying via trade associations and individual lobbying
using direct contact with officials.
Lobbying Decision was therefore examined as a binary variable for each kind of lobby-
ing: Collective lobbying is denoted as Collective when the firm is coded as 1 if it lobbies
collectively and 0 otherwise, individual Lobbying is Individual that assigns the firm a
value of 1 if it engages in individual lobbying and 0 otherwise. For dual lobbying I define
Dual where the firm is coded as 1 if it undertakes lobbying using both collective and indi-
vidual lobbying, and 0 otherwise. Finally, I identify the firms that are not lobbying as No
Lobbying. The number of firms that adopt each choice are outlined in Figure 6.2 below.
Figure 6.2: Lobbying Decisions
Figure 6.2 shows the number of firms by the Lobbying Decision choices.
Next, using the binary measures above, I defined Lobbying Strategy (L) such that
I identified firms that adopt the exclusive use of each lobbying choice and the dual use of
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both to include: No Lobbying (=1), Lobbying only collectively (=2), Lobbying only indi-
vidually (=3) and Lobbying both collectively and individually (=4) as outlined in Figure
6.3 below as exclusive choices.
Figure 6.3: Lobbying Strategy
Figure 6.3 shows the number of firms by Lobbying Strategy, the categories are mutually exclusive.
The firms in my sample were asked specific questions on lobbying. I find on average
83 per cent of Indian manufacturing firms lobby using membership to associations as a
possible strategy to lobby the government particularly for trade policy. In terms of indi-
vidual Lobbying, an average of approximately 71 per cent firms lobby individually. Based
on this information, I identified the number of firms undertaking each strategy exclusively.
I construct a measure Lobbying Strategy (L) such that I identify firms that choose
the exclusive use of each strategy and a combination of the two single strategies which is
termed as a dual strategy. Using this method, Figure 6.3 shows that only 34 firms use
the single strategy of lobbying only collectively (L=2), while only 16 firms use the other
single strategy being lobbying only individually (L=3). 87 firms use a dual strategy that
is a combination of lobbying both collectively and individually (L=4). This suggests the
preferred choice of Indian firms is therefore a dual strategy to lobby for trade policy.
Further, examining the lobbying strategy across the 20 sectors of WBES, the number
of firms opting for the lobbying strategies is shown by average firm size in Table 6.2 below.
On the whole, there is evidence that sectors with larger average firm size seem to opt for
dual lobbying using both collective and individual lobbying.
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Table 6.2: Lobbying by Average Firm Size
Industry Firms Avg. No Collective Individual Dual
Firm Size Lobbying Lobby Only Lobby Only Lobbying
Str. Metals, Prod. 16 6.551 1 1 1 13
Paper, Prod. 6 6.53 1 0 0 5
Auto Compo. 6 6.421 0 2 2 2
Rubber, Prod. 5 6.373 1 1 0 3
Other Chem 6 6.362 1 1 0 4
Wood, Furniture 5 6.261 1 0 1 3
Electr. Appl. 3 6.24 0 0 0 3
Garments 8 6.224 0 2 0 6
Sugar 4 6.103 0 0 0 4
Plastics, Prod. 5 6.095 0 1 0 4
Mach. Tools, Parts 7 5.958 0 2 0 5
Mineral Pro. 5 5.897 0 0 3 2
Food Pro. 8 5.892 3 0 2 3
Textiles 29 5.759 1 13 1 14
Electr., durables 4 5.728 0 1 0 3
Agro Pro. 5 5.684 0 0 1 4
Paints, Varnish 6 5.68 0 2 2 2
Drugs, Pharma. 6 5.63 0 3 2 1
Cosmetics 5 5.491 0 2 1 2
Leather, prod. 7 5.06 0 3 0 4
Total 146 5.991 9 34 16 87
Note: Table 6.2 shows the sectors in decreasing order of firm size (average of log firm size) and reports
the number of firms by sector opting for various lobbying strategies.
To examine the differences in lobbying strategy by outcomes, I ask the firm questions
on their intensity of lobbying for specific trade policy outcomes. Termed as Lobbying
Activity, firms were asked about various trade policy outcomes22, but in the thesis I will
compare the case of MFN and Special Consignments (SC).
22This includes preferential tariffs, import licenses and non-tariff barriers
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The intensity of lobbying in the survey is captured as a self-assessed measure of lob-
bying activity for each outcome of MFN and Special Consignments (SC, henceforth): "On
a scale of 1 − 4, where 1 shows not active and 4 shows very active, how active would you
say your firm was in lobbying with regard to the following: MFN Tariff Protection, Special
Consignments?" (1 = Not active, 2 = Moderately active, 3 = Fairly Active, 4 = Very
Active). MFN is defined as the average of lobbying activity for MFN using both collective
and individual lobbying. SC takes the average of lobbying activity for using both collective
and individual lobbying for Special Consignment lobbying.
This question asked separately for collective and individual lobbying reveal firm pref-
erences such that I find 58 (39.7%) firms use a dual strategy when lobbying for the public
good MFN while 47 (32.2%) firms use the single strategy of individual lobbying when tar-
geting special consignments shown below. These numbers for the choice of each strategy
(by outcome) motivates an empirical analysis of lobbying strategies by different trade policy
outcomes.
Table 6.3: MFN by Lobbying Strategy
Collective
Individual
Total
1 2 3 4
1 0.014 0.007 0.027 0.055 0.103
2 0.000 0.068 0.096 0.000 0.164
3 0.000 0.089 0.397 0.000 0.486
4 0.007 0.000 0.164 0.075 0.247
Total 0.021 0.164 0.685 0.130 1.000
Note: Table 6.3 shows the relative frequencies of firms based on responses to the question "On a scale
of 1 − 4, where 1 shows not active and 4 shows very active, how active would you say your firm was in
lobbying with regard to the following: MFN Tariff Protection?" (1 = Not active, 2 = Moderately active, 3
= Fairly Active, 4 = Very Active) for Collective and Individual Lobbying
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Table 6.4: SC by Lobbying Strategy
Collective
Individual
Total
1 2 3 4
1 0.034 0.000 0.322 0.048 0.404
2 0.007 0.000 0.075 0.041 0.123
3 0.014 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.151
4 0.007 0.000 0.137 0.178 0.322
Total 0.062 0.000 0.603 0.336 1
Note: Table 6.4 shows the relative frequencies of firms based on responses to the question "On a scale
of 1 − 4, where 1 shows not active and 4 shows very active, how active would you say your firm was in
lobbying with regard to the following: Special Consignments?" (1 = Not active, 2 = Moderately active, 3
= Fairly Active, 4 = Very Active) for Collective and Individual Lobbying
Finally, effectiveness in lobbying has been an unexplored question for firms in India.
Following the exercises on lobbying effectiveness in previous Chapters, I also ask firms
about their perceived Lobbying Effectiveness as a sector. It is measured using the per-
ception of firms on their ability to influence trade policy based on firm-level responses to
the following question: "On a scale of 1 to 4, how successful would you rate a typical firm
in your sector in lobbying the government for trade policy influence?" (1 = Not effective,
2 = Moderately Effective, 3 = Moderately Effective, 4 = Very Effective).
This question asked separately for collective and individual lobbying reveal perceptions
on effectiveness by lobbying strategy. Of the total of 146 firms surveyed, 25 firms did not
choose to lobby through any associations (refer Figure 6.2). However, I find that only 20
(13.7%) firms perceive themselves being ineffective in collective lobbying. 71 (48.6%) firms
perceive that they have only moderately effective lobbying through associations while 55
(37.7%) firms think they have very effective collective lobbying. 43 of the total of 146 firms
do not lobby individually (refer Figure 6.2). However, I find that only 32 (21.9%) of the
firms actually perceive their individual lobbying as ineffective. 82 (56.2%)firms report only
moderate effectiveness of their individual lobbying and only 32 (21.9%) firms have very
effective individual lobbying.
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Table 6.5: Lobbying Effectiveness by Lobbying Strategy
Collective
Individual
Total
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 0.048 0.041 0.007 0.041 0.137
2 0.082 0.055 0.048 0.027 0.212
3 0.062 0.082 0.116 0.014 0.274
4 0.027 0.055 0.158 0.137 0.377
Total 0.219 0.233 0.329 0.219 1.000
Note: Table 6.5 shows the relative frequencies of firms based on responses to the question "On a scale of 1
to 4, how successful would you rate a typical firm in your sector in lobbying the government for trade policy
influence?" (1 = Not effective, 2 = Moderately Effective, 3 = Moderately Effective, 4 = Very Effective).)
for Collective and Individual Lobbying
On the whole, firm perception on lobbying effectiveness is higher for collective lobbying
through associations in comparison to individual lobbying. It can thereby be inferred that
firms are confident in using association lobbying when channelling their lobbying efforts.
Firms seem to perceive themselves more effective in lobbying via associations than indi-
vidual lobbying. In light of the observed findings in my data, I set-up a framework to
conduct an empirical analysis of the data in the following section.
6.4 The Model
This section presents the theoretical framework to guide the empirical analysis on lobby-
ing strategies. The underlying motivation derives from the specific features observed in
the context of India. Firms seek trade policy influence by lobbying the government using
available resources. There is an associated cost for each lobbying strategy i.e. to lobby
collectively via trade associations for a collective outcome T or individual firms lobbying
themselves for an individual outcome ti. Here, I consider the possibility that firms can
lobby for both trade policy outcomes at the same time using a dual strategy i.e. a com-
bination of collective and individual lobbying.
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A rise in concentration creates a Free-Riding Effect and a Competition Effect. Free-
riding implies that higher concentration creates greater incentive to lobby via associations
as the larger firm gets more of the total return from an increase the sector-wide outcome.
Therefore, if the size dispersion of firms is larger (higher concentration), there is more in-
centive for the large firm to lobby for the public good. The competition effect on the other
hand creates a stronger incentive to lobby for a product-specific outcome than for the pub-
lic good when the size dispersion is larger (higher concentration). A stronger competition
effect would thereby imply that for sectors with low output concentration, firms choose to
lobby together, and for sectors with higher concentration firms lobby more individually.
Assume that the government welfare G is such that different weights are attached to
the two kinds of lobbying strategies relative to the aggregate welfare V (as in BT). I ar-
gue that particularly for India, government preferences vary for the two kinds of lobbying
strategies (evidenced in Chapter 5). G is specified in terms of V as a function of the
trade policy outcomes for two firms t1, t2 and the collective outcome T . The association
lobbying expenses are L and the total individual firm lobbying expenses are l. Each is
valued differently by the government, weights given by τ and θ respectively in the welfare
function shown below on lines of Bombardini and Trebbi (2009):
G = V (t1, t2, T ) +
1
τ
L+
1
θ
l (6.1)
However, it is important to note here that the BT model does not make any assumptions
on whether trade associations might be more effective at lobbying than individual firms or
why individual lobbying may be more effective than lobbying via associations. In the con-
text of India, the choice of collective lobbying is the preferred medium for the government
to consider industry influence in formulating trade policy in India (argued in Chapters 3
and 5). Also, I assume there is an imperfect trade-off between lobbying collectively and
individual lobbying that in turn depends on the trade policy.
In BT, the extent of free-riding determines the trade-off between collective and indi-
vidual lobbying where firms may choose to contribute less for the lobbying expenditures of
the trade association as they expect the return from a collective outcome to be spread over
all firms in the sector. While in some sectors firms may prefer the collective outcome be
raised for all firms simultaneously. Note that if firms decide to lobby collectively, there is
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no individual lobbying in BT. I introduce the following in this existing framework. First,
the possibility that firms can decide to adopt both lobbying strategies. Second, the notion
of an imperfect trade-off between the sector-wide outcome from collective lobbying and the
product-specific one from individual lobbying. Finally, the idea that lobbying collectively
is more effective than individual lobbying.
The combination of individual and collective lobbying would depend on the specific
trade policy instrument and the degree of substitutability of these strategies for that in-
strument. The firms in a given sector will take the decision on collective lobbying. Once
the firms know their contribution to the association, they decide on individual lobbying
that is undertaken by each firm in its own capacity. Therefore, some firms can adopt a
dual strategy where they maximize their returns by considering a combination of the two
lobbying strategies.
For asymmetric firms, with firm 1 being larger, the incentive to lobby individually will
increase in concentration and the incentive to lobby via associations will decrease with rise
in concentration (as in BT). Therefore, as concentration increases, firm 1 has a higher in-
centive to lobby for the collective trade policy outcome (as it internalizes a higher fraction
of the total return) and also to deviate and lobby individually for the individual outcome.
This is the scenario when the larger firm is likely to adopt a dual strategy.
This framework motivates the following directly testable hypothesis:
Proposition 1. A lower elasticity of substitution among goods is associated with
higher individual lobbying, while sectors with firms producing similar goods are likely to
lobby collectively (as in BT). For similar goods, firms are likely to lobby only collectively.
Proposition 2. A lower output concentration is associated with higher collective and
dual lobbying, while sectors with higher output concentration lobby more individually.
Competition effect is stronger than free-riding effects such that in sectors with larger num-
ber of firms producing the output, firms choose to lobby together.
Proposition 3. Firms lobby for a sector-wide outcome using collective lobbying,
individual lobbying is used to target product-specific outcomes. This is an underlying
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assumption in BT that I seek to examine. In addition, I examine the likelihood of dual
lobbying, a dual strategy is preferred to the use of each single strategy. Introducing the
possibility of a dual strategy in the BT set-up, I attempt to provide evidence to this un-
derlying assumption of the model. Complemented with the stylized findings for India, I
test the preference of a dual strategy to the use of each single strategy in lobbying.
6.5 Empirical Analysis
This section will outline the data and present the empirical analysis. Sector and firm char-
acteristics include the primary determinants of interest from the model and in addition
control variables.
The first variable of interest include the elasticities of substitution from Broda and
Weinstein (2004)23 taken as the logarithmic transformation to deal with outliers and is
defined as Elasticity for each sector. Second, Concentration is the output concentration
calculated as the share of output of the four largest firms in a sector using data from All
India Survey of Industries (ASI). The third variable is Firm Size where firms were asked
about the number of workers, as: "What is the size (number of workers) of your firm?”.
In the empirical analysis, it is measured using the log of number of workers.
The control variables include the following. First, Foreign defined using: "What is
the ownership structure of your firm in terms of Private Foreign Ownership?" (1 = None,
2 = Less than 10 per cent, 3 = Between 10 percent-40 per cent, 4 = More than 40 per
cent). This information is used to construct the binary variable that takes the value 1 for
foreign ownership and 0 for none. Second, Competition measured by asking how many
competitors the firm faces. “In the last year, how many competitors did your firm face for
its top 3 products?” (1 = No competitors, 2 =1-3 Competitors, 3 = 4-10 Competitors, 4
= More than 10 Competitors). This is constructed as a variable that can take the values
from 1 to 4, where 1 shows no competitors, 4 shows more than ten competitors for the top
products produced by the firm. Note that I will have two measures for competition, the
firm-level control is the number of competitors while the sector-level variable (discussed
23They use the 6-digit HS import data (1992 classification system) from the COMTRADE database from
1994- 2003 to estimate the elasticities between varieties of imported goods that are reported at the 3-digit
HS. I obtain concordances between 3-digit HS codes and 4-digit NIC/ISIC codes to group the estimates of
elasticities of substitution by NIC/ISIC. Finally, I take the mean elasticity of substitution for each of the
20 sectors in this study.
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below) is the output concentration.
6.5.1 Lobbying Decision
Lobbying Decision was defined as a binary variable for each kind of lobbying strategy:
Collective, Individual and Dual.
I begin by examining the three propositions derived from the framework above. The
determinants of the lobbying decision are examined in terms elasticities and concentra-
tion. The implicit assumption in BT that firms lobby collectively to target sector-wide
tariffs and lobby individually for product-specific tariffs is also examined. In what follows,
I examine the decision to lobby as a binary variable for each single strategy and the dual
strategy to examine the determinants of each lobbying strategy as a binary decision vari-
able. Let Lobby Decisioni be a binary variable that takes the value one when the firm
reports to have undertaken lobbying in a typical year using a specific strategy during the
period 2010-2014. This depends on the benefit from lobbying outweighing the cost to lobby.
Let this decision be based as a latent variable formulation such that y∗ is the unobserved
continuous latent variable representing the excess utility derived by lobbying compared to
not lobbying. The observed decision to lobby takes a value of one if the excess utility from
lobbying (1) compared to not lobbying (0) is positive.
LobbyDecisioni =

1 if y∗ > 0
0 otherwise
(6.2)
I estimate a probit model as specified below assuming that the error terms are inde-
pendent and normally distributed on the entire sample of 146 firms:
LobbyingDecisioni = β0 + βR+ ηC + φi (6.3)
The main variables of interest are the sector-specific variables in R that include the elasti-
city of substitution among goods in a given sector and output concentration of the sector.
B includes the control variables at the firm-level: firm-size in each sector (Firm Size) is ex-
amined as a control variable for lobbying decision; foreign ownership of the firm (Foreign);
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and the number of competitors faced by the firm for its top products (Competitors). It
is important to note here that a firm reporting to have done one single strategy does not
exclude the use of the other single lobbying strategy. An empirical complication here is
that the observations within each sector may not be independently distributed. Therefore
I report robust standard errors and accounting for small sample size, I cluster the boot-
strapped standard errors.
The empirical evidence in BT examines the determinants for the fraction of individual
lobbying by firms. I provide empirical evidence on the determinants of lobbying decisions
for each strategy of collective lobbying, individual lobbying and dual lobbying. Table 6.6
presents the results for the binary lobbying decision variables.
Proposition 1 and 2 are examined using the data from the survey using the baseline
estimation Model 1. Model 1 examines the determinants of lobbying decision for each
strategy in columns (1)-(3). Sectors with firms producing similar goods are found more
likely to lobby in all models except for collective strategy in Model 1 and Model 3; however
this effect is insignificant. In terms of proposition 2, I find the likelihood of collective and
dual lobbying is increasing significantly with fall in sector concentration. This provides
support for proposition 2 such that the competition effect is clearly dominating any free-
riding effects as sectors with higher concentration (small number of firms producing most
of the output) will be more likely to lobby for trade policy influence using collective lob-
bying, and a combination of collective and individual lobbying.
Next, I include the variables MFN and SC to test Proposition 3, I estimate Model 2
and Model 3 respectively. Columns (4)-(6) in Model 2 includes the objective of lobbying
activity MFN and columns (7)-(9) includes the activity SC. Introducing the additional lob-
bying covariates on activity, I find support for MFN activity being positively related to the
likelihood of collective lobbying and dual lobbying, while special consignments are found
to show a positive and significant relationship to individual and also dual lobbying. The
evidence thereby gives support to the overall firm preference of a dual strategy, with the
single strategy of collective lobbying being likely for a public good and individual strategy
for product-specific outcomes.
Finally, I find only weak evidence for firm-size at the sector-level for the decision on
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each lobbying strategy. There is a negative but insignificant effect of size for collective
lobbying in columns (1), (4) and (7). For individual lobbying, I find a positive yet in-
significant effect; where including the objective of lobbying for SC in this framework, in
Models 2 and 3, it turns negative. I find a positive effect for dual lobbying across all models.
Overall, these findings lend evidence in the direction that justifies the argument of
differences in lobbying strategies controlling for specific trade policy outcomes. However,
it is important to examine these differences by defining the strategies as exclusive choices
in the next section.
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Table 6.6: Lobbying Decision
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variables Collective Individual Dual Collective Individual Dual Collective Individual Dual
Elasticity -0.017 0.179 0.123 0.0329 0.192 0.153 -0.022 0.127 0.079
(0.248) (0.235) (0.181) (0.158) (0.247) (0.194) (0.281) (0.196) (0.140)
Concentration -0.018* -0.013 -0.029*** -0.018* -0.011 -0.028*** -0.017** -0.011 -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
MFN 0.480** 0.203 0.389***
(0.161) (0.108) (0.112)
SC 0.050 0.283** 0.265*
(0.126) (0.109) (0.108)
Controls
Firm Size -0.074 0.011 0.044 -0.121 -0.005 0.013 -0.08 -0.025 0.012
(0.081) (0.164) (0.200) (0.064) (0.164) (0.203) (0.108) (0.191) (0.234)
Foreign -0.268 -0.408 -0.708 -0.143 -0.399 -0.701 -0.255 -0.392 -0.711
(0.535) (0.277) (0.448) (0.613) (0.280) (0.467) (0.585) (0.367) (0.589)
Competitors 0.099 0.277** 0.330* 0.0662 0.272** 0.327** 0.091 0.255** 0.317**
(0.289) (0.107) (0.147) (0.300) (0.096) (0.119) (0.304) (0.097) (0.119)
N 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146
Note: Table 6.6 shows probit coefficients; constant term is included in all estimations; Standard errors are bootstrapped using ten replications and clustered by sector.
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6.5.2 Lobbying Strategy
Lobbying Strategy (L) was defined such that I identified firms that adopt the exclus-
ive use of each strategy and the dual use of both: No Lobbying (=1), Lobbying only
collectively (=2), Lobbying only individually (=3) and Lobbying both collectively and in-
dividually (=4). I argue that there exist significant differences between the use of each
exclusive lobbying strategy on its own and the dual lobbying strategy as motivated above.
What lends further support to this argument is that these differences are more evident if
one considers the objective of lobbying activity for specific trade policy outcomes. This is
in turn strengthened by the assumption that I made above in terms of imperfect substitu-
tion between each lobbying strategy and the dual strategy. Also, I find support from the
existing literature that suggests the domestic institutional environment creates differences
for the firm decision to do dual lobbying for a public good vs. only collective lobbying or
only individual lobbying as in Beyers (2004).
The differences between each strategy to lobby collectively via the association and
lobby individually by going directly to the government or between one of these and using
a combination of both, lends direction to examine the differences across these choices. If
the assumption of the random disturbance term associated with each strategy for firm i
satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption24, I can examine the
likelihood of lobbying using the exclusive strategies as independent choices in a Multinomial
Logit (MNL) model25, given the objective of lobbying activity. An empirical complication
here is that the observations within each sector may not be independently distributed,
therefore I report robust standard errors that have been corrected for clustering by sector.
24To check the IIA, I examined the coefficient estimates by dropping each of the choices. However, I
find that the statistical inference is unchanged even when I eliminate one option at a time. Now, if the
errors for each lobbying strategy are highly correlated, dropping a choice should change the results a lot as
outlined in Hausman and McFadden (1984). However, note that the results are interpreted as conditional
on satisfying the assumption of the IIA.
25Multinomial Logit was preferred over the Multinomial Probit (MNP) even though MNP relaxes the
IIA by allowing error terms across different choices to be correlated. This is because MNP requires
alternative-specific variables in order to converge, However in my framework THE variables vary across
the agents that are firms and not across alternatives. Therefore, the identification of the matrix of variance-
covariance parameters here requires the correlation across errors to be independent and standard errors to
be homoskedastic. Therefore, I undertake the MNL as the preferable empirical strategy over the MNP for
purpose of this study.
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If one believes the data from the survey justifies the assumption of IIA, then lobby-
ists are indifferent between any two or more of the choices. The firm facing N lobbying
strategies chooses a particular strategy if the utility of that choice is greater than the util-
ity it derives from the remaining strategies. This utility is dependent on a set of firm and
sector characteristics motivated in the framework above. Accounting for small sample size,
I also cluster the bootstrapped standard errors. The multinomial logit helps examine the
exclusive lobbying choices compared to the base category. Fitting the log-odds of lobbying
strategy in each category pij vs. base pik as a linear function of the covariates with each ex-
planatory variable having j−1 coefficients, one for each category of the dependent variable:
log
pij
piK
= αi + βiR+ ηiC (6.4)
The lobbying strategy is examined in terms of the main covariates of interest from the
model R that include elasticity, concentration and firm size and the additional control
variables C including foreign ownership and competition. The log odds of the lobbying
outcomes are modelled as a linear combination of the predictor variables. The likelihood of
each single strategy compared to the dual strategy are presented in Table 6.7. The depend-
ent variable is the response variable consisting of three categories of lobbying strategies:
Only Collective Lobbying=2, Only Individual Lobbying=3, Both Collective and Individual
Lobbying=4 as unordered choices. I report the relative log odds from the multinomial logit
regression for each lobbying strategy compared to the base outcome for each explanatory
variable. All columns report the logit coefficients controlling for foreign ownership and
competition. I present the results using alternate base categories in Model 1 and Model
2 as a means of comparison. The direct propositions suggest Model 2 to be of primary
interest such that I examine the likelihood of dual lobbying compared to collective lobby-
ing. However, examining the two models together shows the differenced in one strategy
compared to the other.
Now, to provide evidence on the theoretical model, the primary cases of interest include
the following. First, to examine individual lobbying vs. cooperation in lobbying in terms
of competition effects for proposition 1 and 2 of my framework. Second, the dual strategy
(Dual) compared to the base category of each single strategy is of interest for the third
proposition of my framework26.
26I began by examining the likelihood of pursuing each lobbying strategy compared to the base category
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Table 6.7: Lobbying Strategy: Baseline Regressions
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = Collective, Individual, Dual
MNL Model 1. Base-Individual Lobbying
Individual Correlations Baseline 1 Bootstrap
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity Collective -0.449 -0.344 -0.344
(0.398) (0.445) (0.619)
Dual -0.312 -0.036 -0.036
(0.200) (0.229) (0.425)
Concentration Collective -0.022 -0.015 -0.015
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
Dual -0.062** -0.061** -0.061**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Firm Size Collective -0.051 -0.010 -0.010
(0.235) (0.332) (0.384)
Dual 0.186 0.160 0.160
(0.253) (0.291) (0.347)
Controls
Foreign Collective -0.542 -0.554 -0.475 -0.555 -0.563
(0.840) (0.918) (0.845) (0.816) (7.660)
Dual -1.873* -1.914* -1.917* -1.946 -1.945
(0.835) (0.931) (0.945) (1.002) (8.100)
Competition Collective -0.246 -0.151 -0.288 -0.133 -0.129
(0.345) (0.344) (0.321) (0.343) (0.495)
Dual 0.374 0.580 0.323 0.563 0.547
(0.370) (0.382) (0.348) (0.365) (0.522)
N 137 137 137 137 137
of no lobbying. These preliminary regressions on lobbying strategies are attached in Table A.26 in Appendix
A.5.2. I consider the base category as no lobbying. Columns (1)-(3) report the individual correlations.
Compared to the base category of no lobbying, the findings are similar in sign for each strategy in terms of
elasticity of substitution, concentration and firm size, the coefficients are however insignificant in all cases
but one where I find support for proposition 2 such that a higher concentration implies greater likelihood
of individual lobbying. To discern the likelihood of a single strategy compared to the dual strategy, I drop
the 9 firms that are not lobbying.
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MNL Model 2. Base-Collective Lobbying
Individual Correlations Baseline 2 Bootstrap
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity Individual 0.449 0.344 0.344
(0.398) (0.445) (0.619)
Dual 0.137 0.308 0.308
(0.366) (0.442) (0.502)
Concentration Individual 0.022 0.015 0.015
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017)
Dual -0.041** -0.046** -0.046*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019)
Firm Size Individual 0.051 0.010 0.010
(0.235) (0.332) (0.384)
Dual 0.237 0.170 0.170
(0.313) (0.391) (0.500)
Controls
Foreign Individual 0.542 0.554 0.475 0.555 0.563
(0.840) (0.918) (0.845) (0.816) (7.660)
Dual -1.331** -1.359** -1.442** -1.392** -1.382*
(0.316) (0.330) (0.346) (0.430) (0.602)
Competition Individual 0.129 0.246 0.151 0.288 0.133
(0.345) (0.344) (0.321) (0.343) (0.495)
Dual 0.621** 0.731** 0.611** 0.696** 0.677**
(0.215) (0.230) (0.186) (0.225) (0.224)
N 137 137 137 137 137
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 6.7 shows the coefficients (log odds) from the Multinomial Logit (MNL) regressions. Constant
term included in all estimations. Top panel shows the results for model 1 with base category of lobby-
ing individually. Bottom panel reports results for model 2 WITH base category collective lobbying. In
column (4), I test the baseline specification. Robust (clustered by industry) standard errors in parentheses.
Bootstrapped standard errors (30 replications) in column (5) to check robustness.
In the top panel, model 1 presents the relative log odds from the multinomial logit
regression for the lobbying strategy compared to the base outcome of individual lobbying.
The bottom panel presents results for model 2 where the base category is collective lobby-
ing. Column (4) presents the baseline estimation for each model. In terms of Proposition
1, the signs are found reversed in columns (1)-(5) such that I find negative coefficients for
collective lobbying and positive for individual lobbying, both are however found insignific-
ant. In column (2), I find support for Proposition 2 of the model such that I observe a
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negative coefficient for concentration in model 1 and a positive coefficient in model 2, in
both cases the coefficients are however insignificant. The dual strategy compared to each
single strategy shows a negative and significant coefficient for concentration. This implies
strong competition effects where if the firm dispersion is higher (lower concentration), con-
sequently firms will cooperate and lobby more using a collective lobbying strategy or a
dual strategy. The strong competition effects in lobbying add support to the BT findings.
In column (5), to check the robustness of the results, I bootstrap the standard errors.
Table 6.8 introduces additional lobbying covariates on activity, these being lobbying
activity MFN and Special consignments (SC) to test Proposition 3 for Model 1. I find
that the baseline results hold when I control for each trade policy outcome. In addition,
there is support for this proposition such that MFN activity is positively related to the like-
lihood of collective lobbying and dual lobbying in column (1) and (3), with the coefficient
for dual lobbying being significant in (3) when I control for both outcomes. SC is found
to show a negative relationship for the likelihood of collective lobbying in column (2) and
(3), this being significant in (3). Further, the coefficient for dual lobbying is positive in (2)
that suggests the preference of a dual strategy compared to collective lobbying for a SC.
However, controlling for both MFN and SC, gives a negative coefficient (insignificant) for
dual lobbying that indicates the possibility of a stronger preference for individual lobbying
to target SC. These findings for Model 1 imply that firms are most likely to adopt a dual
strategy to lobby for MFN.
Table 6.9 outlines the results for model 2. Now, SC shows a positive relationship for
individual and dual lobbying in comparison to lobbying collectively in column (2) and (3),
that is significant when we control for both MFN and SC in (3). MFN is found to be
negatively related to the likelihood of individual lobbying. Controlling for MFN and SC
together, reverses the sign for dual lobbying in the case of MFN as seen for SC in Table
6.8. This suggests that it is less likely for firms to use a collective strategy to target SC as
firms prefer to lobby individually or adopt a dual strategy.
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Table 6.8: Lobbying Strategy given trade policy outcomes, Model 1
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = Collective, Individual, Dual
MNL Model 1. Base-Individual Lobbying
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3)
Elasticity Collective -0.305 -0.250 -0.135
(0.428) (0.338) (0.313)
Dual 0.017 -0.067 0.058
(0.166) (0.207) (0.186)
Concentration Collective -0.012 -0.016 -0.011
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Dual -0.059** -0.062** -0.059**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm Size Collective -0.057 0.020 -0.023
(0.313) (0.340) (0.354)
Dual 0.056 0.127 0.067
(0.305) (0.316) (0.329)
MFN Collective 0.575 1.058
(0.428) (0.592)
Dual 0.962* 0.960*
(0.401) (0.509)
SC Collective -0.343 -0.716*
(0.267) (0.314)
Dual 0.243 -0.102
(0.219) (0.252)
Controls
Foreign Collective -0.492 -0.492 0.006
(0.836) (0.836) (0.678)
Dual -1.898 -1.898 -1.446
(1.027) (1.027) (0.809)
Competition Collective -0.191 -0.191 0.166
(0.335) (0.335) (0.541)
Dual 0.498 0.498 0.795
(0.361) (0.361) (0.553)
N 137 137 137
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 6.8 shows the coefficients (log odds) from the Multinomial Logit (MNL) regressions given the
objective of lobbying activity for MFN and Special Consignments (SC). Constant term in all estimations.
Robust (clustered by industry) standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.9: Lobbying Strategy given trade policy outcomes, Model 2
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = Collective, Individual, Dual
MNL Model 2. Base-Collective Lobbying
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3)
Elasticity Individual 0.305 0.250 0.135
(0.428) (0.338) (0.313)
Dual 0.321 0.183 0.194
(0.423) (0.311) (0.303)
Concentration Individual 0.012 0.016 0.011
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012)
Dual -0.047** -0.047** -0.047**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Firm Size Individual 0.057 -0.020 0.023
(0.313) (0.340) (0.354)
Dual 0.113 0.107 0.090
(0.374) (0.409) (0.416)
MFN Individual -0.575 -1.058
(0.428) (0.592)
Dual 0.387 -0.099
(0.281) (0.356)
SC Individual 0.343 0.716*
(0.267) (0.314)
Dual 0.585** 0.614*
(0.219) (0.244)
Controls
Foreign Individual 0.492 0.492 -0.006
(0.836) (0.836) (0.678)
Dual -1.406** -1.406** -1.452**
(0.448) (0.448) (0.539)
Competition Individual 0.191 0.191 -0.166
(0.335) (0.335) (0.541)
Dual 0.689** 0.689** 0.629**
(0.229) (0.229) (0.212)
N 137 137 137
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 6.9 shows the coefficients (log odds) from the Multinomial Logit (MNL) regressions given
the lobbying activity for MFN and Special Consignments (SC). Constant term in all estimations. Robust
(clustered by industry) standard errors in parentheses.
168
The evidence in Table 6.8 and 6.9 thereby points to the overall firm preference of a
dual strategy, with the single strategy of collective lobbying being likely for MFN and the
individual strategy for product-specific outcomes. What is surprising is that firms seem to
prefer the dual strategy compared to the exclusive use of the other single strategy (which
is individual lobbying for MFN and collective lobbying for SC). This lends evidence to the
underlying assumption in BT, where firms lobby collectively for a public good which in
my case is the MFN and lobby individually for policy specific to products. Additionally,
it points to the preference of dual strategies which is explained by groups lobbying for a
change in policy, while each single strategy is potentially to only defend the existing policy.
Lobbying for a product-specific outcome therefore seems to fit into the criteria where firms
react quickly and defend an existing policy (say that relating to a customs regulation).
6.5.3 Robustness
A potential problem in regressing lobbying strategy on determinants for firms that are
lobbying, is that the equation for the entire population of the firms is not observed. Those
firms that decide to lobby will be more likely to select a strategy that being a single or the
dual strategy than those that are not lobbying. Hence, there maybe an issue of sample se-
lection bias. Since the results so far reveal that the determinants on firm lobbying strategy
are not random, sample selection bias may plague the primary findings.
The Heckman (1979) selection model is a type of simultaneous equations model that
can help address this potential bias caused by the lobbying decision27. The first equation
is the selection equation that includes all 146 firms in the sample since it is designed to get
at the decision to lobby or not. The sample in the second equation is restricted to include
only firms that do lobby as we observe the lobbying strategy only for them.
The first step is to estimate the selection equation using a a probit model as spe-
cified in equation 6.3 above assuming that the error terms are independent and normally
distributed on the entire sample of 146 firms. The variables of interest here are the sector-
specific variables in R, that include the elasticity of substitution, output concentration of
the sector and firm size. The control variables in B include foreign ownership of the firm
27Greene (2006) discusses this case of a multinomial outcome after selection. I use a conventional non-
linear multinomial choice regression specification while accounting for the potential selection from the
binary decision variable.
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(Foreign) and the number of competitors faced by the firm for its top products (Com-
petitors). Additionally, I include lobbying activity for MFN and Special Consignments
(SC). The exclusion restriction is Lobbying Effectiveness that is the firm perception on
effectiveness of lobbying of the sector28.
The estimates (coefficients shown in Table 6.10) 29 are then used to calculate an inverse
Mills ratio (IMR). It is important to note here that these are firm perceptions on effect-
iveness of their lobbying as a sector and this is different from actual effectiveness of the firm.
Table 6.10: Selection Equation
Variables (1)
Elasticity -0.036
(0.233)
Concentration 0.022
(0.014)
Firm Size -0.160
(0.180)
MFN 0.598**
(0.163)
Special -0.217
(0.121)
Effectiveness 0.586**
(0.222)
N 146
Note: Table 6.10 shows probit coefficients; Robust standard errors; Constant and control variables in-
cluded.
The second step then is to add the IMR to the second equation as an additional
independent variable. The equation for lobbying strategy is modified such that it is now
given by:
28The overall effectiveness in lobbying is not expected to affect the choice of lobbying strategy and only
affects the decision to lobby. Further, the effectiveness is measured as the perception of the firm about the
effectiveness in lobbying as a sector. By definition, lobbying effectiveness is not expected to be correlated
with the regressors in the second stage.
29I report the coefficients on the primary variables, coefficients on foreign ownership and competition
discussed earlier are not shown.
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log
pij
piK
= αi + βiR+ ηiC + γIMR (6.5)
The correction for selection enters the multinomial logit model. The standard errors are
bootstrapped and clustered by sector. I do the Heckman selection as a robustness check for
the primary findings above. Table 6.11 and 6.12 present the results for lobbying strategy
with selection for Model 1 and 2 respectively, given MFN lobbying and SC lobbying30.
The IMR is found negative and significant for the dual strategy in columns (1) to (4) in
both tables, that suggests a selection problem and a downward bias31. Correcting for
selection, I find higher coefficients for concentration, the main variable of interest. The
findings in terms of the lobbying strategy for MFN and SC outcomes are upheld though
we lose on significance. Therefore, the selection problem seems to affect the likelihood
of dual lobbying even if the overall qualitative results are unchanged and robust to selection.
30I have not included the coefficients on the control variables foreign ownership and competitors discussed
earlier in the interest of space.
31To examine the exclusion restriction, I check for the correlation of effectiveness with the regressors in
step 2, the results are in column (5) for each model. I find effectiveness is insignificant in Model 1, however
in Model 2 the effectiveness is found significant. Recognizing the issue of identification in Model 2, I focus
on the findings from Model 1.
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Table 6.11: Lobbying Strategy given Trade Policy outcomes, Model 1 with Selection
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = Collective, Individual, Dual
MNL Model 1. Base-Individual Lobbying
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity Collective -0.271 -0.265 -0.140 0.000 0.118
(0.389) (0.364) (0.308) (0.248) (0.238)
Dual -0.013 -0.033 0.029 0.051 -0.060
(0.243) (0.248) (0.230) (0.251) (0.232)
Concentration Collective -0.024 -0.012 -0.025 -0.008 -0.017
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Dual -0.081** -0.076** -0.081** -0.078** -0.056**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014)
Firm Size Collective -0.099 -0.218 -0.067 -0.267 -0.243
(0.295) (0.296) (0.322) (0.314) (0.323)
Dual 0.200 0.190 0.129 0.150 -0.060
(0.310) (0.333) (0.327) (0.341) (0.302)
MFN Collective 0.759 0.206 0.928
(0.555) (0.597) (0.501)
Dual 0.275 1.574 1.084
(0.499) (0.936) (0.604)
SC Collective -0.392 -0.011 -0.210
(0.219) (0.227) (0.244)
Dual 0.081 -0.850* -0.500
(0.186) (0.362) (0.311)
IMR Collective -1.383 1.654 -1.946 3.602
(2.593) (3.335) (2.682) (4.686)
Dual -9.594** -8.826** -9.030** -9.174*
(2.499) (3.359) (2.606) (3.852)
Effectiveness Collective -1.002
(0.711)
Dual 0.634
(0.461)
N 137 137 137 137 137
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 6.11 shows the results from Heckman selection as a robustness check for the primary findings.
The IMR is based on the first stage probit reported in Table 6.10. Constant term and controls in all
estimations. Robust (clustered by industry) standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 6.12: Lobbying Strategy given Trade Policy outcomes, Model 2 with Selection
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = Collective, Individual, Dual
MNL Model 2. Base-Collective Lobbying
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elasticity Individual 0.271 0.265 0.140 -0.000 -0.118
(0.389) (0.364) (0.308) (0.248) (0.238)
Dual 0.257 0.233 0.169 0.051 -0.178
(0.363) (0.351) (0.278) (0.210) (0.207)
Concentration Individual 0.024 0.012 0.025 0.008 0.017
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.012)
Dual -0.058** -0.064** -0.056** -0.070** -0.039**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.017)
Firm Size Individual 0.099 0.218 0.067 0.267 0.243
(0.295) (0.296) (0.322) (0.314) (0.323)
Dual 0.299 0.407 0.196 0.418 0.182
(0.266) (0.238) (0.280) (0.221) (0.192)
MFN Individual -0.759 -1.574 -1.084
(0.555) (0.684) (0.604)
Dual -0.484 -1.367* -0.156
(0.403) (0.936) (0.360)
SC Individual 0.392 0.850* 0.289
(0.219) (0.304) (0.362)
Dual 0.473* 0.839** 0.289
(0.222) (0.304) (0.304)
IMR Individual 1.383 -1.654 1.946 -3.602
(2.593) (3.335) (2.682) (4.686)
Dual -8.211** -10.480** -7.084* -12.775**
(3.095) (3.841) (3.134) (4.844)
Effectiveness Individual 1.002
(0.711)
Dual 1.637*
(0.633)
N 137 137 137 137 137
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table 6.12 shows the results from Heckman selection as a robustness check for the primary findings
above. The IMR is based on the first stage probit reported in Table 6.10. Constant term and controls in
all estimations. Robust (clustered by industry) standard errors in parentheses.
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6.6 Conclusions and future Research
This paper provides a new element for understanding lobbying behaviour for trade
policy in India. It has important implications for democratic policy-making and offers
evidence to recognize that specific types of groups are utilizing dual lobbying strategies
and potentially achieving more influence. The results outline broad patterns of lobbying
strategies that suggest the most likely combinations of factors that predict use of various
lobbying strategies.
In the context of individual lobbying compared to lobbying via collective action, I
found that Indian manufacturing firms seem reactionary such that they respond quickly
in order to capitalize on a change in the political status of a policy. For this, the specific
policy issue and resource constraints can potentially limit their choices. The use of dual
lobbying strategies have significant implications to identify the process of policy-making
in trade but the underlying mechanisms have remained unexplored in the Indian context.
On the whole, Indian manufacturing firms prefer a dual lobbying strategy i.e. Firms
Join Hands while Walking Alone. The probability of lobbying via associations and
lobbying using a dual strategy is higher in sectors with lower concentration such that
the competition effect is clearly dominating any free-riding effects in lobbying for Indian
trade policy. Third, firms are likely to adopt a collective lobbying strategy when targeting
sector-wide public goods such as MFN tariffs while they are likely to lobby individually
when targeting more product-specific trade policy outcomes; the dual strategy is preferred
over each single strategy that suggests firms often lobby for changes in ongoing policy
than defend existing ones.
One main finding for policy that emerged both from interviews with policy-makers
and the manufacturing firms is the need for a structured consultative framework that
would encompass associations and trade groups. A strengthened structure of domestic
lobbying can in turn feed into responsible multilateral representation. Also, interest
group representation can further democratic participation and better policy while the
potential threat of corruption can be curbed. In this light, the study provides primary
information on lobbying as a means of approaching policy-makers to support transparency
and accountability to the trade policy process.
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Finally, there are directions for further research that emerge from this study. First, I
believe that an improvement of the primary investigation will consist of following up on
the survey with a larger sample and constructing a panel. This will allow an examination
of specific trade policy changes that include preferential tariffs which have implications
for ongoing trade negotiations. Second, reducing the non-response bias and a detailed
questionnaire can enable a better investigation into the findings. Third, I seek to address
potential issues of endogeneity that may affect the choice of lobbying strategy. Finally, the
survey collected lobbying information on preferential tariffs, import licenses and non-tariff
measures in addition to that discussed in the text, this will be used for further research
on differences in lobbying strategies across different outcomes.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis set out to examine the political economy of trade protection in India. It adopted
an intuitive modification of a structural model to examine Indian trade protection. New
and original estimates of effectiveness in lobbying were presented and examined in terms
of their determinants. This was complemented with an analysis of original information on
the actual trade policy process collected by means of a survey.
7.1 Summary of Findings
The primary findings of this thesis appear below in the order with which they were taken
up for analysis in the Chapters.
7.1.1 Protection has been for Sale in India from 1999
The first essay of this thesis aimed at resolving various empirical issues of the PFS model.
The analysis used a novel dataset that combined trade and industry data with informa-
tion on membership to associations. It provided a new measure of political organization
arguably more reflective of the actual trade policy set-up in India. The results presented
evidence for the cross-section across various years to enable comparison with two exist-
ing studies that estimate PFS for India but have differed on several accounts. The pre-
liberalization results are opposed to that of existing findings. The pooled dataset was also
used to examine the findings for all the years together, the results presented structural es-
timates as an average for the decade of 2000s. Overall, the findings suggest that protection
has been for sale after 1999.
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7.1.2 Modified PFS with Lobbying Effectiveness
The literature correctly argued that quantifying effectiveness in lobbying to obtain policy
outcomes is a challenging task. I used the structural framework of PFS model with
an intuitive modification to provide original estimates on lobbying effectiveness using a
panel dataset. Two alternate factors were suggested to explain the differences in lobbying
effectiveness across sectors, this included the predisposition of the government to supply
protection or the ability to lobby based on market structure. The theoretical framework
was pursued using the former logic.
7.1.3 Geographically concentrated firms are more effective in lobbying
where effectiveness declines with increase in product similarity
I used the estimates derived from the modified framework to examine its determinants
in terms of market structure. The evidence suggests that sectors with geographically
concentrated firms are more effective in lobbying and the effectiveness declines with an
increase in similarity of goods produced in the sector. This provides support for an overall
competition effect such that if concentrated firms in a given sector produce similar goods
they are likely to be competitors and will lobby against each other. Being geographically
close together, these firms have less opportunity to free ride and in fact compete for
protection.
7.1.4 Protection is for sale (only) for very effective sectors
Chapter 4 began with the premise that accounting for differences in effectiveness to lobby
across sectors in the PFS model explains the variation of trade protection across sectors.
The modified PFS framework taken to the pooled data suggests that protection is still
for sale with lobbying effectiveness but only for those sectors that are very effective in
lobbying the government. Effectiveness in this Chapter was proxied using a measures on
firm membership to associations that is seen as the more effective mechanism to lobby the
government in India.
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7.1.5 Competition effects clearly dominate any free-riding for Indian
manufacturing
Based on the primary survey conducted in Chapter 6, I found the likelihood of lobbying
collectively was higher in sectors characterized by low concentration in India. This
further re-instated the earlier finding that competition effects are clearly dominating any
free-riding for Indian manufacturing firms. Thereby, if the firm dispersion is higher (lower
concentration), firms will cooperate and lobby more using a collective lobbying strategy or
a dual strategy. This can be further explained by the finding in Chapter 4, where sectors
with geographically spread firms are less effective such that they have to increase their
chances of trade policy influence and therefore employ collective and dual strategies than
just lobbying individually.
7.1.6 Indian manufacturing firms join hands while walking alone to
lobby the government
Chapter 6 provided evidence that firms lobby collectively for a public good and lobby
individually for policy specific to products. The unique finding was that firms preferred
the dual strategy compared to the exclusive use of the other single strategy. The preference
of dual strategies is explained by groups lobbying for changes in current policies, while each
single strategy is potentially to only defend the existing policy. Lobbying for a product-
specific outcome therefore fits with the criteria where firms react quickly and defend an
existing policy.
7.2 Limitations and Future Research
This thesis was constrained by several factors, some caveats are worth noting. During the
study, topic for future research have also emerged. These are discussed below to highlight
both limitations and direction of future research.
Key issues calling for further investigation include examination of the basic analytical
approach developed in Chapter 4 of this thesis to include further improvements. Sug-
gestions consist incorporating information on the proportion of sector-specific capital
owners αi, that would then give direct measures of lobbying effectiveness γi. Variables
on intermediate goods tariffs in an industry and exporter vs importer lobbying can also
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be introduced. The current work can serve as the benchmark for such further analysis to
refine the estimates on lobbing effectiveness that are new for India.
It would be desirable to examine equivalence of the joint maximization approach
used by following work on PFS and that of the truthful criteria in traditional PFS.
While we have attempted to examine both frameworks, it remains a direction of future
research. Also, we believe that truthful revelations applies primarily to individuals and
has limitations in explaining group behaviour as in PFS. It would be worth exploring
other alternate approaches to explain the joint maximization in PFS.
The survey conducted in this study faced several limitations, primarily owing to time
and budget constraints. The survey collected lobbying information on preferential tariffs,
import licenses and non-tariff measures in addition to the ones discussed in the text. This
data will be used for further research on differences in lobbying strategies across different
outcomes. Additionally, I believe that an improvement of the primary investigation will
consist of following up on the survey and constructing a panel. This has the potential to
enable an examination of specific trade policy changes for example of preferential tariffs
which have implications for ongoing trade negotiations..
7.3 Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
The aim of this thesis was to contribute towards the limited literature on political economy
of India. In the process, it has identified a simple intuitive modification to the PFS model
that can potentially capture the actual trade policy set-up.
This thesis has been able to identify manufacturing sectors based on lobbying effect-
iveness that can facilitate informed trade policy reform. It has shed light on factors that
determine such effectiveness. The importance of competition over free-riding suggests the
role of market structure in Indian manufacturing and how that can influence policy changes.
Primary evidence on lobbying strategies presents original information. An understand-
ing of such strategies in the manufacturing sector can be a means of informed decision-
making. The results can inform policy-makers and industry to facilitate support towards
transparency and accountability to the trade policy process.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Mappings
A.1.1 Industry Data
The Indian Industrial Classification is called the National Industrial Classification (NIC).
It has been developed following the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC)
of classifying data according to the kind of economic activity. The Annual Survey of
Industries (ASI) in India collects data using the NIC classification. To build a dataset for
Indian industry from 1990-2009, I have data at various revisions of the NIC: NIC-1987,
NIC-1998, NIC-2004 and NIC-2008. I will discuss each of these in detail and develop a
mapping for all data to be at a common classification for all years.
The NIC-87 groups together economic activities which are similar in terms of process
type, raw material used and finished goods produced. It is a hierarchical system of
categories arranged on a decimal coding system with four levels similar to that of ISIC
Rev. 2. This comprises 10 sections at one-digit level and 72 codes at 2-digit. Further, the
scale of operation/technology has been used as criteria for classifying certain activities in
the manufacturing sector such that the four digit classifications increased to 687 codes.
NIC-1987 later gave way to NIC-1998 that identifies 99 categories at the 2-digit level
of the classification. Similar to ISIC Rev.3, it makes use of the concept of ‘tabulation
categories’ which makes it possible to identify more than 9 broad categories of the
economy. The new NIC has 17 such tabulation categories; ‘A’ through ‘Q’ called Sections,
easily convertible into one digit major divisions of NIC 1987. Each section consists of one
or more Divisions which are 60 in total. In turn, each Division is divided into groups: there
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are a total of 159 Groups in the revised NIC. These Groups are further sub-divided into
292 Classes at 4-digit. The ultimate category at the 5-digit level is termed as Sub-class
which meets the national requirements and accommodates appropriate 4-digit categories
of NIC 1987. The number of such sub-classes is 1021.
The major changes comparing across the two classifications for the manufacturing
sector in particular is listed below: 1. NIC-1998 consists of 23 2-digit divisions compared
to only 18 in NIC-1987. 2. 191 3-digit groups in NIC-1987 were compressed to only 61 in
NIC-1998. 3. At the 4-digit level, 687 classes were re-defined to only 127 4-digit classes in
NIC-1998. 4. The 5-digit level of classification was now introduced as 611 sub-classes. 5.
A new division Recycling (37) was added to include the transformation of unusable waste
and scrap into usable waste and scrap by means of an industrial process.
From NIC-1987 to NIC-1998 in Section D Manufacturing
NIC-1987 NIC-1998
2-digit (DIVISIONS) 18 23
3-digit (GROUPS) 191 61
4-digit (CLASSES) 687 127
5-digit (SUB-CLASSES) - 611
The NIC-1998 is a classification of economic activities undertaken by economic units.
It has followed the principles of ISIC Rev. 3 and identical with its structure up to the
4-digit level. The NIC in 1998 was extended to the 5-digit level to adjust for appropriate
four-digit categories of NIC-1987 and national requirements. For the scope of my study,
I take up only Section D, which is the manufacturing sector comprising 23 divisions. All
the divisions taken together consist of 61 Groups that are further disaggregated to 127
Classes and 611 Sub-Classes.
The ISIC Rev.3 was updated to ISIC Rev 3.1 and to meet the national requirements
on account of changes in the structure of economy, the NIC-1998 was also updated to
NIC-2004. The updated NIC-2004 is also comparable with ISIC Rev 3.1 till four digits.
NIC-2004 has 17 sections, 62 divisions, 161 groups, 310 classes and 1191 subclasses. It
should be noted that there are no changes at the 2-digit and 3-digit. The major changes
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comparing across the two classifications for the manufacturing sector in particular is
listed. Total 4-digit sectors have increased from 127 to 139. 4-digit classes 1713 and
1714 under Group 171 (Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles), classes 1724 and
1725 under Group 172 (Manufacture of other textiles) and classes 2711 to 2719 under
the Group 271(Manufacture of Basic Iron and Steel) have been created. Sub-classes on
activities of ‘repair and maintenance’ have been introduced under their related 4-digit
classes. There are many changes at 5-digit (sub-class) level to meet national requirements
that increased from1021 to 1191 5-digit sub-classes.
From NIC-1998 to NIC-2004 in Section D Manufacturing
NIC-1998 NIC-2004
2-digit (DIVISIONS) 23 23
3-digit (GROUPS) 61 61
4-digit (CLASSES) 127 139
5-digit (SUB-CLASSES) 611 708
Now, in order to build a complete dataset of India’s industrial data for the scope
of my thesis, I select the NIC-1998 4-digit that has a perfect one-to-one correspondence
with ISIC Revision 3 at 4-digit. Data from 2004-2007 is reported at NIC-2004. The task
at hand was then to map all data for the available years to the NIC-1998 classification.
For this, I develop concordance tables based on mappings by Ministry of Statistics and
Programme Implementation (MOSPI) India. I begin by discussing the mappings from
NIC-2004 to NIC-1998.
As we observed, at the 4-digit there are additions and changes to sectors. There are
12 new additions to NIC 4-digit from 1998 to 2004. There are also changes in terms of
classifications. These additions and changes are shown in Table 4 below. For the new
additions, I convert industrial data to NIC-1998 by summing or averaging depending on
the industrial characteristic we are dealing with. For example, for output data we sum
across the new classifications, while for average wage per worker we would take average
across them.
Observing the changes in the classifications, we reach both one-to-many and many-to
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one mapping. Now, I refer to explanatory notes on these classifications by MOSPI to
observe the mappings. This however leaves some ambiguity which could be dealt with by
aggregating from 5-digit of NIC. Another way to deal with this is to use these mappings
to combine these 4-digit sectors.
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A.1.2 WBES and NIC Data
Table A.1: Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
Garments 1729 other textiles n.e.c.
1730 knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
Rubber & rubber products 2511 rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres
2519 other rubber products
Other chemicals 2411 basic chemicals except fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
2412 fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
2429 other chemical product n.e.c.
2430 man-made fibers
Mining 2310 coke oven products
2320 refined petroleum products
Mineral processing 2610 glass and glass products
2691 non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware
2692 refractory ceramic products
2694 cement, lime and plaster
2695 articles of concrete, cement and plaster
2696 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
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Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC (cont.)
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
2699 other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
Marine food processing 1512 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
1532 starches and starch products
Agro processing 1533 prepared animal feeds
1541 bakery products
1543 cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery
1544 macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products
Wood and furniture 2010 Saw milling and planing of wood
2021 veneer sheets; plywood, laminboard, particle, other panels and boards
2022 builders’ carpentry and joinery
2023 Manufacturing of wooden containers
3610 furniture
2029 other products of wood, articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials
Textiles 1711 Preparation, spinning of textile fiber incl. weaving of textiles
1721 made-up textile articles, except apparel
1722 carpet and rugs other than by hand
1723 cordage, rope, twine and netting
Drugs & pharm 2423 pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
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Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC (cont.)
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
1600 tobacco products
Electronics inc. consumer durables 2930 domestic appliances, n.e.c.
3000 office, accounting and computing machinery
3110 electric motors, generators and transformers
3130 insulated wire and cable
3140 accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
3150 electric lamps and lighting equipment
3190 other electrical equipment n.e.c.
3210 electronic valves, tubes and other electronic components
3220 television, radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy
3230 television, radio receivers, sound/video recording
3694 games and toys
Electrical appliances inc. white goods 3311 medical equipment, orthopaedic appliances
3320 optical instruments and photographic equipment
3330 watches and clocks
3692 musical instruments
3693 sports goods
Machine tools inc. machinery & parts 2912 pumps, compressors, taps and valves
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Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC (cont.)
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
2919 other general purpose machinery
2921 agricultural and forestry machinery
2922 machine-tools
3511 Building and repairing of ships
2924 machinery for mining, quarrying and construction
2925 machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing
Auto components 3410 motor vehicles
3520 railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
3530 aircraft and spacecraft
3591 motorcycles
3592 bicycles and invalid carriages
3599 other transport equipment n.e.c.
Leather & leather products 1810 wearing apparel, except fur apparel
1820 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather
1912 luggage, handbags, and the like, saddlery and harness
1920 footwear.
Sugar 1553 malt liquors and malt
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Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC (cont.)
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
1554 soft drinks; production of mineral waters
1542 sugar
Food processing 1511 Production, processing and preserving of meat products.
1513 Processing and preserving of fruit, vegetables and edible nuts
1514 Vegetable and animal oils and fats
1520 dairy product
1531 grain mill products
1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits
1552 wines
Plastics & plastic products 2413 plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber.
2520 plastic products
Paper & paper products 2101 pulp, paper and paper board
2102 corrugated paper and paper board, containers
2109 other articles of paper and paperboard
2212 Publishing of newspapers, journals and periodicals
2219 Other publishing
2221 Printing
2222 Service activities related to printing
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Concordance of WBES to NIC/ISIC (cont.)
WBES Description NIC498/ISIC Sector NIC/ISIC Description
Structural metals and metal products 2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel
2720 basic precious and non-ferrous metals
2811 structural metal products
2812 tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal
2813 steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
2893 cutlery, hand tools and general hardware
2899 other fabricated metal products n.e.c.
3691 jewellery and related articles
Paints and varnishes 2422 paints, varnishes, printing ink and mastics
Cosmetics and toiletries 2424 soap, detergents, cleaning, polishing, perfumes, toilet prep
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A.2 Chapter 3
A.2.1 PFS Theoretical Setup
The model assumes a small economy with n+ 1 goods. Let the goods be produced across
i sectors where i = 0, . . . , n. Let 0 is the numeraire and n be the number of non-numeraire
sectors.
The population size in the economy is normalized to 1. Let the model comprise m
individuals with identical quasi-linear preferences. This assumption eliminates general
equilibrium considerations stemming from income effects. Individuals differ in specific
factor endowments.
Each individual maximizes his/her direct utility function u shown in the equation
below. The preferences are separable by sector that eliminates any cross-price effects on
demand.
u = x0 +
n∑
i=1
ui(xi) (A.1)
Where, x0 is consumption of the numeraire and xi is consumption of good in sector i. ui is
the sub-utility that is an increasing concave function. As the utility function is separable
by sector, the demand in each sector depends only on the price of the good in that sector.
Let the demand function di for sector i be defined as: di(pi) and consumption be defined
as xi = di(pi).
Now, the indirect utility v of an individual with income E and the sector-specific
consumer surplus si(pi), takes the following form:
v = E +
n∑
i=1
si(pi) (A.2)
Where s(p) = u(d(p)) − pd(p) and s′i(pi) = −di. Maximizing u subject to
x0 +
∑n
i=1 pixi ≤ E, can be formulated as the maximization problem below:
L = x0 +
n∑
i=1
ui(xi)− λ(x0 +
n∑
i=1
pixi − E)
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This gives the folowing:
dL
dx0
= 1− λ = 0
dL
dxi
= u
′
i(xi)− λpi = 0
The above equations imply u′i(xi) = p, such that xi = di(pi) = [u
′
i(xi)]
−1
. Therefore, the
demand function di is the inverse of u
′
i(xi). The demand for numeraire can be written as
x0 = E −
∑
i pidi(pi)
In GH, an almost partial equilibrium demand structure implies that the consumer
surplus perfectly captures the welfare impact of price changes. The numeraire is manu-
factured from labour alone with constant returns to scale and an input-output coefficient
of 1. Wages are fixed at 1 in a competitive equilibrium. Production of the non-numeraire
good requires labour and a sector-specific input for each sector1. The technology for these
also exhibits constant returns to scale with inelastic supply of the specific inputs. With
wage at 1, the aggregate reward to the specific factor depends only on domestic price. Let
the returns to specific factor used in sector i be denoted by pii and by Hotelling’s lemma,
yi(pi) = pi
′
i(pi) where yi(pi) is the supply function of good in sector i. World prices are
exogenous at p∗i such that domestic price is pi = p
∗
i + ti , where ti represents a specific
import tariff if the good is imported2. Government redistributes revenue from trade policy
in lump-sums equally to all citizens. Net imports are given as Mi = di − yi.
An individual derives income from wages, government transfers, and from ownership
of sector specific input. Summing indirect utilities over all k individuals across i sectors,
aggregate welfare in the economy equals:
W = 1 +
n∑
i=1
pii +
n∑
i=1
tiMi +
n∑
i=1
si (A.3)
Those who own a specific input will have a direct interest in the tax applicable to trade
1On the supply side, a Ricardo-Viner set-up is assumed, that eliminates general equilibrium supply side
effects because labour’s price now depends on productivity in the numeraire sector and each sector-specific
factor is paid the Ricardian rent. This means that expenditure for a typical consumer equals labour income,
share of tariff revenue and payment to the sector-specific factors owned.
2It can represent an export subsidy if the good is exported and exports are also considered.
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in the good3. The owners of specific factors can choose to organize their interests into
lobby groups for political activity4, where lobby existence is exogenous. It is assumed in
the model that only i ∈ L sectors, the owners of specific factors are able to form lobbies.
αi is the fraction of population that owns the factors. Gross-of-contributions joint welfare
of members of a lobby group in sector i, can be defined as:
Wi = pii + αi(1 +
n∑
j=1
(tjMj) +
n∑
j=1
(sj)) (A.4)
The contribution schedule of a lobby group in sector i can be defined as shown below (as
in Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007)):
Ci = [pii + αi(1 +
n∑
j=1
(tjMj) +
n∑
j=1
(sj))]−Bi (A.5)
This shows the contributions of a lobby group in sector i should be directly related to its
rents pii , the first term in the equation above. Contributions are reduced by a constant
term Bi, as it does not require lobbies to contribute all their rents to the government and
allows the lobby to retain some fruits of their lobbying as outlined in Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2007). The second term assumes that lobbies maximise the utility of the owners
of industry-specific factors who are also consumers. This is included in the contribution
schedule as it includes elements of the owner’s indirect utility function that involve prices
in other j sectors–the per-capita distribution of tariff revenue
∑n
j=1(tjMj), the per capita
consumer surplus
∑n
j=1 sj , and the per capita labour endowment. This term is mul-
tiplied by αi, to represent the share of lobby i of the social gains/losses due to these factors.
The government objective is a weighted sum of the contributions Ci from the set of
organized sectors i ∈ L and the aggregate welfare W as shown below.
G =
∑
i∈L
Ci + aW (A.6)
The political equilibrium is the two-stage non-cooperative game, where first each lobbying
group presents the government with a contribution schedule and in the second stage the
government chooses the policy to maximize its objective function. The equilibrium set
3This goes beyond the general consumer interest in trade policies that affect domestic prices.
4This collective action has to overcome free-rider problems.
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of contribution schedules is a policy vector that maximizes the objective function of the
government. In this game, the contribution schedule is set so that the marginal change in
the gross welfare of the lobby for a small change in policy equals the effect of the policy
change in contribution i.e. each lobby makes locally truthful contributions that reflects
true preferences of the lobby.
GH assume the interaction between the government and lobby groups takes the
form of a menu auction as in Bernheim and Whinston (1986). (C0i )i∈L, p0 is outlined
as a sub game-perfect Nash equilibrium of the trade-policy game where C0i is the
equilibrium contribution that is feasible for all i ∈ L. In this setting, p0 maximizes
the joint welfare of lobbies and the government. The interaction between lobby groups
and the government has the structure of a menu-auction problem following which
the equilibrium is characterized as a joint maximization of welfare net of lobbying cost.
The maximization of government welfare in GH outlines the following first-order condition:
∑
i∈L
5C0i (p) + a5W (p0) = 0 (A.7)
GH use Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to define a truthful contribution function as
shown below. The government is paid for any policy p that is the excess of the gross
welfare of lobby j at this price relative to a base level of welfare for some scalar amount Bj :
CTj (p,Bj) = max[0,Wj(p)−Bj ] (A.8)
Bernheim and Whinston (1986) state that the equilibria supported by truthful strategies
are the only stable and coalition-proof strategy. Further, the truthful Nash equilibria is
focal among the set of Nash equilibria. This assumption implies that the government
maximizes a social-welfare function where the individuals represented by a lobby group
are weighted by (1 + a) and those not represented receiving the smaller weight of a.
GH assume that lobbies set contribution functions that are differentiable around an
equilibrium price say po. Finally, the characterization of equilibrium trade policies is in
terms of this differentiable contribution function shown below:
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∑
i∈L
5Wi(p0) + a5W (p0) = 0 (A.9)
The change in welfare across all organized lobby groups i ∈ L and change in aggregate
welfare from the change in price/tariff in (A.9) can be written as5:
n∑
i∈L
δijXi +
n∑
i∈L
αi(Mi + tiM
′
i − di)]
+aXi + a[Mi + tiM
′
i − di] = 0
(A.10)
Where δij is an indicator variable that equals 1 when i = j and 0 otherwise.
n∑
i∈L
δijXi +
n∑
i∈L
αi(Mi + tiM
′
i − di)]
+aXi + a[Mi + tiM
′
i − di] = 0
(A.11)
This is simplified in GH, by assuming that Ij =
∑
i∈L δij is an indicator variable that
equals 1 if the industry j is organized and 0 if it is not organized. αL =
∑
i∈L αi is the
fraction of total population represented by a lobby group.
IjXi + αL(−Xi + tiM ′i )] + a+ atiM
′
i = 0 (A.12)
Substituting and solving for ti gives:
ti = −
(
Ij − αL
a+ αL
)
Xi
Mi
(A.13)
Multiplying on both sides of the equation:
5Note that the change in total consumer surplus si is minus the level of consumption di , the change in
producer surplus pii is the level of domestic production Xi, and the derivative of revenue tiMi equals the
level of imports plus the level of the tariff times the change in imports in response to a domestic price change:
s
′
i(pi) = di
pi
′
i(pi) = Xi
(tiMi(pi)) = Mi + tiM
′
I
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Mi
pi
ti =
(
Ij − αL
a+ αL
)
Xi
−M ′i piMi
(A.14)
Let the positive values of the elasticity of import demand ei equals −M ′i piMi and pi = p∗i +ti
where international prices p∗i are assumed equal to
6 1. Substitution gives:
ti
1 + ti
=
(
Ij − αL
a+ αL
)
Xi
Mi
1
ei
(A.15)
6As p∗ equals 1, the ad-valorem tariffs and specific tariffs are easily equated.
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A.2.2 Summary Statistics
Table A.2: Summary Statistics by Years
Variable
1990 1992 1996
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Tariff 84.61 36.09 59.42 32.29 43.51 31.39
t/1+t 0.441 0.096 0.357 0.088 0.286 0.090
Import Demand Elasticity 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33
Output (X in Rs Lakhs) 265740.00 490250.60 323287.60 546612.10 643002.20 1021357.00
Imports (M in Rs Lakhs) 25479.34 60135.34 35271.05 87494.62 91821.57 230574.70
X/M (Rs Lakhs) 385.35 1251.97 466.16 1744.09 232.91 792.02
Workers 53751.54 113891.00 56509.16 115956.80 61753.63 116945.70
Inventories 36881.09 75337.71 56166.04 97248.94 94672.22 155715.70
Variable 1999 2000 2001
Tariff 36.16 20.01 36.04 19.00 34.85 19.73
t/1+t 0.257 0.067 0.256 0.068 0.249 0.071
Import Demand Elasticity 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33
Output (X in Rs Lakhs) 862037.30 1301237.00 896164.50 1404715.00 933621.30 1531384.00
Imports (M in Rs Lakhs) 132369.20 326822.10 123997.40 301809.10 137303.30 320044.30
X/M (Rs Lakhs) 115.03 338.26 137.37 469.84 86.41 196.11
Workers 59336.74 107800.60 58185.84 105608.40 56802.05 101885.20
Inventories 162381.40 271251.40 170176.10 314749.40 167874.30 323319.60
Variable 2004 2006 2007
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Tariff 31.51 18.21 18.40 18.59 19.28 21.36
t/1+t 0.230 0.071 0.142 0.091 0.145 0.097
Import Demand Elasticity 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33 15.46 16.33
Output (X in Rs Lakhs) 1618978.00 3382978.00 2300029.00 4873125.00 2657099.00 5715065.00
Imports (M in Rs Lakhs) 302604.70 688638.50 506018.70 1071660.00 397520.40 898767.50
X/M (Rs Lakhs) 63.06 159.95 86.96 380.63 103.24 410.77
Workers 62480.14 102477.20 74172.18 116810.40 77405.94 119382.30
Inventories 242219.80 422042.70 346800.20 613800.70 423931.90 752664.60
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A.2.3 First Stage Estimates
Table A.3: First Stage Estimates: IV
(I) (II) (III)
1990 1992 1996
Model IV IV IV
Inventories 0.00163 0.00276 0.00050
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Observations 94 96 98
Shea R-squared 0.011 0.030 0.012
F-Statistic 1.458 1.818 2.578
(IV) (V) (VI)
1999 2000 2001
Model IV IV IV
Inventories 0.00016* 0.00029*** 0.00019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 98 98 98
Shea R-squared 0.019 0.046 0.100
F-Statistic 3.712 10.29 11.79
(VII) (VIII) (IX)
2004 2006 2007
Model IV IV IV
Inventories 0.00006* 0.00020 0.00019
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 98 98 98
Shea R-squared 0.033 0.137 0.145
F 3.864 1.463 1.643
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Pooled First Stage Estimates: IV1-IV4
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Model IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Lag Inventories 0.00152*** 0.00226* 0.003444*** 0.00639***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Lag Workers -0.00065 -0.00223**
(0.001) (0.001)
Workers Squared -0.00336*** -0.00406***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 876 876 876 876
R-squared 0.045 0.046 0.073 0.082
F 14.88 12.25 12.46 10.87
Note: Table A.4 shows the first stage results for the pooled dataset assuming all industries are organized.
Limited Information Maximum Likelihood is used that is shown to provide better estimates with weak
instruments. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.5: Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization IiWBES : First Stage
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Dependent Variables: X/M X/M*Ii X/M X/M*Ii X/M X/M*Ii X/M X/M*Ii
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lag Inventories 0.0032*** 0.0029*** 0.0032*** 0.0029*** 0.0028*** 0.0025** 0.0028*** 0.0030***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Workers Square -0.0031*** -0.0028 *** -0.0031*** -0.0028*** -0.0033** -0.0029** -0.0028*** -0.0029***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Org. Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 876 876 876 876 876 876 876 876
Shea R-squared 0.0012 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0028 0.0030 0.0608 0.0903
First Stage F-Stat. 10.68 10.78 10.52 10.60 15.14 19.48 6.73 9.92
Anderson-Rubin (p-values) 0.932 0.939 0.118 0.118
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table A.5 shows the first stage estimates for the IV strategy above.
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A.2.4 Robustness
Table A.6: Protection for Sale across the Years: OLS vs 2 IVs
(I) (II) (III)
1990 1992 1996
Model OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
X/M 0.004*** 0.024** 0.002 0.008 0.003* 0.022
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.013)
R2 0.21 -5.25 0.15 -0.96 0.08 -3.32
N 94 94 96 96 98 98
(IV) (V) (VI)
1999 2000 2001
Model OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
X/M 0.010** 0.031* 0.007** 0.017* 0.018** 0.037**
(0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
(VII) (VIII) (IX)
2004 2006 2007
Model OLS IV2 OLS IV2 OLS IV2
X/M 0.016** 0.065** 0.004* 0.018 0.004** 0.013
(0.004) (0.022) (0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.013)
R2 0.15 -1.33 0.06 -0.83 0.08 -0.29
N 98 98 98 98 98 98
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table A.6 shows the results for PFS assuming all industries are organized. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table A.7: Pooled Cross-Sections with Time Dummies: IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
X/M 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
yr1 1.374 2.447 2.977 2.441
(2.548) (2.136) (1.902) (2.049)
yr2 -0.902 0.396 1.038 0.389
(2.231) (1.868) (1.701) (1.875)
yr3 1.431 2.080 2.401* 2.076
(1.620) (1.359) (1.259) (1.370)
yr4 2.668*** 2.988*** 3.147*** 2.986***
(0.870) (0.785) (0.754) (0.785)
yr5 2.371** 2.754*** 2.943*** 2.752***
(0.969) (0.865) (0.828) (0.868)
yr6 3.012*** 3.253*** 3.372*** 3.252***
(0.705) (0.666) (0.652) (0.663)
yr7 3.051*** 3.227*** 3.314*** 3.226***
(0.639) (0.611) (0.603) (0.614)
yr8 1.487* 1.729** 1.848*** 1.727**
(0.769) (0.685) (0.643) (0.678)
yr9 1.335 1.623** 1.765** 1.621**
(0.830) (0.736) (0.690) (0.728)
N 876 876 876 876
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table A.7 shows the results from Limited Information Maximum Likelihood for the pooled dataset
with time dummies. The results are presented for IV strategies 1-4.
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Table A.8: Pooled Cross-Sections with Time Dummies: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Lag Inventories 0.00097** 0.00276** 0.00276*** 0.00595***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Lag Workers -0.00164** -0.00254***
(0.001) (0.001)
Workers Squared -0.00270*** -0.00334***
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 876 876 876 876
R-squared 0.090 0.095 0.104 0.115
First Stage F-Stat. 9.062 8.314 7.931 7.259
Anderson-Rubin statistic . . . .
(Over-identification test)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Table A.8 shows the first stage estimates for the IV strategy in Table A.7.
A.2.5 Political Organization
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Table A.9: Thresholds to define Organization
Thresholds to define Organization
Percentiles Percent Cum. Organized Unorganized
Sectors Sectors
0.75 25 25 79 19
0.82 25 50 63 35
0.84 25 75 47 51
0.89 25 100 21 77
Table A.10: Summary of Political Organization Measures
Organization Years Organized Unorganized
I (WBES) All 79 19
I (Cadot) All 47 51
Table A.11: Summary Statistics by Organized and Unorganized Sectors: IiCadot
Tariffs by Organized and Unorganized Sectors
Year
Organized I=1 Unorganized I=0
Avg. Max Avg. Max
Average Max Average Max
1990 84.49 180.38 84.72 318.13
1992 57.85 172.86 60.86 318.13
1996 42.98 241.29 44.01 247.56
1999 33.85 100.00 38.29 206.11
2000 33.43 110.00 38.44 188.50
2001 31.41 100.00 38.03 190.56
2004 28.22 100.00 34.54 165.11
2006 14.30 100.00 22.17 134.44
2007 14.28 100.00 23.88 165.11
Total 37.87 241.29 42.77 318.13
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Dependent Variable (t/1+t)*e by Organized and Unorganized Sectors
Year
Organized I=1 Unorganized I=0
Avg. Max Avg. Max
1990 4.27 23.74 9.64 55.38
1992 3.46 23.74 8.21 55.38
1996 2.91 26.49 6.66 51.84
1999 2.48 18.73 6.09 49.01
2000 2.47 19.63 6.17 47.56
2001 2.36 18.73 6.05 47.73
2004 2.20 18.73 5.62 45.33
2006 1.41 18.73 4.02 41.74
2007 1.38 18.73 4.22 45.33
Total 2.55 26.49 6.30 55.38
X/M by Organized and Unorganized Sectors
Year
Organized I=1 Unorganized I=0
Avg. Max Avg. Max
1990 95.13 2495.71 651.87 10086.30
1992 34.88 606.32 846.69 13948.44
1996 155.50 5716.44 304.25 4051.37
1999 91.11 2058.35 137.07 1720.80
2000 87.40 2848.68 183.42 3431.56
2001 41.59 584.87 127.72 1071.44
2004 22.09 329.87 100.83 961.17
2006 16.48 208.60 151.92 3608.05
2007 22.76 249.09 177.40 3795.65
Total 62.97 5716.44 296.36 13948.44
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Table A.12: PFS with various Thresholds
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
X/M -0.131* 0.003 0.002 0.011***
(0.053) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
X/M*LM I 0.158**
(0.053)
X/M*LM II 0.025**
(0.082)
X/M*LM III 0.035***
(0.007)
X/M*LM IV 0.024**
(0.007)
N 876 876 876 876
F 21.01 20.31 19.54 13.12
Note: Table A.12 shows the results for PFS with different political organization measures constructed
with the thresholds of 0.75 (LM I), 0.82 (LM II), 0.84 (LM III) and 0.89 (LM IV). Limited Information
Maximum Likelihood is used that is shown to provide better estimates with weak instruments. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.13: Pooled Cross-Section with Political Organization: IiCadot
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Pooled Restricted Restricted Sample Drop Drop Outlier Drop Outlier
Sample Time Dummies Outlier Restr. Sample Restr. Sample
Time Dummies
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4 IV5 IV6
X/M 0.0154*** 0.0120*** 0.0108*** 0.0146*** 0.0115** 0.0110**
(0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0047)
X/M*IiCadot 0.0256* 0.0225 -0.0034 0.0272** 0.0236 0.0086
(0.0132) (0.0158) (0.0118) (0.0137) (0.0164) (0.0157)
yr1 3.0526 1.8715
(2.2734) (2.4659)
yr2 0.9989 0.1520
(1.5766) (1.8819)
yr3 2.6037 1.1639
(1.7652) (2.3552)
yr4 3.2698*** 2.2611*
(1.0885) (1.2738)
N 876 386 386 867 382 382
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: (I) shows the results for the pooled data, (II) restricts the sample till 1999, (III) restricts the sample with time dummies, (IV) drops maximum tariff, (V) data till
1999 and dropping the outlier, finally (VI) results for years till 1999 and dropping the outlier with time dummies.
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A.2.6 Comparison
Table A.14: Comparison of Political Organization Measures
NIC498 Description Political Org. Cadot et al
(WBES) Measure
1511 Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products. 1 1
1512 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 1 0
1513 Processing and preserving of fruit, vegetables and edible nuts 1 0
1514 Manuf. of Vegetable and animal oils and fats 1 0
1520 Manuf. of dairy product [production of raw milk is classified in class 0121] 1 0
1531 Manuf. of grain mill products 1 0
1532 Manuf. of starches and starch products 1 0
1533 Manuf. of prepared animal feeds 1 0
1541 Manuf. of bakery products 1 0
1542 Manuf. of sugar 1 0
1543 Manuf. of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery 1 0
1544 Manuf. of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products 1 0
1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 1 0
1552 Manuf. of wines 1 1
1553 Manuf. of malt liquors and malt 0 0
1554 Manuf. of soft drinks; production of mineral waters 0 1
1600 Manuf. of tobacco products 1 0
1711 Preparation and spinning of textile fiber including weaving of textiles 1 0
1721 Manuf. of made-up textile articles, except apparel 1 0
1722 Manuf. of carpet and rugs other than by hand 1 0
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Comparison of Political Organization Measures
NIC498 Description Political Org. Cadot et al
(WBES) Measure
1723 Manuf. of cordage, rope, twine and netting 1 0
1729 Manuf. of other textiles n.e.c. 1 1
1730 Manuf. of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 1 0
1810 Manuf. of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 1 1
1820 Dressing and dyeing of fur; Manuf. of articles of fur 1 0
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather 1 0
1912 Manuf. of luggage, handbags, and the like, saddlery and harness 1 1
1920 Manuf. of footwear. 0 0
2010 Saw milling and planing of wood 0 0
2021 Manufacture of veneer sheets; plywood, laminboard, particle board 0 0
2022 Manufacture of builders’ carpentry and joinery 0 0
2023 Manufacturing of wooden containers 0 0
2029 Manufacture of other products of wood, manufacture of articles of cork 0 0
2101 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper board 1 1
2102 Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard 1 0
2109 Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard 1 1
2212 Publishing of newspapers, journals and periodicals 1 0
2219 Other publishing 1 1
2221 Printing 1 1
2222 Service activities related to printing 1 0
2310 Manufacture of coke oven products 1 0
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Comparison of Political Organization Measures
NIC498 Description Political Org. Cadot et al
(WBES) Measure
2320 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 1 1
2411 Manufacture of basic chemicals except fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 1 1
2412 Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 1 1
2413 Manufacture of plastics in primary forms and of synthetic rubber. 0 1
2422 Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings,printing ink and mastics 0 1
2423 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products 1 1
2424 Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations 0 0
2429 Manufacture of other chemical product n.e.c. 1 1
2430 Manufacture of man-made fibers 1 1
2511 Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes; retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres 1 0
2519 Manufacture of other rubber products 1 1
2520 Manufacture of plastic products 0 1
2610 Manufacture of glass and glass products 1 0
2691 Manufacture of non-structural non-refractory ceramic ware 1 0
2692 Manufacture of refractory ceramic products 1 0
2694 Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster 1 0
2695 Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster 1 0
2696 Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone 1 0
2699 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 1 0
2710 Manufacture of basic iron and steel 1 0
2720 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 1 1
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Comparison of Political Organization Measures
NIC498 Description Political Org. Cadot et al
(WBES) Measure
2811 Manufacture of structural metal products 1 0
2812 Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 1 0
2813 Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers 1 1
2893 Manufacture of cutlery, hand tools and general hardware 1 1
2899 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 1 1
2912 Manufacture of pumps, compressors, taps and valves 1 1
2919 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery 1 1
2921 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 1 0
2922 Manufacture of machine-tools 1 1
2924 Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction 1 1
2925 Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing 1 1
2930 Manufacture of domestic appliances, n.e.c. 1 1
3000 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 1 1
3110 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 1 1
3130 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 1 0
3140 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 1 0
3150 Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment 1 1
3190 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 1 1
3210 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 1 1
3220 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony 1 1
3230 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording 1 1
217
Comparison of Political Organization Measures
NIC498 Description Political Org. Cadot et al
(WBES) Measure
3311 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances 1 1
3320 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 1 1
3330 Manufacture of watches and clocks 1 1
3410 Manufacture of motor vehicles 1 0
3511 Building and repairing of ships 1 1
3520 Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock 1 1
3530 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 1 1
3591 Manufacture of motorcycles 0 0
3592 Manufacture of bicycles and invalid carriages 0 1
3599 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 0 1
3610 Manufacture of furniture 0 0
3691 Manufacture of jewellery and related articles 0 1
3692 Manufacture of musical instruments 0 0
3693 Manufacture of sports goods 0 0
3694 Manufacture of games and toys 1 1
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A.3 Chapter 4
A.3.1 OLS Estimates
Table A.15: Modified PFS, OLS Estimates
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 1511 1.05828** -0.08579 0.02069 0.46371*
(0.474) (0.298) (0.384) (0.237)
NIC 1512 0.00266 0.00106 -0.00062 -0.00015
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NIC 1513 0.00385*** 0.00160*** 0.00102 0.00051
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
NIC 1514 0.19667*** 0.03309 0.03595 -0.01364
(0.065) (0.032) (0.053) (0.025)
NIC 1520 0.02790*** -0.00256 0.01090** -0.00512
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
NIC 1531 0.01320*** -0.00005 0.00754*** 0.00329**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
NIC 1532 0.03310*** 0.00564 0.00467 -0.00427
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
NIC 1533 0.00285 0.00069 -0.03828*** -0.01359**
(0.015) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006)
NIC 1541 0.00027 0.00011 -0.00520*** -0.00207**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
NIC 1542 0.00097*** 0.00003 0.00038 -0.00004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NIC 1543 0.01089 0.00310 -0.00362 -0.00081
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
NIC 1544 0.03280** -0.00729 -0.00787 0.01358
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
NIC 1551 0.37747*** 0.05306*** 0.33920*** 0.04053***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
219
Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 1552 0.19431*** -0.00185 0.14677*** -0.01785*
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
NIC 1553 0.00152** 0.00006 -0.00033 -0.00062**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
NIC 1554 0.00083 0.00020 -0.00034 -0.00005
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
NIC 1600 0.01233*** 0.00331*** 0.01039*** 0.00276***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
NIC 1711 0.14817*** 0.11820*** 0.03482 0.05078*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.028)
NIC 1721 0.07142*** 0.03715*** 0.01330 0.01478*
(0.020) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009)
NIC 1722 0.02289*** 0.00854** 0.00863 0.00445
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
NIC 1723 0.09861*** 0.07092*** 0.00015 0.02780
(0.031) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020)
NIC 1729 2.03005*** 1.27452 -0.12902 0.45204
(0.682) (0.920) (0.557) (0.732)
NIC 1730 0.08463*** 0.01028 0.03087* 0.00798
(0.022) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010)
NIC 1810 0.00500*** 0.00220*** 0.00090 0.00072
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NIC 1820 0.18298 -0.18006*** -0.03195 -0.06899
(0.114) (0.062) (0.092) (0.050)
NIC 1911 0.13128 0.08272 -0.56200*** -0.33564*
(0.213) (0.215) (0.174) (0.171)
NIC 1912 0.04189 0.02477 -0.03850* -0.00912
(0.027) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
NIC 1920 0.05333* 0.04456* -0.03600 -0.00567
(0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020)
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Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 2010 0.67566*** -0.16343 0.22295* -0.10431
(0.148) (0.194) (0.121) (0.155)
NIC 2021 0.15914*** 0.08437*** 0.01042 0.02227
(0.049) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025)
NIC 2023 0.00797*** 0.00337*** 0.00450*** 0.00215***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NIC 2029 0.03990*** 0.00111 0.01964** -0.00030
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004)
NIC 2101 0.40684*** 0.14794* 0.09490 0.08989
(0.111) (0.076) (0.091) (0.060)
NIC 2102 0.46018 0.82274 -0.50322** -0.14136
(0.295) (0.548) (0.241) (0.437)
NIC 2109 0.04249** -0.04100 -0.01480 -0.00561
(0.019) (0.027) (0.016) (0.021)
NIC 2212 0.23081 0.31573 -0.45386*** -0.29884
(0.208) (0.312) (0.171) (0.249)
NIC 2219 0.00000 0.00000 -0.01022*** 0.00342
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
NIC 2221 0.43515 -0.11441 -1.96917*** 0.78953
(0.850) (0.876) (0.693) (0.698)
NIC 2222 0.00325 0.00210 -0.00805*** -0.00284
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
NIC 2310 0.06334 0.02341 -0.24676*** -0.10290**
(0.105) (0.060) (0.086) (0.048)
NIC 2320 0.02637 0.00706 -0.19440*** -0.07651**
(0.084) (0.041) (0.069) (0.032)
NIC 2411 0.01518 -0.01117 -0.13304** 0.04467
(0.082) (0.041) (0.066) (0.033)
NIC 2412 0.52111 0.67011 -2.28651*** -1.94796*
(0.857) (1.376) (0.701) (1.098)
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Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 2413 0.11781 0.05603 -0.47947*** -0.08212
(0.193) (0.254) (0.157) (0.202)
NIC 2422 0.08364 -0.02510 -0.59736*** 0.15700
(0.253) (0.214) (0.206) (0.170)
NIC 2423 0.03200 0.02245 -0.09043*** -0.03262
(0.040) (0.026) (0.033) (0.021)
NIC 2424 0.05325 0.01236 -0.28677*** 0.04376
(0.108) (0.229) (0.089) (0.182)
NIC 2429 0.04061 0.02815 -0.10704*** -0.04415
(0.046) (0.042) (0.038) (0.034)
NIC 2430 0.25235 0.29255 -0.88684*** -0.66564
(0.348) (0.547) (0.284) (0.436)
NIC 2511 0.38520*** 0.23362** -0.03675 0.10167
(0.140) (0.106) (0.114) (0.085)
NIC 2519 0.00504 0.00417 -0.02882*** -0.01412**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
NIC 2520 0.08262 0.07347 -0.49133*** -0.27876*
(0.176) (0.187) (0.144) (0.150)
NIC 2610 0.07352 0.07577 -0.15885*** -0.08874
(0.071) (0.087) (0.058) (0.070)
NIC 2691 0.76613*** 1.16593*** 0.10869 0.53318*
(0.201) (0.349) (0.164) (0.279)
NIC 2692 0.13550** 0.08127* -0.04917 0.00559
(0.060) (0.043) (0.049) (0.034)
NIC 2694 0.33928*** 0.30136*** 0.06309 0.14364**
(0.086) (0.087) (0.070) (0.069)
NIC 2695 0.00435*** 0.00213*** 0.00344*** 0.00177***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NIC 2696 0.00979*** 0.00648*** -0.00137 0.00127
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
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Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 2699 0.00248* 0.00092 -0.00027 0.00019
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
NIC 2710 0.20279** 0.16015** -0.06589 0.00351
(0.083) (0.072) (0.068) (0.058)
NIC 2720 0.22293** 0.22167 -0.08227 0.10096
(0.096) (0.179) (0.079) (0.142)
NIC 2811 1.60168** 0.90309* -0.71467 -0.02238
(0.772) (0.478) (0.631) (0.382)
NIC 2812 0.09874*** 0.05161*** 0.04158*** 0.02924***
(0.019) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009)
NIC 2813 0.04831*** 0.02744*** 0.00556 0.00942
(0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007)
NIC 2893 0.16343 0.01510 -0.30187** -0.05108
(0.148) (0.214) (0.121) (0.170)
NIC 2899 0.09592 0.06044 -0.38164*** -0.18263*
(0.150) (0.118) (0.122) (0.094)
NIC 2912 0.63510** -0.36153 -0.25737 0.05170
(0.316) (0.337) (0.258) (0.268)
NIC 2919 1.37919** 2.74750 -0.55168 -0.15473
(0.595) (1.877) (0.486) (1.496)
NIC 2921 0.05594 0.02378 -0.05228 -0.01535
(0.053) (0.022) (0.043) (0.018)
NIC 2922 0.01558 0.00492 -0.01296 -0.00555
(0.010) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004)
NIC 2924 1.73304 1.65815* -1.87803** -0.04553
(1.152) (0.863) (0.942) (0.689)
NIC 2925 0.66137 0.40822 -1.04862** -0.73453
(0.526) (0.680) (0.431) (0.542)
NIC 2930 0.63247 0.47786 -1.52690*** -0.92859
(0.666) (0.761) (0.545) (0.607)
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Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 3000 0.09615*** 0.04998*** -0.00046 0.01173
(0.033) (0.019) (0.027) (0.015)
NIC 3110 0.46893 0.31918 -1.41750*** -0.32697
(0.670) (0.377) (0.548) (0.301)
NIC 3130 0.11799 0.07010 -0.44403*** -0.26641*
(0.173) (0.176) (0.142) (0.141)
NIC 3140 0.03861 0.02873 -0.16012*** -0.06276
(0.063) (0.048) (0.052) (0.038)
NIC 3150 0.07615 0.03855 -0.16080** -0.04404
(0.081) (0.051) (0.066) (0.041)
NIC 3190 0.19106** 0.11179** -0.05500 0.01267
(0.082) (0.051) (0.067) (0.041)
NIC 3210 1.14338 -1.38821* -0.91665 0.05598
(0.730) (0.833) (0.594) (0.664)
NIC 3220 0.37643 -0.75085 -2.07985*** 0.70684
(0.887) (0.909) (0.722) (0.724)
NIC 3230 0.02936 -0.00060 -0.09442* -0.00259
(0.063) (0.029) (0.051) (0.023)
NIC 3311 0.19927 0.18050 -0.39447*** -0.15094
(0.185) (0.190) (0.151) (0.151)
NIC 3320 1.54948 -1.47940 -2.87681** 1.19461
(1.437) (2.835) (1.173) (2.256)
NIC 3330 0.74632 0.16680 -1.70262** 0.02708
(0.890) (0.621) (0.725) (0.494)
NIC 3410 0.31650* 0.24015 -0.24655* -0.02933
(0.179) (0.158) (0.146) (0.126)
NIC 3511 0.86302*** -0.43749*** 0.63026*** -0.32178***
(0.077) (0.119) (0.063) (0.095)
NIC 3520 0.78608 0.19610 -1.44416** -0.30318
(0.840) (0.485) (0.685) (0.387)
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Modified PFS, OLS Estimates (cont.)
Variables Model 1 (OLS1) Model 2 (OLS2) Model 3 (OLS3) Model 4 (OLS4)
Baseline
NIC 3530 0.13020 0.03565 -0.23455** -0.07990
(0.120) (0.099) (0.098) (0.079)
NIC 3591 0.66968 0.22966 -2.16524** -0.23781
(1.337) (0.625) (1.086) (0.497)
NIC 3592 0.00838*** -0.00003 0.00258 0.00133
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
NIC 3599 0.11942*** 0.08345*** 0.03891* 0.04787***
(0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018)
NIC 3594 0.00167 0.00039 -0.00046 0.00014
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
NIC 3610 0.02180* 0.01035** -0.00555 0.00046
(0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004)
NIC 3691 0.13773 0.05579 -0.12735 -0.03790
(0.099) (0.050) (0.081) (0.040)
NIC 3692 0.04884 -0.00401 -0.16719 -0.05326
(0.145) (0.059) (0.117) (0.047)
NIC 3693 0.14515 -0.02183 -0.42846** -0.02071
(0.213) (0.152) (0.174) (0.121)
NIC 3694 0.32823 -0.14961 -0.26656 0.00289
(0.210) (0.204) (0.171) (0.162)
Sector FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 876 876 876 876
R-squared 0.729 0.966 0.828 0.979
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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A.3.2 First Stage Estimates
Table A.16: First Stage Estimates Summary
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*1511 0.9089 75.73 0.8111 28.62 0.6513 75.16 0.3482 28.33
X/M*1512 0.0534 0.44 0.5417 7.88 0.0374 0.45 0.1889 7.8
X/M*1513 0.0759 0.71 0.3936 4.33 0.0635 0.75 0.1685 4.29
X/M*1514 0.4679 6.68 0.2411 2.12 0.2761 6.63 0.1657 2.14
X/M*1520 0.7798 26.89 0.0625 0.44 0.4896 26.58 0.0236 0.45
X/M*1531 0.7407 21.85 0.7936 25.63 0.45 21.61 0.2928 25.39
X/M*1532 0.3649 4.37 0.1561 1.23 0.2482 4.36 0.0768 1.26
X/M*1533 0.2864 3.05 0.4211 4.85 0.1958 3.06 0.1714 4.8
X/M*1541 0.4475 6.15 0.5503 8.16 0.2843 6.09 0.2264 8.08
X/M*1542 0.4201 5.55 0.235 2.05 0.2599 5.5 0.0888 2.03
X/M*1543 0.1422 1.26 0.175 1.41 0.105 1.26 0.1158 1.41
X/M*1544 0.8289 37.09 0.4811 6.18 0.5027 36.77 0.1874 6.14
X/M*1551 0.7001 17.72 0.1282 0.98 0.4293 17.55 0.0755 1
X/M*1552 0.8576 45.7 0.298 2.83 0.5507 45.26 0.2029 2.86
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*1553 0.2403 2.4 0.2134 1.81 0.1666 2.41 0.1196 1.81
X/M*1554 0.1299 1.14 0.4593 5.66 0.1033 1.15 0.3384 5.62
X/M*1600 0.5423 9.01 0.0707 8.51 0.3203 8.93 0.0597 6.87
X/M*1711 0.9292 113.84 0.7912 213.57 0.5567 117.65 0.2969 174
X/M*1721 0.1398 1.31 0.3852 4.18 0.1231 1.44 0.1818 4.14
X/M*1722 0.0447 0.36 0.3984 4.41 0.0391 0.42 0.2253 4.38
X/M*1723 0.5741 10.24 0.0702 0.5 0.4047 10.23 0.0383 0.51
X/M*1729 0.7197 19.61 0.0169 0.11 0.5257 19.64 0.0079 0.12
X/M*1730 0.4803 7.58 0.0025 0.02 0.315 7.48 0.0013 0.03
X/M*1810 0.3107 4.91 0.4027 9.58 0.2392 5.1 0.1673 8.46
X/M*1820 0.8896 61.15 0.7668 21.92 0.7046 60.46 0.5144 21.7
X/M*1911 0.8771 54.17 0.1223 0.93 0.5185 53.66 0.1007 0.99
X/M*1912 0.2864 3.06 0.584 9.36 0.2041 3.12 0.2176 9.26
X/M*1920 0.6285 12.94 0.4935 6.5 0.4084 12.76 0.2586 6.43
X/M*2010 0.8217 34.97 0.0175 0.12 0.4448 35.01 0.0058 0.12
X/M*2021 0.6548 14.39 0.0122 0.08 0.3914 14.26 0.0114 0.14
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*2022 0.1293 1.13 0.1337 1.03 0.0825 1.13 0.0799 1.06
X/M*2023 0.3073 3.37 0.0172 0.12 0.1884 3.34 0.0144 0.13
X/M*2029 0.7554 23.44 0.3588 3.73 0.4444 23.26 0.3197 3.74
X/M*2101 0.9292 99.74 0.0012 0.01 0.5575 98.59 0.0009 0.06
X/M*2102 0.9557 163.86 0.5367 7.72 0.6498 162.06 0.2087 7.64
X/M*2109 0.7106 18.64 0.5273 7.44 0.4975 18.65 0.2237 7.35
X/M*2212 0.7714 25.61 0.6059 10.25 0.4659 25.33 0.3099 10.15
X/M*2219 0.7554 23.45 0.1175 0.89 0.4422 23.22 0.1102 0.91
X/M*2221 0.6664 15.16 0.0885 0.65 0.4087 15 0.0508 0.67
X/M*2222 0.4402 5.97 0.1614 1.28 0.2828 5.93 0.1242 1.3
X/M*2310 0.1698 1.57 0.0057 0.04 0.1207 1.63 0.0029 0.09
X/M*2320 0.8109 38.81 0.7857 49.93 0.6556 38.66 0.3935 44.35
X/M*2411 0.9194 86.65 0.0532 0.37 0.5621 85.71 0.0236 0.41
X/M*2412 0.9149 81.57 0.0048 0.03 0.547 80.68 0.0039 0.05
X/M*2413 0.8187 34.26 0.0921 0.68 0.5064 33.87 0.038 0.68
X/M*2422 0.7747 26.1 0.416 4.75 0.451 25.97 0.2936 4.77
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*2423 0.8882 61.14 0.0102 0.07 0.5607 60.17 0.0042 0.08
X/M*2424 0.7256 20.08 0.3616 3.78 0.4555 19.86 0.1868 3.76
X/M*2429 0.9423 123.83 0.024 0.16 0.5643 122.56 0.0112 0.22
X/M*2430 0.7351 21.06 0.0001 0 0.4416 20.83 0.0004 0.04
X/M*2511 0.7313 20.66 0.1887 1.55 0.4456 20.46 0.0793 1.6
X/M*2519 0.7971 29.82 0.2284 1.97 0.5017 29.5 0.0932 1.98
X/M*2520 0.6834 16.77 0.7645 21.65 0.4478 16.47 0.2944 21.44
X/M*2610 0.7889 28.49 0.1995 1.66 0.4825 28.34 0.1103 1.72
X/M*2691 0.6979 17.53 0.0272 0.19 0.4183 17.36 0.0254 0.23
X/M*2692 0.5917 11.91 0.4561 5.59 0.3874 11.64 0.3169 5.57
X/M*2694 0.4065 5.2 0.0663 0.47 0.2421 5.15 0.0406 0.52
X/M*2695 0.278 3.32 0.65 12.38 0.1638 3.38 0.2919 12.27
X/M*2696 0.1356 1.2 0.2759 2.54 0.0901 1.19 0.1354 2.53
X/M*2699 0.9473 136.54 0.7301 18.04 0.5222 135.39 0.2772 17.89
X/M*2710 0.9053 74.75 0.4674 5.85 0.4918 74.89 0.4018 5.79
X/M*2720 0.5126 8.01 0.6777 14.02 0.3035 7.91 0.281 13.87
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*2811 0.4655 6.71 0.006 0.04 0.2931 6.64 0.0056 0.08
X/M*2812 0.7104 18.61 0.3177 3.1 0.4097 18.47 0.185 3.11
X/M*2813 0.9614 189.29 0.5146 7.07 0.5961 187.13 0.45 7.05
X/M*2893 0.8198 34.53 0.2579 2.32 0.4827 34.26 0.1918 2.38
X/M*2899 0.7859 28.23 0.2972 2.82 0.6119 27.79 0.1329 2.8
X/M*2912 0.9221 89.96 0.3583 3.72 0.5826 88.77 0.1636 3.69
X/M*2919 0.3226 3.61 0.166 1.33 0.182 3.59 0.076 1.32
X/M*2921 0.505 7.74 0.1528 1.2 0.3034 7.66 0.1223 1.21
X/M*2922 0.8681 49.92 0.4932 6.49 0.4864 49.55 0.2123 6.48
X/M*2924 0.9034 70.97 0.0047 0.03 0.5397 70.25 0.0037 0.09
X/M*2925 0.8711 51.28 0.0425 0.3 0.5125 50.76 0.0343 0.34
X/M*2930 0.6234 12.56 0.2063 1.73 0.3683 12.47 0.1482 1.78
X/M*3000 0.7473 22.44 0.537 7.73 0.4374 22.41 0.294 7.8
X/M*3110 0.6194 12.53 0.3117 3.02 0.3866 12.31 0.1676 3.02
X/M*3130 0.5128 8.11 0.0939 0.69 0.308 8.38 0.0441 0.73
X/M*3140 0.3892 4.84 0.9348 95.58 0.2578 4.86 0.3858 94.55
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*3150 0.4148 5.38 0.243 2.14 0.28 5.38 0.1211 2.17
X/M*3190 0.9412 121.68 0.7039 15.85 0.693 121.17 0.2903 15.67
X/M*3210 0.9621 192.76 0.7493 19.92 0.6783 190.73 0.3141 19.71
X/M*3220 0.4514 6.24 0.1637 1.31 0.2848 6.18 0.123 1.3
X/M*3230 0.7094 18.59 0.0248 0.17 0.4578 18.46 0.0126 0.23
X/M*3311 0.9226 90.53 0.063 0.45 0.6013 89.58 0.0312 0.45
X/M*3320 0.6595 14.7 0.0001 0 0.44 14.55 0.0001 0.01
X/M*3330 0.9108 77.44 0.583 9.32 0.5225 76.92 0.3188 9.28
X/M*3410 0.9201 92.16 0.2156 1.83 0.6036 91.08 0.1095 1.82
X/M*3511 0.6262 12.71 0.1291 0.99 0.3795 12.61 0.0923 1.03
X/M*3520 0.6413 13.71 0.1684 1.35 0.3728 14.21 0.0647 1.34
X/M*3530 0.4125 5.33 0.0964 0.71 0.234 5.27 0.056 0.71
X/M*3591 0.6036 11.67 0.0014 0.01 0.3899 11.5 0.0009 0.02
X/M*3592 0.8783 54.74 0.366 3.85 0.5155 54.23 0.2306 3.85
X/M*3599 0.5709 10.1 0.2383 2.09 0.4609 10 0.1533 8
X/M*3610 0.1536 1.38 0.4472 5.39 0.1029 1.38 0.1955 5.35
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First Stage Estimates Summary (cont.)
Variable
IV1 IV2 IV3 IV4
Shea F Shea F Shea F Shea F
Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2 Partial R2
X/M*3691 0.1753 1.85 0.2872 2.69 0.105 1.82 0.1318 2.66
X/M*3692 0.3036 3.31 0.237 2.07 0.1634 3.31 0.0724 2.06
X/M*3693 0.5595 9.65 0.0079 0.05 0.4082 9.63 0.0033 0.06
X/M*3694 0.8076 31.89 0.0397 0.28 0.554 31.57 0.0142 0.28
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A.3.3 Comparison
Table A.17: Comparison with previous estimates on India
NIC498 I1 Cadot et al Effectiveness
1511 1 1 0.894334
1512 1 0 0.887439
1513 1 0 0.888718
1514 1 0 0.908373
1520 1 0 0.89082
1531 1 0 0.88984
1532 1 0 0.890966
1533 1 0 0.875721
1541 1 0 0.886638
1542 1 0 0.888239
1543 1 0 0.885498
1544 1 0 0.88611
1551 1 0 0.969811
1552 1 1 0.918997
1553 0 0 0.888138
1554 0 1 0.887772
1600 1 0 0.891139
1711 1 0 0.893962
1721 1 0 0.887595
1722 1 0 0.893969
1723 1 0 0.885972
1729 1 1 0.84647
1730 1 0 0.896201
1810 1 1 0.889411
1820 1 0 0.880521
1911 1 0 0.786959
1912 1 1 0.875753
1920 0 0 0.880574
2010 0 0 0.94829
2021 0 0 0.889417
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Comparison with previous estimates on India (cont.)
NIC498 I1 Cadot et al Effectiveness
2022 0 0 0.890714
2023 0 0 0.897996
2029 0 0 0.907327
2101 1 1 0.800116
2102 1 0 0.885549
2109 1 1 0.806697
2212 1 0 0.8855
2219 1 1 0.458157
2221 1 1 0.886313
2222 1 0 0.822747
2310 1 0 0.81131
2320 1 1 0.850249
2411 1 1 0.495878
2412 1 1 0.799478
2413 0 1 0.756821
2422 0 1 0.869163
2423 1 1 0.839497
2424 0 0 0.867064
2429 1 1 0.735254
2430 1 1 0.876824
2511 1 0 0.882213
2519 1 1 0.797833
2520 0 1 0.859462
2610 1 0 0.90838
2691 1 0 0.876529
2692 1 0 0.900206
2694 1 0 0.889096
2695 1 0 0.887893
2696 1 0 0.887733
2699 1 0 0.877327
2710 1 0 0.873585
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Comparison with previous estimates on India (cont.)
NIC498 I1 Cadot et al Effectiveness
2720 1 1 0.692024
2811 1 0 0.896569
2812 1 0 0.888997
2813 1 1 0.837325
2893 1 1 0.814237
2899 1 1 0.842606
2912 1 1 0.799295
2919 1 1 0.863911
2921 1 0 0.884799
2922 1 1 0.514211
2924 1 1 0.706773
2925 1 1 0.6087
2930 1 1 0.887226
3000 1 1 0.563615
3110 1 1 0.805156
3130 1 0 0.860403
3140 1 0 0.841359
3150 1 1 0.869665
3190 1 1 0.73492
3210 1 1 0.527679
3220 1 1 0.853193
3230 1 1 0.810172
3311 1 1 0.396709
3320 1 1 0.4905
3330 1 1 0.842582
3410 1 0 1
3511 1 1 0.520144
3520 1 1 0.839726
3530 1 1 0
3591 0 0 0.888849
3592 0 1 0.895561
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Comparison with previous estimates on India (cont.)
NIC498 I1 Cadot et al Effectiveness
3599 0 1 0.887869
3610 0 0 0.883526
3691 0 1 0.812996
3692 0 0 0.788624
3693 0 0 0.790138
3694 1 1 0.835894
Note: Table compares the political organization measures based on Cadot et al (2007) with the lobbying
effectiveness measures estimated across the industries at the 4-digit of ISIC.
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A.4 Chapter 5
A.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table A.18: WBES Sample
WBES Sector Firms % Firms Members* Additional**
Garments 275 12.03 205 255
Textiles 222 9.71 196 207
Drugs & Pharma 165 7.22 137 154
Electronics inc. Consumer Durables 100 4.37 80 92
Electrical Appliances inc. white goods 155 6.78 125 142
Machine tools inc. Machinery & parts 195 8.53 152 183
Auto Components 218 9.54 167 208
Leather & leather products 74 3.24 34 62
Sugar 4 0.17 4 4
Food Processing 155 6.78 124 140
Plastics & plastics products 122 5.34 104 115
Rubber & rubber products 38 1.66 34 35
Paper & paper products 24 1.05 20 20
Structural metals and metal products 303 13.25 186 272
Paints and varnishes 20 0.87 16 19
Cosmetics and toiletries 13 0.57 6 11
Other chemicals 112 4.9 94 109
Mining 3 0.13 2 3
Mineral processing 32 1.4 28 28
Marine food processing 14 0.61 11 12
Agro processing 26 1.14 17 24
Wood and furniture 16 0.7 3 13
Total 2,286 100 1745 2108
Note: Table A.18 presents the sampling distribution of the WBES survey. There are 22 sectors in total,
with 2,286 firms distributed across the sectors. % Firms shows the percentage of firms in each sector.
*Members shows the number of firms that are members of associations in every sector. **Additional
shows the number of firms that report having direct interactions (additional political factors) with the
government.
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A.4.2 First Stage Estimates
Table A.19: Protection for Sale with Lobbying Effectiveness: First Stage
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variables: X/M X/M*γai X/M X/M*γ
b
i
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Instrumental Variables
Lag Inventories 0.009** 0.006** 0.009** 0.008**
(0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0031)
Workers Squared -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0008)
Lag Workers*γai -0.006* -0.004*
(0.0039) (0.0030)
Lag Workers*γbi -0.006* -0.005*
(0.0035) (0.0028)
Centered R-Square 0.0386 0.0520 0.0384 0.0438
Shea Partial R-Square 0.0196 0.0223 0.0026 0.0028
N 876 876 876 876
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table A.19 shows the first stage results for the endogenous variable X/M and its interaction term
for Models 1 and 2. Model 1 in column (1) uses the percentage members to associations in every sector
to proxy for lobbying effectiveness in the modified PFS model. Model 2 uses predicted values of lobbying
membership for each sector as another proxy measure of lobby effectiveness. Robust standard errors and
first-stage F-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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Table A.20: PFS with Additional Political Factors: First Stage
Model 3
Dependent Variables: X/M X/M*γai X/M*Ei
(I) (II) (III)
Instrumental Variables
Lag Inventories 0.0002 0.0002 0.00003
(0.0002) (0.0032) (0.0038)
Workers Squared -0.0037*** -0.0031*** -0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0002)
Lag Workers*γai -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0002)
Lag Inventories*Ei 0.0136** 0.0109** 0.0036***
(0.0047) (0.0039) (0.0010)
Shea Partial R-Square 0.0811 0.0302 0.0258
N 876 876 876
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Note: Table A.20 shows the first stage results for the endogenous variable X/M and its interaction terms
in Model 3. Robust standard errors and first-stage F-statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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A.4.3 Robustness
Table A.21: Model 1 and Model 2, Additional Regressions
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X/M -0.058 -0.103*** -0.063*** -0.200 -0.840** -0.222***
(0.049) (0.037) (0.014) (0.139) (0.347) (0.055)
X/M*a 0.090 0.143*** 0.079***
(0.061) (0.047) (0.018)
X/M*y 0.267 1.051** 0.274***
(0.172) (0.432) (0.068)
yr1 7.548*** 9.300***
(1.745) (2.150)
yr2 6.765*** 8.996***
(1.709) (2.711)
yr3 6.743*** 6.504***
(1.719) (1.195)
yr4 4.691*** 5.545***
(0.761) (1.108)
yr5 4.432*** 5.765***
(0.831) (1.441)
yr6 4.498*** 5.269***
(0.650) (0.866)
yr7 4.222*** 4.720***
(0.631) (0.769)
yr8 2.876*** 3.104***
(0.559) (0.571)
yr9 2.959*** 3.249***
(0.603) (0.605)
R2 -1.54 -3.20 -0.69 -2.78 -32.39 -1.99
N 876 876 876 876 876 876
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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A.4.4 Comparison
Table A.22: Comparison of Effectiveness: Chapter 4 and 3
NIC498 Effectiveness Effectiveness
(γai ) (γi)
Chapter 4 Chapter 3
1511 0.854546 0.894334
1512 0.854546 0.887439
1513 0.854546 0.888718
1514 0.854546 0.908373
1520 0.854546 0.89082
1531 0.854546 0.88984
1532 0.791667 0.890966
1533 0.766055 0.875721
1541 0.766055 0.886638
1542 0.766055 0.888239
1543 0.766055 0.885498
1544 0.766055 0.88611
1551 0.766055 0.969811
1552 0.854546 0.918997
1553 0.461539 0.888138
1554 0.461539 0.887772
1600 1 0.891139
1711 1 0.893962
1721 1 0.887595
1722 1 0.893969
1723 1 0.885972
1729 0.745455 0.84647
1730 0.745455 0.896201
1810 0.842105 0.889411
1820 0.842105 0.880521
1911 0.842105 0.786959
1912 0.842105 0.875753
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Comparison of Effectiveness: Chapter 4 and 3
NIC498 Effectiveness Effectiveness
(γai ) (γi)
Chapter 4 Chapter 3
1920 0.465753 0.880574
2010 0.465753 0.94829
2021 0.465753 0.889417
2022 0.465753 0.890714
2023 0.465753 0.897996
2029 0.465753 0.907327
2101 0.903226 0.800116
2102 0.903226 0.885549
2109 0.903226 0.806697
2212 0.903226 0.8855
2219 0.903226 0.458157
2221 0.903226 0.886313
2222 0.903226 0.822747
2310 0.816327 0.81131
2320 0.816327 0.850249
2411 0.840491 0.495878
2412 0.840491 0.799478
2413 0.666667 0.756821
2422 0.68 0.869163
2423 0.821192 0.839497
2424 0.1875 0.867064
2429 0.840491 0.735254
2430 0.840491 0.876824
2511 0.890909 0.882213
2519 0.890909 0.797833
2520 0.666667 0.859462
2610 0.816994 0.90838
2691 0.816994 0.876529
2692 0.816994 0.900206
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Comparison of Effectiveness: Chapter 4 and 3
NIC498 Effectiveness Effectiveness
(γai ) (γi)
Chapter 4 Chapter 3
2694 0.816994 0.889096
2695 0.816994 0.887893
2696 0.816994 0.887733
2699 0.816994 0.877327
2710 0.785714 0.873585
2720 0.785714 0.692024
2811 0.785714 0.896569
2812 0.785714 0.888997
2813 0.785714 0.837325
2893 0.785714 0.814237
2899 0.785714 0.842606
2912 0.833333 0.799295
2919 0.833333 0.863911
2921 0.833333 0.884799
2922 0.833333 0.514211
2924 0.833333 0.706773
2925 0.833333 0.6087
2930 0.866667 0.887226
3000 0.866667 0.563615
3110 0.866667 0.805156
3130 0.866667 0.860403
3140 0.866667 0.841359
3150 0.866667 0.869665
3190 0.866667 0.73492
3210 0.866667 0.527679
3220 0.866667 0.853193
3230 0.866667 0.810172
3311 0.944444 0.396709
3320 0.944444 0.4905
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Comparison of Effectiveness: Chapter 4 and 3
NIC498 Effectiveness Effectiveness
(γai ) (γi)
Chapter 4 Chapter 3
3330 0.944444 0.842582
3410 0.944444 1
3511 0.944444 0.520144
3520 0.944444 0.839726
3530 0.944444 0
3591 0.613861 0.888849
3592 0.613861 0.895561
3599 0.613861 0.887869
3610 0.613861 0.883526
3691 0.613861 0.812996
3692 0.613861 0.788624
3693 0.613861 0.790138
3694 0.866667 0.835894
244
A.5 Chapter 6
A.5.1 Survey
Figure A.1: Questionnaire
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Figure A.2: Count distribution of World Bank Enterprise Survey
This shows the coverage of the World Bank Enterprise Survey of 2005. I drop the sector of Mining and
Marine food processing that gives me 20 sectors. These sectors are the base sampling reference of my
survey.
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Table A.23: Sampling Procedure
Stratum
Population Criteria Sample
Firms % Cost (c) Variability (s) s√
c
Firms %
Member Directories 508 49.20% $20 6.4 1.431 211 60.30%
Phone directories 524 50.80% $32 5.2 0.919 139 39.70%
Total 1032 100% 350 100%
Table A.24: ASI Data 2010
SECTOR
ASI data (2010)
Economic Activity
GARMENTS AND TEXTILES 7.69
PHARMACEUTICAL 5.28
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENTS 4.49
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT N.E.C. 6.09
MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS 5.91
LEATHER AND RELATED PRODUCTS 0.64
FOOD PRODUCTS 6.73
RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 4.07
PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 1.37
BASIC METALS 12.32
CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 8.74
MINERAL PRODUCTS 5.14
AGRO 0.52
FURNITURE 0.18
OTHERS 30.83
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Table A.25: Target vs Actual Distribution across Sectors
Industry
Target Coverage
Actual Response
Coverage Rate
Firms Percent Firms Percent Percent
Garments 18 7.2 8 5.48 44.40%
Textiles 32 12.8 29 19.86 90.60%
Drugs & Pharma. 12 4.8 6 4.11 50.00%
Electronics inc. consumer durables 9 3.6 4 2.74 44.40%
Electrical Appliances 15 6 3 2.05 20.00%
Machine Tools incl. Machinery & Parts 9 3.6 7 4.79 77.80%
Auto Components 18 7.2 6 4.11 33.30%
Leather & leather products 10 4 7 4.79 70.00%
Sugar 12 4.8 4 2.74 33.30%
Food Processing 9 3.6 8 5.48 88.90%
Plastics & Plastic Products 11 4.4 5 3.42 45.50%
Rubber & Rubber Products 10 4 5 3.42 50.00%
Paper & Paper Products 10 4 6 4.11 60.00%
Structural Metals & Metal Products 22 8.8 16 10.96 72.70%
Paints & Varnishes 11 4.4 6 4.11 54.50%
Cosmetics & Toiletries 8 3.2 5 3.42 62.50%
Other Chemicals 9 3.6 6 4.11 66.70%
Mineral Processing 7 2.8 5 3.42 71.40%
Agro Processing 10 4 5 3.42 50.00%
Wood & Furniture 8 3.2 5 3.42 62.50%
Total 250 100 146 100 58.40%
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A.5.2 Additional Regressions
Table A.26: Lobbying Strategy: Preliminary Regressions
Dependent variable: Lobbying Strategy = No Lobbying, Collective, Individual, Dual
Preliminary MNL. Base-No Lobbying
Individual Correlations Primary
Variables Categories (1) (2) (3) (4)
Elasticity Collective 0.003 -0.159
(0.586) (0.626)
Individual 0.503 0.223
(0.337) (0.381)
Dual 0.195 0.217
(0.287) (0.275)
Concentration Collective 0.058 0.060
(0.037) (0.032)
Individual 0.083* 0.076**
(0.034) (0.028)
Dual 0.021 0.015
(0.033) (0.030)
Firm Size Collective -0.492 -0.443
(0.458) (0.457)
Individual -0.350 -0.369
(0.433) (0.439)
Dual -0.342 -0.347
(0.442) (0.411)
N 146 146 146 146
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Note: Table A.26 shows the coefficients (log odds) from the preliminary regressions where the likelihood
of collective, individual and dual lobbying is compared to the base category of no lobbying. Note that all
categories are mutually exclusive. Columns (1) - (4) contains control variables on Foreign Ownership and
Competition. Individual correlations controlling for foreign ownership and competition are observed in
columns (1) - (3). In column (4), I test the primary specification with the controls. Robust (clustered by
industry) standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) - (4).
